(1) WE have heard learned counsel on both sides.

(2) BOTH the appeals are heard and disposed of together since claims arising out of them arise out of the same cause of action.

(3) THESE appeals arise from the orders dated 12/1/1995 of the National Consumer Redressal Commission ("the Commission", for short) made in Original Petitions Nos. 62 and 102 of 1993. Admittedly, the respondent was holding two policies. First policy covered the period from 31/3/1986 to 31/3/1987 and the second policy covered the period from 1/4/1987 to 31/3/19888. During the said period, admittedly, due to the employees strike the leather in process was damaged due to the spoilage. The respondent laid claims for damages caused during the first period for a sum of Rs. 4,99,453.23 and for the second period for Rs. 5,000.00 which amount to a total of Rs. 5,04,453.23 with interest from the date of the claim. The tribunal accepted the claim and directed payment of the said amount with interest at 18% from one month after the date of the claim. The respondents Appeals Nos. 11443-44 of 1995, though arise from the impugned order, are for the claim of consequential loss in the sum of rs 14,00,000.00.

(4) SHRI Suri, the learned counsel for the appellant-Company, contended that insurance coverage is only for riots and strikes and malicious damages and spoilage "under spoilage Item 8" clearly enumerates as under:

"STOCKS or leather of all kinds in process during soaking, liming, fleshing, tanning, wet blue, sammying, splitting, shaving, dye liquering, setting, vacuuming, drying."

(5) THE learned counsel relying upon these clauses, seeks to read clause (b) of "Section 2 - Fire Policy C of Part II - Fire Policies, Endorsements, Clauses and Warranties" as recommended by Tariff Advisory Committee constituted under Section 64(U) of the Insurance Act, 1938. Since these recommendations are made by the Advisory Committee which is a statutory authority they bind the appellant-insurer as they are an integral part of the policies referred to hereinbefore. Resultantly, by operation of clause (b), the insurance does not cover if loss or damage results from total or partial cessation of work or the retarding or interruption or cessation of any process of operation or omissions of any kind. According to the learned counsel, since the damage was caused due to the strike organised by the workmen of the insured, by operation of clause (b), the appellant-insurer is not liable for the loss to the goods while the leather remains unattended in its process during the period of strike. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel. It is true that the Advisory Committee is a statutory body which has gone in and recommended the policies for riot, strike and malicious damages. The clause would exclude the insurance company from the coverage, if the loss or damage resulted from total or partial cessation of work or the retarding or interruption or cessation of any process of operation or omissions of any kind which would include strike by its workers. This may be due to either the operational inconvenience due to non-supply of the electricity or strike by the employees or any cause but the insured must be put on notice of this clause.

(6) IT is a fundamental principle of Insurance law that utmost good faith must be observed by the contracting parties. Good faith forbids either party from concealing (non-disclosure) what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact and his believing the contrary. Just as the insured has a duty to disclose, "similarly, it is the duty of the insurers and their agents to disclose all material facts within their knowledge, since obligation of good faith applies to them equally with the assured".

(7) THE duty of good faith is of a continuing nature. After the completion of the contract, no material alteration can be made in its terms except by mutual consent. The