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2000 Supreme(SC) 1634

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
G.B.Pattanaik : M.B.Shah : S.N.Phukan
State Of A.P.
Versus
A.Sathyanarayana
Case No. : 318 of 1995
Date of Decision : 10/11/00
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Prior approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA for registering a case is a condition precedent, but the statute does not mandate that such approval must be in writing; therefore, oral approval by the competent authority is legally valid and does not vitiate subsequent proceedings.

Headnote:(A) Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 - Section 20-A(1) - Prior approval for registration of case - Whether approval must be in writing - Statute does not make it imperative that the prior approval must be in writing - Prior approval is a condition precedent for registering a case, but it may be either oral or in writing - Oral approval is not illegal and would not vitiate further proceedings. (Paras 5, 7, 8)

Facts of the case:
A case was registered under the specialized act after the investigating officer obtained oral instructions from the competent authority on the same day of the seizure of explosive substances. Written approval was granted by the authority on the same day but reached the investigating officer the following day. The designated court returned the charge-sheet on the ground that there was no prior written approval as required by law, viewing the written approval as a post-facto sanction of the registration of the case.

Findings of Court:
The designated court was in error in refusing to register the case solely on the ground that the prior approval was not in writing.

Issues: Whether the prior approval required under Section 20-A(1) of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, must necessarily be in writing to be legally valid.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the statute does not explicitly require the prior approval to be in writing. While the provision serves as a check against lower-ranking officials, necessitating the consideration of a superior official, such approval can be obtained orally in exigencies. Requiring written approval in every instance might lead to the obliteration of evidence if the registration of the case is delayed. Thus, the essential requirement is the fact of approval, whether oral or written.

Result: Impugned order set aside and directed that the matter should be proceeded with in accordance with law.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • crime and sentencing
    • terrorism offences
      • tada offences
        • sections 4 and 5, tada (Para 1, 8)
  • practice and procedure
    • investigation
      • registration of case
        • prior approval under section 20-a(1), tada

Table of Contents

1. The core matter: Prior approval of DSP under Section 20-A(1), TADA for registration of a case. (Para 1 , 2 )

2. State argued prior approval may be oral; accused argued written approval is mandatory per Section 20-A(1), TADA. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )

3. Court observed Section 20-A(1) does not mandate prior approval in writing; it may be oral. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 )

4. Prior approval under Section 20-A(1), TADA need not necessarily be in writing; oral approval is valid. (Para 7 , 8 )

5. Appeal allowed; Designated Court's order set aside; case directed to proceed under TADA. (Para 8 , 9 )

6. Is prior approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA required to be in writing?

No, the section does not mandate written approval; oral approval by the competent authority is permissible. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 )

7. Does oral prior approval under Section 20-A(1) vitiate further TADA proceedings?

No, oral approval by itself is not illegal and does not vitiate further proceedings under TADA. (Para 5 , 6 , 8 )

G.B.PATTANAIK, J.

(1) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the learned Designated Court, Karimnagar, returning the charge- sheet to be filed before an appropriate court by deleting Sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "TADA"). The learned Designated Judge being of the view that there was no prior approval of the District Superintendent (DSP) in writing as required under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and the order dated 6-1- 1994 issued by the Superintendent of Police tantamounts to post facto sanction of the registration of the case, he passed the impugned order.

(2) THE facts are undisputed that on 6-1-1994 the Sub Inspector of Police, Huzurabad seized certain explosive substances and then contacted the Superintendent of Police, Karimnagar on VHP who is the appropriate authority for getting prior approval for registering a case under Section 20-A (1) of TADA. The said Superintendent of Police instructed the Sub Inspector to register the case and book the accused under Sections 4 and 5 of TADA in compliance of which the Sub Inspector did register the case. The said Superintendent of Police on the self-same day, i.e., on 6-1-1994, accorded approval in writing for registration of the case under Sections 4 and 5 of TADA which however reached the Sub Inspector on the 7th of January 1994. When the chargesheet was filed, the learned Designated Judge on the basis of the aforesaid materials being of the opinion that there was no approval in writing of the competent authority the registration of the case under the TADA is bad in law, directed return of papers for being presented in appropriate forum.

(3) THE State of A.P. is in appeal against the aforesaid order. When this matter came up before a Bench of this Court, as two divergent views of two-Judge Benches of this Court were placed, the matter had been referred to us.

(4) IN Mohd. Yunus v. State of Gujarat [1997 (8) SCC 459] a Division of this Court in which one of us (Justice G.B. Pattanaik) was a Member, considered the question of prior approval as required under Section 20-A(1) and it was indicated therein that Section 20- A(1) must be construed by indicating that the prior approval of the statutory authority referred to in the said sub-section must be in writing so that there is transparency in the action of the statutory authority and there is no occasion for any subterfuge subsequently by introducing oral permission. The Court was persuaded to make that observation in the facts of that case inasmuch as even the subsequent written approval referred to in the judgment indicated that there had been no mention about the so-called oral permission having been granted by the Commissioner of Police. This judgment was delivered on 15/10/1997.

(5) ON 6th of November, 1997, another Bench of this Court disposed of a batch of cases since reported in 7997 (8) SCC 732 [Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI)] and in that case also the question of prior approval of the competent authority was under consideration. In paragraph 19 of the said judgment their Lordships held : "Theft the question is whether prior approval envisaged in Section 20-A(1) of TADA should necessarily be in writing. There is nothing in the sub-section to indicate that prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police should be in writing. What is necessary is the fact of approval which is sine qua non for recording the information about the commission of the offence under TADA. The provision is intended to operate as a check against the police officials of lower ranks commencing investigation into offences under TADA because of the serious consequences which such action be-falls the accused. However, the check can effectively be exercised if a superior police official of the rank of DSP first considers the need and feasibility of it. His approval can be obtained even orally if such an exigency arises in




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