G.B.PATTANAIK, J.

(1) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the learned Designated Court, Karimnagar, returning the charge- sheet to be filed before an appropriate court by deleting Sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "TADA"). The learned Designated Judge being of the view that there was no prior approval of the District Superintendent (DSP) in writing as required under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and the order dated 6-1- 1994 issued by the Superintendent of Police tantamounts to post facto sanction of the registration of the case, he passed the impugned order.

(2) THE facts are undisputed that on 6-1-1994 the Sub Inspector of Police, Huzurabad seized certain explosive substances and then contacted the Superintendent of Police, Karimnagar on VHP who is the appropriate authority for getting prior approval for registering a case under Section 20-A (1) of TADA. The said Superintendent of Police instructed the Sub Inspector to register the case and book the accused under Sections 4 and 5 of TADA in compliance of which the Sub Inspector did register the case. The said Superintendent of Police on the self-same day, i.e., on 6-1-1994, accorded approval in writing for registration of the case under Sections 4 and 5 of TADA which however reached the Sub Inspector on the 7th of January 1994. When the chargesheet was filed, the learned Designated Judge on the basis of the aforesaid materials being of the opinion that there was no approval in writing of the competent authority the registration of the case under the TADA is bad in law, directed return of papers for being presented in appropriate forum.

(3) THE State of A.P. is in appeal against the aforesaid order. When this matter came up before a Bench of this Court, as two divergent views of two-Judge Benches of this Court were placed, the matter had been referred to us.

(4) IN Mohd. Yunus v. State of Gujarat [1997 (8) SCC 459] a Division of this Court in which one of us (Justice G.B. Pattanaik) was a Member, considered the question of prior approval as required under Section 20-A(1) and it was indicated therein that Section 20- A(1) must be construed by indicating that the prior approval of the statutory authority referred to in the said sub-section must be in writing so that there is transparency in the action of the statutory authority and there is no occasion for any subterfuge subsequently by introducing oral permission. The Court was persuaded to make that observation in the facts of that case inasmuch as even the subsequent written approval referred to in the judgment indicated that there had been no mention about the so-called oral permission having been granted by the Commissioner of Police. This judgment was delivered on 15/10/1997.

(5) ON 6th of November, 1997, another Bench of this Court disposed of a batch of cases since reported in 7997 (8) SCC 732 [Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI)] and in that case also the question of prior approval of the competent authority was under consideration. In paragraph 19 of the said judgment their Lordships held : "Theft the question is whether prior approval envisaged in Section 20-A(1) of TADA should necessarily be in writing. There is nothing in the sub-section to indicate that prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police should be in writing. What is necessary is the fact of approval which is sine qua non for recording the information about the commission of the offence under TADA. The provision is intended to operate as a check against the police officials of lower ranks commencing investigation into offences under TADA because of the serious consequences which such action be-falls the accused. However, the check can effectively be exercised if a superior police official of the rank of DSP first considers the need and feasibility of it. His approval can be obtained even orally if such an exigency