1. Dispute over possession of property with two houses — Mother-in-law and son-in-law — Proceeding under Section 145, CrPC. (Para 3 )
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2000 Supreme(SC) 1238
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.T.Thomas : R.P.Sethi
Lophinoris Shangpling
Versus
Hamboy Shullai
Case No. : 609 of 2000
Date of Decision : 8/1/00
Proceedings under Section 145 CrPC cannot be maintained if the party claiming possession admits to having vacated the property prior to the issuance of the preliminary order, as the Executive Magistrate's jurisdiction cannot be expanded to cover disputes concerning possession from such a distant date.
Headnote:(A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 145 - Dispute as to immovable property - Jurisdiction of Executive Magistrate - When a party admits to having vacated the disputed property prior to the issuance of the preliminary order under Section 145(1), the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate cannot be expanded to cover a dispute regarding possession extending to such a distant date. (Paras 5 and 6)
(B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 145(4) - Scope of proviso - Interpretation of the proviso to Section 145(4) cannot be used to encompass or entangle a dispute of such a distant date where possession was voluntarily relinquished. (Para 7)
Facts of the case:
Dispute between parties over land with houses, with a civil suit already pending. One party alleged dispossession and successfully sought the initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although the Executive Magistrate initially dropped the proceedings, a subsequent revision order revived them. The party claiming possession admitted in evidence to having vacated the premises approximately one year before the preliminary order was issued.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the party's admission of having vacated the property of their own will without coercion, prior to the issuance of the preliminary order, precluded the continuation of proceedings under Section 145.
Issues: Whether the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 can be extended to cover a dispute where the party has admittedly vacated the property prior to the issuance of the preliminary order.
Ratio Decidendi: The Executive Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 145 cannot be expanded to cover a dispute regarding possession where the party had already vacated the property before the preliminary order was passed. The proviso to Section 145(4) does not support an interpretation that allows proceedings to extend to such a distant date. (Paras 6 and 7)
Result: Appeal allowed and impugned order set aside; proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code quashed.
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2. Respondent conceded that a party who only passed the order should not be joined ; petitioner sought continuation of proceedings. (Para 1 , 4 )
3. Admission by respondent that he vacated the property on a prior date precludes expansion of Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 145. (Para 5 , 6 )
4. Section 145, CrPC proceedings cannot be revived if the party claiming possession had voluntarily vacated the property much earlier. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 )
5. Appeal allowed — Impugned order set aside — Proceedings under Section 145, CrPC quashed. (Para 8 )
6. Can Section 145, CrPC proceedings be initiated if the claimant had voluntarily vacated the property months earlier?
No. The Executive Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 145, CrPC cannot cover a dispute where the claimant had voluntarily vacated the property on a much earlier date. (Para 5 , 6 )
7. Does the proviso to Section 145(4), CrPC allow revival of proceedings for a dispute of a remote date?
No. The court rejected the interpretation that the proviso could entangle a dispute of a farther date where the party had vacated earlier. (Para 7 )
(1) LEARNED Counsel for respondent no.2 points out that the said respondent should not have been joined as party as he has only rendered the order. On this objection being raised learned Counsel for the petitioner conceded to it. We, therefore, order that respondent no.2 be deleted from the array of the parties.
(2) LEAVE granted.
(3) FIRST appellant is the motherin-law of the first respondent. Proceedings have been initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of a property on which two houses are situated. First respondent claimed absolute right and possession in respect of one of the houses. He complained to the police that he was dispossessed therefrom by the persons led by his mother-in-law, the first appellant. It appears that there is a civil suit pending between the parties in respect of the disputed land. First respondent moved a petition before the High Court under Article 226 for initiating proceedings under Section 145 of the Code.An order was passed on 26.5.1998 pursuant to which an Executive Magistrate initiated proceedings. On the strength of the evidence collected by the Executive Magistrate, he dropped the proceedings on 9.7.1998.
(4) A revision was filed against the said order dated 9.7.1998 which revision was made over to the Additional Deputy Commissioner for disposal. That revision was allowed in favour of the first respondent against which the first appellant approached the High Court in a second revision. As per the impugned order that revision was dismissed. The result of the impugned order is that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code would revive.
(5) ON a perusal of the evidence for the first respondent given before the Executive Magistrate we are of the opinion that no proceedings under Section 145 of the Code can continue in respect of the disputed property. First respondent has admitted in his evidence thus :
"IT is a fact that on 26.8.1997 I no longer stay at Jalaw Pdeng within the disputed land."
(6) HE also admitted that "it is a fact that I want to stay at Mandanniting of my own will without any outside force or coercion". The preliminary order under Section 145 (i) of the Code was passed by the Executive Magistrate on 9.7.1998. If it is a fact that first respondent had vacated from the disputed property way back on 26.8.1997 there is no possibility of expanding the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under the Section to cover a dispute regarding possession upto such a farther extent.
(7) LEARNED Counsel for the first respondent made an attempt to interpret the scope of the proviso to Section 145(4) of the Code as to entangle a dispute of such a farther date. We are not impressed by the said interpretation and therefore we are not disposed to accept the said contention.
(8) IT is open to the parties to approach the civil court to vindicate their grievances and to have their claims properly adjudicated upon. Without prejudice to the said right we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. We quash the proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
