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2000 Supreme(SC) 421

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.T.Thomas : Y.K.Sabharwal
Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran
Versus
State Of Tamil Nadu
Case No. : 225 of 1999
Date of Decision : 2/23/00

(1) THE petitioner is a law graduate. He is preventively detained under Section 3(l)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act). His detention commenced on 26/4/1999 and is for a period of one year. This writ petition is filed under Section 32 of the Constitution challenging the aforesaid detention order.

(2) THE petitioner arrived at Anna International Airport, Chennai on 25/4/1999 from Singapore by Singapore Airlines. He was intercepted by customs authorities and on interrogation the authorities realised that he was carrying with him in one of his baggage items electronic goods worth about Rs. 16 lakhs. After recording his statement he was arrested on the next day. He moved the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai for bail on 28/4/1999 Though his application for bail was dismissed by the said Magistrate and again dismissed when the motion was repeated by him he was, however, released on bail by order dated 28/6/1999.

(3) IT was in the aforesaid background that detention order, now under challenge, has been passed against him. Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel who argued for the petitioner raised mainly 4 grounds for assailing the said detention order, they are: (1) there was delay in disposing of the representation made by him to the central government; (2) the documents referred to in the grounds of detention have not been supplied to him; (3) the application for bail and the connected documents relating to one Mr. Rajappa Neelakantan, who was co-traveller of him, who too was arrested in connection with the same transaction, have not been supplied to the petitioner; and (4) there was no compelling reason to preventively detain the petitioner.

(4) AT the outset, we may point out in fairness to learned counsel that he did not pursue the ground No. 3 mentioned above, probably, as he felt that he could succeed on other grounds.

(5) WHILE dealing with the 1st ground, learned counsel contended that his representation was set to the central Government on 2/9/1999 but the same was rejected only by order dated 15/9/1999. Apparently, there was delay. Hence the question is whether the said delay was explained by the central government. As we required a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the central government, Mr. Tarsem Lal, Deputy secretary to the government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue has sworn to the affidavit in answer to the said allegations. He said that the representation actually reached the secretary, Unit of COFEPOSA, Ministry of Finance only on 9/09/1999. As early as possible the same was forwarded to the sponsoring authority for remarks or comments thereon on the same day and those comments were received in the Department only on 13/09/1999. The deponent said that the representation was considered and final order rejecting the representation was passed on 15/9/1999. The intervening period between reception of the comments/ remarks from the sponsoring authority and the final order rejecting the representation was only one day. We cannot in any manner treat that as sufficient to amount to unreasonable delay.

(6) MR. K K Mani, learned counsel further contended that the delay was more discernible at the stage of receipt of the representation by the COFEPOSA Unit which is noted to be 9/9/1999. Learned counsel for the Union of India pointed out that as a matter of fact the representation reached the secretary, Ministry of Finance on 7/09/1999 and after processing the same at the level of Deputy Secretary and Joint secretary the same was put up on 9/9/1999. The above would sufficiently explain the various steps taken in the matter and hence we are not disposed to treat the intervening days as amounting to unreasonable delay.

(7) DEALING with the 2nd ground, learned counsel laid emphasis to the non-supply of 3 documents: (1) the application for bail submitted by





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