ORDER

1. Leave granted. C.A. No. 1487 of 1993 (arising out of SLP No. 3171 of 1993) :

2. The appeal is directed against the interlocutory order dated May 21, 1992 passed by the High Court. Normally, this Court does not interfere with the interlocutory orders. But the case in hand impels us to do so.

3. The respondent was employed at the relevant time as Cashier of the Agricultural Market Committee (the Market Committee) at Rampur. The allegation against the respondent is that during his tenure as such Cashier, lakhs of rupees credited in the accounts of the Market Committee were not deposited in its bank account. On learning of the said misfeasance, the appellant-Market Committee suspended him from service with effect from March 22, 1991. He challenged his suspension in the High Court on the ground that some other suspended officers had been allowed to join service. The High Court quashed the suspension order on the said ground.

4. The investigation into the defalcation was, however, in progress. In April, 1991, special auditors were appointed to audit the accounts of the Market Committee. They submitted their report in May 1991 in which it was stated that severallakhs of rupees had been embezzled from the funds of the Market Committee. On May 4, 1991 an order was passed appointing an inquiry officer to inquire into the conduct of various officers of the Market Committee. Upon preliminary inquiry, it was found that the defalcation was done either with the active involvement of the respondent or with his connivance and in any case he was guilty of dereliction of duty for not scrutinising the accounts of the Market Committee, properly. With this prima facie case against the respondent made out in the auditors report, a fresh order of suspension along with a charge-sheet was served upon the respondent on March 26, 1992. The respondent again approached the High Court and the High Court by the impugned order, stayed the order of suspension on the ground that it was not competent for the appellants to pass the order of suspension second time in the same manner. The High Court, however, directed the appellant to complete the inquiry expeditiously.

5. The ground given by the High Court to stay the operation of the suspension order, is patently wrong. There is no restriction on the authority to pass a suspension order second time. The first order might be withdrawn by the authority on the ground that at that stage, the evidence appearing against the delinquent employee is not sufficient or for some reason, which is not connected with the merits of the case. As happened in the present case, the earlier order of suspension dated March 22, 1991 was quashed by the High Court on the ground that some other suspended officer had been allowed to join duties. That order had nothing to do with the merits of the case. Ordinarily, when there is an accusation of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees have to be kept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep the individual concerned out of the employment is a different matter. But even in such a case, no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question and hence it is always advisable to allow disciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered. It is possible that in some cases, the authorities do not proceed with the matter as expeditiously as they ought to, which results in prolongation of the sufferings of the delinquent employee. But the remedy in such cases is either to call for an explanation from the authorities in the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, to direct them to complete the inquiry within a stipulated period and to increase the suspension allowance adequately. It is true that in the present case, the charge-sheet was tiled after almost a year of the order of suspension. However, the facts pleaded by the appellants show that t