ORDER

1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 5-3-1980 made in Civil Writ Petition No. 1592 of 1967.

2. The admitted facts are that the appellants/tenants were in possession of the land bearing specified khasra numbers mentioned in the appellate order (the details of which are not in dispute), admeasuring 190 kanals, 6 marlas in Village Kotrani in Kapurthala District of Punjab. Their application C made under Section 22 of the Pepsu Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (13 of 1955) (for short, the Act) was rejected by order dated 25-4-1960 on the ground that they did not have possession for 12 years which was confirmed by all the authorities including the High Court in the writ petition on 7-9- 1964. Subsequently, they made second application on 26-3-1965 for conferment of ownership rights based on tenancy from the respondents. Similarly, the landlord filed an application for reservation of the land for personal cultivation. The authorities have dismissed the application of the landlord for reservation of the land which order became final. The application of the appellants was allowed on 15-12- 1965. On apeal, it was confirmed on 22-6-1966. In revision, the Financial Commissioner by order dated 15-6-1967 confirmed the same. In the writ petition, by the impugened judgment the Division Bench set aside the orders of the authorities on the sole ground that the orders passed on the earlier occasion cluminated as res judicata and, therefore the second application under Section 22 is not maintainable.

3. Shri Ujagar Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, contended that the view taken by the High Court is not correct in law. Since the proceedings before the authorities is of summary nature, the doctrine of res judicata has no application. The act does not prescribe any principle of - res judicata as such. The proceedings before the authorities are of summary nature. It would not be correct to apply the principle of res judicata. We find force in the contention. It is not in dispute that the order passed by the authorities is without any elaborate trial like in a suit but in a summary manner. It is well-settled law that the doctrine of res judicata envisaged in Section 11 of CPC has no application to summary proceedings unless the statute expressly applies to such orders. The authorities are not the civil court nor the petition a plaint. No issues are framed nor tried as a civil suit. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error to conclude that the earlier proceeding opreted as res judicata.

4. It is then contended by Shri Sehgal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, that unless the appellants satisfy the requirements of Section 7-A (2) read with Section 22, they are not entitled to claim proprietary rights to the land or the interest held from the landlord. Therefore, the application is not maintainable. Though this contention was not raised before any of the fora, since it trenches upon jurisdiction, we permitted the learned counsel to argue the case on this aspect of the matter. In this behalf, he sought to place reliance on the Division Bench judgment of the High Court in Jaisi Ram Financial Commi :, Revenue [AIR 1972 P&H 72 : 73 Punjab LR 48l]. The question is whether the appellants are entitled to avail of the benefit of Section 22, as ordered by the authorities under the Act. Section 2(k) defines tenant to mean a tenant defined in the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (16 of 1887). The exclusionary clause is not relevant for the purpose of this case; hence omitted. The "Presidents Act" has been defined under Section 2(1) to mean Patiala Punjab State Union Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953, Presidents Act 8 of 1953. Section 7-A deals with the right to additional grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases which are in addition to grounds specified in Section 7. It is brought by way of Amendment Act 15 of 195