ORDER

1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, made on 16-11-1986 in RSA No. 848 of 1977.

2. The admitted and proved facts are that one Dalip Kaur, daughter of Inder Singh was the owner of the property in question. She sold the property on 14-4-1967 to Smt. Jeth Kanwar. Zail Singh had filed a suit for pre-emption of the sale and obtained a decree of pre-emption on 9-10-1969. Thereafter, he sought to interfere with the possession of the appellant who was admittedly in possession of the said property. Therefore, the appellant filed the suit in question for perpetual injunction restraining Zail Singh and any other person from interfering with his possession. He claimed to be a tenant prior to 1957 from Dalip Kaur and was, therefore, entitled to remain in possession uninterruptedly as such. The trial court found that he was in possession as a tenant prior to 1957 and accordingly granted the decree of perpetual injunction against the respondents. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decree holding that the appellant had come into possession of the suit property some time in 1968 after the sale was made in favour of Jeet Kanwar. Since Dalip Kaur had pre-empted the property sold by her mother, the tenancy right created by Jeet Singh in favour of the appellant did not bind Jeet Singh-defendant. Having obtained the pre-emption, he had right to take physical possession of the property dispossessing the appellant. As a consequence, the injunction was not correct in law. That was affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal following the ratio of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in Hukam Singh v. Hakumat Rai (1967 Punj LR 743 (P&H)).

3. Mr. Prem Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that even accepting the finding of the appellate court, without conceding that he was not a tenant prior to 1957, the findings recorded by the appellate court are unsustainable in law and the application of the judgment of the Full Bench to the facts in this case is not warranted. Therefore, the decree of the trial court is correct in law. In support thereof, he relied upon Propositions (i), (ii) and (iv) laid in the judgment of the Full Bench which read as under :

(i) The title of a pre-emptor in respect of the pre-empted property accrues from the date on which payment of the purchase money and costs (if any) is made by him in accordance with the provisions of Order XX, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure;

(ii) On such title accruing to him the pre-emptor is entitled to delivery of possession of the property in question from the vendee including any person who has happened to possess the property through the vendee after the original sale;

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(iv) a tenant inducted into pre-emptible property by a vendee after its sale in his favour does not become the tenant of the pre-emptor after title to the property passes to the latter by devolution of interest, as the vendee is not the predecessor-in-interest of the pre-emptor;"

4. Though notice has been served on the respondents, they are not appearing either in person or through counsel. Having considered the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that there is force in the same. It is seen that Proposition (i) lays that the title of the pre-emptor in respect of the pre-empted property accrues from the date on which payment of the purchase money and the costs, if any, is made by him in accordance with the provisions of Order XX, Rule 14 CPC. In other words, he acquires the title only from the date of the deposit of the pre-emption money and the costs, if any, into the Court. Proposition (ii) envisages that the pre-emptor is entitled to delivery of possession of the property in question from the vendee including any person who happened to possess the property through the vendee after the original sale. Proposition (iv) provides that a tenan