( 1 ) IT appears notice on the SLP was not issued but the first respondent entered appearance as a caveator and thus waived notice. The second respondent was impleaded by the order of this Court. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, leave to appeal is granted.

( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Delhi in SAO 87/ 87 dated March 13, 1990. The appellant-UCO Bank is the tenant of the premises in question and the first respondent is the landlord.

( 3 ) THE land, upon which the premises in question was subsequently constructed, is the property of Land and Development office, New Delhi, from whom one kanwal Sain took it on lease on August 23,1956. He sold his interest in favour of mool Chand and Vaisno Das on November 24, 1962. The appellant-Bank is said to have obtained from them the premises in question on lease on a monthly rent of rs. 1800/- on April 10,1966. On November 10, 1971, they sold the premises in question to Amrik Singh, the first respondent herein.

( 4 ) ON the allegation of misuse of the premises in violation of the terms of the main lease, the Land and Development office issued a notice for cancellation of lease and passed order of re-entry against the first respondent on July 4, 1973. The first respondent instituted an eviction petition under Section 14 (i) (k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short the Delhi Rent Act) for eviction of the appellant. On March 5, 1986 the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi passed a conditional order of eviction against the appellant that in the event of non-stopping of the misuse of the premises within one month the order of eviction would follow. That order was unsuccessfully assailed by the appellant before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, as the appeal was dismissed on 12. 12. 1986. A second appeal was then taken by the appellant to the High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned order; that is how the appellant-Bank is in appeal before us.

( 5 ) MR. S. B. Sanyal, learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that as proceedings under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 (in short "the p. P. Act) were initiated before institution of the eviction petition against the appellant, the rights of the first respondent under the main lease were extinguished so he cannot prosecute the eviction petition under the Delhi Rent Act.

( 6 ) MR. Sanyal further urged that in view of the provisions of Section 15 (a) of the P. P. Act there is a bar to entertain any suit or petition and therefore the eviction petition filed by the first respondent could not have been entertained by the Additional Rent controller, so this appeal has to be allowed and the eviction petition dismissed.

( 7 ) WE are afraid, we cannot accede to any of the contentions of Mr. Sanyal. So far as the first submission is concerned, this point was not taken in the written statement, but a perusal of the orders of the Rent Tribunal as well as of the High court discloses that in one form or the other this point was urged although it was not specifically dealt with by them.

( 8 ) THE position is that the first respondent is still in possession of the building of which the premises in question is a part. Further the appellant has been paying the monthly rent to him and the jural relationship of the tenant and the landlord between the appellant and the first respondent subsists, therefore, the provisions of delhi Rent Act are applicable and he can prosecute eviction proceedings thereunder irrespective of any lis between him and the Land and Development Office. As all the courts below, viz. , Additional rent Controller, Appellate Tribunal and the High Court, found that the appellant was liable to be evicted under Section 14 (1 ) (k) of the Delhi Rent Act, we find no reason to take a different view of the matter.

( 9 ) THE second submission regarding the plea of bar of jurisdiction contained in section 15 (a) of th