Important point
Simply directing parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was is not an order that should be passed at initial stage of a litigation.

Headnote:(i) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order 39 Rules 1 and 2—Ex-parte interim mandatory injunction—Order is to be passed only in circumstances which are clear and prima facie material clearly justified a finding that status quo had been altered and interest of justice demanded that status quo ante be restored—Suit for declaration by respondent that he was a tenant in suit property and injunction—Interim stay application—Trial Court declined ex-parte interim stay—District Judge in appeal granted ex parte interim order of status quo on 19.6.1998—Application by plaintiff for interim mandatory injunction on plea that despite status quo order, he was dispossessed on 20.6.1998—District Court allowed same upholding claim of plaintiff that he was dispossessed after interim order of status quo was passed—Revision against order under Article 227 of Constitution was rejected by High Court—Appeal—Grant of mandatory injunction would depend upon plaintiff establishing that on 19.6.98 when Court directed parties to maintain status quo he was in possession as tenant of plaint schedule property—Document regarding tenancy produced by plaintiff did not satisfy requirements of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act—No evidence was before District Judge to show prima facie that plaintiff had been forcibly dispossessed on 20.6.1998—Prima facie plaintiff had not been able to establish foundation for possession claimed by him—Impugned order was liable to be set aside.
       Held : Simply directing the parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was, is not an order that should be passed at the initial stage of a litigation, especially when one court had found no reason to grant an ex parte order of injunction and the appellate court was dealing with only the limited question whether an ad interim order of injunction should or should not have been granted by the trial court, since the appeal was only against the refusal of an ad interim ex parte order of injunction and the main application for injunction pending suit, was still pending before the trial court itself. Therefore, we are prima facie of the view that the Additional District Judge ought not to have passed an equivocal order like the one passed in the circumstances of the case. But of course, that aspect has relevance only to the extent that before ordering an interim mandatory injunction or refusing it, the court has first to consider whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession on the date of suit and on the date of the order and he had been dispossessed the next day. Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not have been passed and any such order passed would be one without jurisdiction. An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie materials clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim mandatory injunction. Keeping this principle in mind, it is necessary to see whether in the case on hand, the Additional District Judge was justified in passing the interim order of injunction. (Paras 4 and 5)
       Thus, prima facie, we find that the tenancy claimed by the plaintiff remains to be proved in the suit. For the present, we should say that prima facie, the plaintiff has not been able to establish the foundation for the possession claimed by him. It is significant to note that not even another tenant of the building among the various tenants in the building, was examined to establish that the plaintiff while in possession, had been dispossessed on 20.6.1998 as claimed by him. Any way, the Additional District Judge has not referred to any such evidence except referring to the affidavit of Shivanand Mishra, who even according to the plaintiff was no more in occupation. Thus, the disturbance of the status quo by the defendants has not been established. Thus, prima facie it is clear that the plaintiff has not laid the foundation for the grant of an interim order of mandatory injunction in his favour. The order so passed by the Additional District Judge, and confirmed by the High Court, therefore, calls for interference in this appeal. (Para 13)
       (ii) Constitution of India—Article 227—Failure to render necessary findings to support the order would be a jurisdictional error liable to correction in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of High Court.
       Held : The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the necessary findings to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction. Here the jurisdiction to grant an interim mandatory injunction could be exercised on entering a finding that on the day the order for maintaining the status quo was passed, the plaintiff was in possession and a day after the interim order was passed, he was in fact dispossessed. The interim direction to maintain status quo was an ex parte order. From the order of the Additional District Court it is not possible to come to the conclusion that on a proper advertence to the relevant materials, prima facie clear findings had been rendered by that court on these aspects. The prima facie infirmities attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim of possession. (Para 12)

Judgement Key Points

Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

The court emphasized that simply directing parties to maintain status quo without specifying what the status quo entails is not appropriate at the initial stage of litigation. Clear and specific findings regarding possession and dispossession are necessary before granting interim mandatory injunctions (!) (!) .
An interim mandatory injunction is a drastic remedy and should only be granted when there is clear, prima facie evidence that the status quo has been altered and that justice requires restoring the previous situation. The court must be satisfied that the plaintiff was in possession at the relevant times and that dispossession occurred after the interim order was passed (!) (!) .
The order granting such injunction must be supported by specific, adequate findings on the plaintiff’s possession status and subsequent dispossession. Failure to provide these findings constitutes a jurisdictional error and can be corrected by higher courts (!) (!) (!) .
The court scrutinized the evidence regarding the existence of a tenancy and possession, noting issues with the authenticity and sufficiency of the documents relied upon by the plaintiff. The genuineness of the alleged lease transaction was a critical factor that needed to be established in the suit (!) (!) .
The appellate court found that the lower courts lacked proper consideration of the evidence and did not follow lawful procedures for granting interim relief. The approach to the case was improper, and the orders passed were not supported by necessary findings, leading to their being set aside (!) (!) .
The jurisdiction under constitutional provisions for supervisory review is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors. When a court approaches the case improperly or asks the wrong questions, its findings are not rendered with jurisdiction and can be corrected by higher courts (!) (!) .
The court clarified that, pending the final decision, possession should be restored to the defendants, but they should not create third-party interests in the property until the case is resolved. The trial court was directed to dispose of the case expeditiously, considering the importance of a fair and lawful process (!) (!) .
Overall, the orders of the higher courts were set aside, and directions were issued to ensure proper adjudication based on lawful findings and evidence, with a focus on the correct application of principles governing interim relief and possession disputes (!) (!) .

These points reflect the core legal principles and procedural requirements highlighted in the document, emphasizing the importance of clear findings, proper evidence evaluation, and lawful exercise of jurisdiction in cases involving possession and property disputes.

Judgment

P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.—Leave granted.

1. The respondent herein, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, filed a suit TS No. 119 of 1998 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Howrah for a declaration of his status as a tenant of the suit property and for a perpetual injunction restraining the appellants herein, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, the owners of the building, from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and for other incidental reliefs. Along with the suit, the plaintiff moved an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’), for an interim injunction pending the suit, restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the plaint schedule property. When the application for interim injunction was moved on 12.6.1998, the trial court found that there was no urgency which justified the grant of an ad-interim ex parte order of injunction and taking the view that the delay will not defeat justice, refused to pass an ad-interim order of injunction and issued notice to the defendants to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, as to why the temporary injunction, as prayed for by the plaintiff, shall not be granted. Feeling himself aggrieved by the non-grant of an ad interim ex parte injunction, the plaintiff filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of The Code of Civil Procedure before the District Court. The Additional District Judge on 19.6.1998, while entertaining the civil miscellaneous appeal admitted the same and issued notice to the defendants fixing 4.9.1998 for their appearance. After allowing an application for amendment of the application for injunction by way of incorporating a schedule thereto, the Additional District Judge along with the issuance of notice to the defendants to show cause why the prayer for temporary injunction shall not be granted, stating that in the light of the materials available it was just and proper to direct the parties to maintain the status quo as on date and delay in the grant of an ad-interim order may cause complications, passed an ex parte ad interim order directing both the parties to maintain status quo as on that day till 17.7.1998. Thereafter alleging that he was in possession on 19.6.1998 when the order to maintain status quo was passed by the Additional District Judge and that he was dispossessed on 20.6.1998 in violation of that order, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 151 of the Code for an interim mandatory injunction directing the defendants to put him in possession of the suit premises. The District Court originally passed an order of interim mandatory injunction directing the defendants to restore possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. This was challenged by the defendants before the High Court in a proceeding under Section 115 of the Code. The High Court set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the application for interim mandatory injunction for reconsideration by the District court. Thereafter, the District court reconsidered the application for interim mandatory injunction and allowed the same by upholding the claim of the plaintiff that he was dispossessed after the interim order of status quo was passed by that Court. A challenge by the defendants to that order before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution was rejected by the High Court. This appeal by special leave is filed by the defendants challenging those orders.

2. We may note two incidental facts at this stage. The first is the filing of a suit TS No. 153 of 1998 by the present defendants for a declaration that the document relied on as a rent deed by the present plaintiff, be adjudged void and cancelled and for consequential reliefs flowing from the grant of the main relief. The second is that even though the petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dated 25.11.2004 was filed in this Cou

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2006 Supreme(SC) 123

Important pointSimply directing parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was is not an order that should be passed at initial stage of a litigation.

Important point
Simply directing parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was is not an order that should be passed at initial stage of a litigation.