1. Dispute over ownership of lands claimed by trustees of two separate temples dedicated to the same deity. (Para 2 , 3 , 5 )
1991 Supreme(SC) 17
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
L.M.Sharma : M.M.Punchhi
Murugayya Udayar
Versus
Kothampatti Muniyandavar Temple By Trustee Pappathi Ammal
Case No. : 2588 of 1977
Date of Decision : 1/10/91
Advocates Appeared: Kumar K.Ram : Sampath A.T.M.
A.T.M.SAMPATH, K.RAM KUMAR
In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its view for that of lower courts unless the finding is perverse. In the absence of title documents, temple lands are presumed to belong to the temple located in the village where the lands are situated.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - Second Appeal - Scope of interference - High Court cannot substitute its own view for that of the courts below unless the finding is perverse or based on a gross violation of law. (Para 7)
(B) Evidence - Ownership of temple lands - In the absence of documentary title, lands are presumed to belong to the temple situated in the village where the lands are located. (Para 8)
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose between two trustees of temples dedicated to the same deity located in different villages. The plaintiff, trustee of a temple in one village, claimed ownership of lands situated in another village. The defendant, trustee of the temple in the village where the lands were located, claimed possession and ownership. The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendant, but the High Court reversed this on second appeal, finding the lower courts' conclusions perverse.
Findings of Court:
The court found that while a temple existed in the plaintiff's village, there was no documentary evidence to prove the lands in the other village belonged to it. The High Court erred in overturning the factual finding of the lower courts regarding ownership, as the finding was not perverse and was based on a reasonable reading of the evidence.
Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the findings of the lower courts on the question of ownership of the suit lands by terming them "perverse" under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court should not substitute its own view for that of the lower courts unless the finding is perverse. Where no documentary title exists, it is reasonable to conclude that lands belong to the temple situated in the village where the lands are located, rather than a temple in another village.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Plaintiff claims lands belong to a temple in one village; defendant claims lands belong to a temple in the village where they are situated. (Para 2 , 3 )
3. In the absence of title documents, lands are presumed to belong to the temple in the village where they are situated unless substantial evidence proves otherwise. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 )
4. High Court cannot substitute findings of fact in second appeal under Section 100 CPC unless findings are perverse or material evidence is ignored. (Para 7 , 8 )
5. Appeal allowed; High Court judgment set aside and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored. (Para 9 )
6. Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
The High Court may interfere if the findings of the courts below are perverse or if important evidence has been ignored from consideration. (Para 7 )
7. How is ownership determined when temple lands are claimed by trustees of different temples for the same deity without title documents?
In the absence of documentary title, the court may lean towards the conclusion that the lands belong to the temple in the village where the lands are situated, unless substantial evidence exists to the contrary. (Para 8 )
8. Does a difference in the weighing of oral evidence by a High Court render the lower court's finding perverse?
No, the mere re-weighing of oral evidence by the High Court does not make the lower court's finding perverse, especially when no documentary title is available to establish ownership. (Para 8 )
M.M.PUNCHHI, J.
(1) HIS appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and decree of the High court of Madras in Second Appeal No. 2170 of 1972, upsetting the concurrent judgment of the courts below.
(2) FACTS giving rise thereto, when digested, appear to be within a narrow compass. The plaintiff-respondent set up a case that being the widow of one Nangu Odayar, she was the successor trustee of a temple situated in her village Kottampatti and within the Vattam of Ariyaripatti (for short to be called "village A"), her husband being the erstwhile trustee, and the suit lands situated in Manjapattai Vattam (for short to be called "village M"), were owned by the said temple. And further, since the defendant-appellant had been successful in proceedings under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in establishing his possession, over the suit lands, it had become necessary for her to safeguard the interests of the temple and to seek possession of the suit lands.
(3) THE defence of the defendant-appellants was that there was no temple in village Kottampatti or its Vattam known as village A. It was cross-asserted by him that there rather was a temple in village M to which belonged the suit lands and he was in possession thereof as a trustee of the said temple.
(4) THE trial court in the first instance dismissed the suit and the appeal of the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed. The High court, however, on second appeal viewed that additional evidence sought to be brought on record by the plaintiff-respondent be permitted and this caused remittal of the case to the file of the first appellate court. On adduction of additional evidence the plaintiff again remained unsuccessful before the first appellate court which gave rise to the second appeal in which the decision presently under appeal was given. The High Court took the view that the finding of the courts below that there was no temple in Kottampatti village A, which village was within the limits of Kottampatti village. Significantly, the High Court did not disturb the finding that there existed a temple within the area of village M, as well.
(5) IT would be apt to cover (sic) up at this stage that both the temples are alleged and proved to be of the same deity known as Muniandavar and respective idols of different sizes stand on the respective places where the temples are situated. The suit lands thus belong in a sense to the same deity though separately templed.
(6) THE High court then went on to examine as to who was in possession of the suit property over and above the finding of the courts below that it was the defendant-appellant who as a trustee of temple in village M was in possession thereof. To conclude the High court held that the courts below had erred in law in not accepting the evidence led on the side of the plaintiff about the possession of the suit lands which established they must have belonged only to the temple of Kottampatti village. To justify substitution of the finding for that of the courts below the High court termed the finding of the courts below to be perverse entitling it to interfere in second appeal.
(7) MR K. Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the judgment under appeal, as also the relevant evidence which has been commented upon, to vehemently urge that the High court was in error in upsetting a finding of fact and thus to have grossly violated S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is idle to elaborate the well known domain within which the High court can exercise power in second appeal under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One may go with the High court, with some reservation though with its finding that there existed a temple in village A as right, and that the finding to the contrary recorded by the courts below confining literally to village Kottampatti (leaving village A unconnected) was an omission. But be that as it may, the findin