M.M.PUNCHHI, J.

(1) HIS appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and decree of the High court of Madras in Second Appeal No. 2170 of 1972, upsetting the concurrent judgment of the courts below.

(2) FACTS giving rise thereto, when digested, appear to be within a narrow compass. The plaintiff-respondent set up a case that being the widow of one Nangu Odayar, she was the successor trustee of a temple situated in her village Kottampatti and within the Vattam of Ariyaripatti (for short to be called "village A"), her husband being the erstwhile trustee, and the suit lands situated in Manjapattai Vattam (for short to be called "village M"), were owned by the said temple. And further, since the defendant-appellant had been successful in proceedings under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in establishing his possession, over the suit lands, it had become necessary for her to safeguard the interests of the temple and to seek possession of the suit lands.

(3) THE defence of the defendant-appellants was that there was no temple in village Kottampatti or its Vattam known as village A. It was cross-asserted by him that there rather was a temple in village M to which belonged the suit lands and he was in possession thereof as a trustee of the said temple.

(4) THE trial court in the first instance dismissed the suit and the appeal of the plaintiff-respondent was dismissed. The High court, however, on second appeal viewed that additional evidence sought to be brought on record by the plaintiff-respondent be permitted and this caused remittal of the case to the file of the first appellate court. On adduction of additional evidence the plaintiff again remained unsuccessful before the first appellate court which gave rise to the second appeal in which the decision presently under appeal was given. The High Court took the view that the finding of the courts below that there was no temple in Kottampatti village A, which village was within the limits of Kottampatti village. Significantly, the High Court did not disturb the finding that there existed a temple within the area of village M, as well.

(5) IT would be apt to cover (sic) up at this stage that both the temples are alleged and proved to be of the same deity known as Muniandavar and respective idols of different sizes stand on the respective places where the temples are situated. The suit lands thus belong in a sense to the same deity though separately templed.

(6) THE High court then went on to examine as to who was in possession of the suit property over and above the finding of the courts below that it was the defendant-appellant who as a trustee of temple in village M was in possession thereof. To conclude the High court held that the courts below had erred in law in not accepting the evidence led on the side of the plaintiff about the possession of the suit lands which established they must have belonged only to the temple of Kottampatti village. To justify substitution of the finding for that of the courts below the High court termed the finding of the courts below to be perverse entitling it to interfere in second appeal.

(7) MR K. Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the judgment under appeal, as also the relevant evidence which has been commented upon, to vehemently urge that the High court was in error in upsetting a finding of fact and thus to have grossly violated S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is idle to elaborate the well known domain within which the High court can exercise power in second appeal under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One may go with the High court, with some reservation though with its finding that there existed a temple in village A as right, and that the finding to the contrary recorded by the courts below confining literally to village Kottampatti (leaving village A unconnected) was an omission. But be that as it may, the fi