(1) IN this appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of the Delhi High court dated 1/5/1986 reversing the order passed by the Controller of Rents, Delhi dated 24/5/1985 directing the eviction of the respondent under clause (e) to the proviso to Section 14(1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the only contention is that the High court was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case in interfering with the order of the learned Rent Controller allowing the application made by the appellant-landlady under Section 14(1(e) of the Act. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the contention must prevail. Although the revisional power conferred on the High court under Ss. (8 of Section 25-B of the Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, there was no ground on which the legality and propriety of the order of the learned Rent Controller could be successfully assailed. The learned Rent Controller had kept the legal principles in view and on an objective determination come to a definite conclusion that the need of the appellant of the demised premises at C-192, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi for her residential use was bona fide and that she did not have any alternative accommodation available for that purpose within the meaning of Section 14(l)(e) of the Act. The High court ought not to have interfered under Section 25-B (8 merely on the ground that on a reappraisal of the evidence it would have come to a contrary conclusion.

(2) THE proven facts are that the appellant who is a widow, since the demise of her husband late Shiv Nath Mukherjee, has been staying as a guest with Shri N.C. Chatterjee who was a family friend of her late husband, at B-4/20, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. There is nothing to show that she has any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of Shri Chatterjee. On the other hand/she is there merely by sufferance. The reason given by the High court that the appellant is an old lady aged about 70 years and has no one to look after her and therefore she should continue to live with Shri Chatterjee, was hardly a ground sufficient for interference. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a lockout of the appellant and not of the High court. We fail to appreciate the High court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. We accordingly reverse the finding reached by the High court and restore that of the Rent Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumsta/nces.,

(3) THE learned counsel for the appellant however relies on the following observations made by a learned Single Judge (T.P.S. Chawla, J.) supposed to be based on the decision of this court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel to the effect:

"I think, the true test is whether, on an overall and reasonable view, it can be said that the landlord has suitable accommodation available for his use. In deciding this question one should certainly have regard to the fact that the landlord has no legal right to the other accommodation, but that is only a factor and not the end of the matter."

These observations proceed on a misunderstanding of the ratio of the decision of this court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case. The High court was in error in laying down that the test is