Judgment-

BEG

( 1 ) DATAR Singh, appellant, was convicted under Section 302, Indian Penal Code by the Sessions Judge of Patiala for murdering his father Thakar Singh at about 9. 30 p. m. on 22-2-1970 at Naru House in Patiala, and sentenced to death. The Punjab High Court had accepted the death reference and dismissed his appeal. He was also convicted in a connected trial, for an alleged illegal possession of a gun, and his convictions and sentences of two years rigorous imprisonment and three years rigorous imprisonment under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act were upheld by the High Court. The appellants applications under Article 134 (1) (c) under the Constitution having been rejected by the High Court, he came to this Court and was granted special leave to appeal in both the connected cases which are now before us.

( 2 ) IT is not the practice of this Court in appeal by special leave to disturb concurrent findings of fact unless the case discloses some exceptional features indicating that a serious miscarriage of justice has taken place. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that such a miscarriage of justice has resulted in this case because Courts ignored certain basis defects in the prosecution version and misread evidence. Several questions of law were also sought to be raised before us. These are :

(1) Whether the prosecution had failed to produce material witnesses in the case so that a presumption against the veracity of any part of the prosecution version arose due to this non-production?

(2) Whether there has been a violation of Section 157, Criminal Procedure Code, and, if so, what is its effect upon the prosecution case?

(3) Whether there had been a violation of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code by inserting in the side plan information derived from statements made by prosecution witnesses and by annexing their signed statements in inquest reports, and, if so, its effect on the prosecution case?

(4) Whether the prosecution case was damaged by an infringement of the best evidence rule inasmuch as neither the ballistic expert, who examined the cartridges and the gun in the case, supported the prosecution case nor was the gun said to have been used by the appellant for the commission of murder examined for the appellants finger prints nor was a chick alleged to be hanging outside the door of the room in which the murder took place taken into possession by the Investigating Officer?

(5) Whether the prosecution instead of the accused had been given the benefit of doubt on various features of the case on which two views were possible?

(6) Whether different standards of proof had been applied in judging the credibility of the defence evidence as compared with the prosecution evidence?

( 3 ) IT is often difficult for Courts of law to arrive at the real truth in criminal cases. The judicial process can only operate on the firm foundations of actual and credible evidence on record. Mere suspicion or suspicious circumstances cannot relieve the prosecution of its primary duty of proving its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Courts of justice cannot be swayed by sentiment or prejudice against a person accused of the very reprehensible crime of patricide. They cannot even act on some conviction that an accused person has committed a crime unless his offence is proved by satisfactory evidence of it on record. If the pieces of evidence on which the prosecution chooses to rest its case are so brittle that they crumble when subjected to close and critical examination so that the whole superstructure built on such insecure foundations collapses, proof of some incriminating circumstances, which might have given support to merely defective evidence cannot avert a failure of the prosecution case.

( 4 ) AFTER having been taken through the evidence on record we have come to the conclusion that the superstructure of the prosecution case is based on the testimony of two alleged eye-witnesses whose evidence