Judgment

THAKKAR

( 1 ) WHETHER or not an adoption had taken place way back in 1956 is the controversy at the centre of the stage.

( 2 ) ONE Rahasa Pandiani (original defendant No. 1), widow of Lakshminarayana Panda had adopted one Gangapani, the son of the sister of her deceased husband in 1942 by a registered document. The said Gangapani died in 1953. Respondent No. 1 Gokulananda Panda (original plaintiff) instituted the suit giving rise to the present appeal. He was a minor at the material time and the suit was instituted through his natural father and maternal uncle seeking a declaration that he was adopted as a son by defendant No. I Rahasa on 22/03/1956. The suit was instituted because she had alienated some of the properties in favour of appellants 2 to 8 and had made a will in favour of the deity bequeathing the rest of the properties on the premise that there was no such adoption and she was free to deal with the properties of her deceased husband. Defendant No. 1 resisted the suit and firmly denied that she had taken Gokulananda Panda in adoption as alleged. The trial Court on an appreciation of evidence disbelieved the version of the plaintiff and dismissed the suit on taking the view that the plaintiff had failed to establish that any such adoption had taken place. A learned single Judge of the High Court reversed the findings recorded by the trial Court and decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff had established that such an adoption had indeed taken place. The defendants preferred a Letters Patent Appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court. but it was dismissed in limine. Thereupon original defendant No. 1 Rahasa Pandiani approached this Court by way of the present appeal by special leave. She having died during the pendency of the present appeal, the estate is now represented by her legal heirs whose names have been brought on record pursuant to the order of this Court on 25/01/1982.

( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for parties have taken us through the judgments of the trial Court and the High Court. We have given our close and anxious consideration to the oral evidence as also the attendant circumstances. On taking an overall view of the matter we are satisfied that the trial Court was right in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the alleged adoption had really taken palce. In our opinion, the High Court failed to attach due importance to a host of significant circumstances which indicate that the version regarding adoption does not inspire confidence. There is hardly any evidence worth the name on which a finding in favour of the plaintiff that such an adoption had taken place could be rested.

( 4 ) BEFORE we advert to the relevant circumstances we consider it appropriate to advert to note of caution sounded by this Court as early as in 1958 in Kishori Lal v. Mst. Chaltibai, 1959 Suppl (1) SCR 698 : (AIR 1959 SC 504 ). We can do no better than to quote the relevant passage from the judgment of Kapur, J.

"as an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. Failure to produce accounts, in circumstances such as have been proved in the present case, would be a very suspicious circumstance. The importance of accounts was emphasised by the Privy Council in Sootrugun v. Sabitra. (1834 (2) Knapp 287); in Diwakar Rao v. Chandanlal Rao, (AIR 1916 PC 81); in Kishorilal v. Chunilal, (1908 (36) Ind App, 9): in Musammat Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal, (1909 (37) Ind App 1) and in Padmalal v. Fakira Debya, (AIR 1931 PC 84 ). "

WHEN the plaintiff relies on oral evidence in support of the claim that he was adopted by the adoptive father in accordance with the Hindu rites, and it is not supporte