IMPORTANT POINT
Where the judicial pronouncement acquitting the delinquent employee was made after a regular trial and on hot contest, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings of guilt recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand when facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same.

Headnote:SERVICE LAW—Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947—Section 5(1)(e) rw/s 5(2)—Dismissal from service—Acquittal in criminal prosecution—Effect on departmental proceedings—Appellant joined the service as an Overseer—A charge sheet was issued alleging that appellant had illegally accumulated the excess income by way of gratification—As per Departmental Enquiry Report, appellant was found guilty of the charge—Criminal case was filed against appellant for offence punishable u/s 5(1)(e) rw/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act—Special Judge honourably acquitted the appellant of the offence—Acquittal is by way of complete exoneration and not by giving benefit of doubt—Respondents have not challenged the order passed by the Special Judge—No evidence against appellant to hold that appellant was guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income—Order of dismissal held liable to be set aside without back wages—Appellant would be entitled to pension.
       Held : In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony’s case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.(Para 30)
       In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8.2.1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs. 700/- p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary. On 15.10.1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant has put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February, 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the Department passed an order of dismissal on 21.10.1982 whereas the Criminal Court acquitted him on 30.1.2002. However, as the Criminal Court acquitted the appellant on 30.1.2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30.1.2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension.(Para 31)

Judgement Key Points

Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

When a departmental proceeding results in a finding of guilt but the employee is subsequently acquitted in a criminal trial on the same facts and evidence, such acquittal must be given significant weight. It indicates that the employee’s guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and it would be unjust to uphold the departmental dismissal based solely on the earlier departmental findings (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The principle that departmental proceedings and criminal trials are distinct, with different standards of proof and objectives, is well-established. Criminal proceedings require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while departmental proceedings are based on a preponderance of probabilities (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
In cases where the same set of facts and evidence are involved, an acquittal in a criminal court on merits (not on technical or procedural grounds) should lead to the quashing or setting aside of the departmental order of dismissal, especially when the criminal court’s decision is final and unchallenged (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The scope of judicial review over departmental decisions under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to examining whether the enquiry was conducted according to proper procedure, whether natural justice was observed, and whether the decision was based on evidence or material on record. Re-evaluation of evidence or re-appreciation of facts by the High Court is generally not permissible (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
If the evidence in departmental proceedings is entirely lacking or insufficient to establish guilt, the employee’s dismissal or disciplinary action may be deemed unjustified and liable to be quashed. The evidence must be credible, balanced, and based on a proper evaluation of facts and witnesses (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The timing of the criminal acquittal relative to the departmental order is relevant. If the employee has been acquitted after the disciplinary action, the order of dismissal should be reconsidered, and in many cases, set aside, especially when the acquittal is on the merits and not due to procedural flaws (!) (!) (!) .
In cases where the employee has served for a significant period and the criminal court’s final order is acquittal, the appropriate remedy may be to set aside the departmental order without back wages but with entitlement to pension, particularly if the employee has already superannuated (!) (!) .
The decision to proceed with departmental proceedings while criminal cases are pending depends on the facts and circumstances. However, if the criminal case results in an acquittal on merits, continuing departmental action may be unjust and oppressive (!) (!) (!) .
The burden of proof in departmental proceedings is lighter than in criminal trials, and findings based on probabilities are sufficient for disciplinary action, provided that the evidence is credible and properly evaluated (!) (!) .
The final authority must ensure that the principles of natural justice are followed during departmental inquiries and that decisions are based on evidence that is legally admissible and properly appreciated (!) (!) (!) .

These points collectively emphasize that an employee’s acquittal in criminal proceedings on the same facts and evidence should influence the outcome of departmental disciplinary actions, often leading to their quashing, especially when the criminal judgment is final and on merits.

JUDGMENT

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.—Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 18.8.2003 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1085 of 2002 filed by the appellant herein. By its impugned final judgment, the High Court dismissed the L.P.A. fiiled by the appellant herein.

Brief facts :

3. The appellant joined the service in 1953 as an Overseer. The appellant was regularly submitting his property return showing all his movable and immovable properties. As per the Department, the movable and immovable properties were disproportionate to his known sources of income. The Anti-Corruption Bureau carried out an investigation against the appellant and submitted a report and on the basis of the said report, a charge sheet dated 20.2.1979 was issued alleging that the appellant had illegally accumulated the excess income by way of gratification. The appellant submitted his explanation on 15.5.1979 and denied the allegations as well as charges made in the charge sheet. A departmental enquiry was ordered and as per Departmental Enquiry Reported dated 31.3.1980, the appellant was found guilty of the charge. The respondent by order dated 21.10.1982 passed an order of dismissal from the service as punishment.

4. Against the said dismissal order, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court. The learned single Judge concluded that there is sufficient evidence against the appellant and dismissed the petition. Against the order of the learned single Judge, the appellant preferred L.P.A. and raised the relevant contentions. The Division Bench dismissed the L.P.A. by confirming the order of the learned single Judge. The said decision is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

5. The charges made against the appellant in the departmental enquiry is reproduced hereunder.

“That total income from wages, interest, house rent, insurance policy amount etc. of Sh. Tank for the period from the year 1953 till June 1978 comes to Rs. 2,75,328.00. Against that, total expenses of Sh. Tank including expenses, saving, movable as well as immovable properties, comes to Rs. 5,29,509.14. Thus, an amount of Rs. 2,54,180.00 has been found very much in excess than his known and legal source of income and it appears that the said amount has been earned by him through bribe, corruption and illegal gratification and, therefore, he is responsible/liable for the breach of Rule 3(1) of Gujarat Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1971.”

CRIMINAL CASE UNDER THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT

6. The Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau had entrusted the enquiry to Mr. V.B. Raval, Police Inspector, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kachchh at Bhuj. Mr. V.B. Raval had enquired into the matter and submitted an Enquiry Report on 8.9.1979. It showed that the total income of the accused out of his salary, interest, rent and insurance policies etc. from April, 1953 to June 1978 was Rs. 2,75,328.00. On the other side, the total expenditure, savings and movable and immovable properties of the accused was Rs.5,29,509.14. Thus, the amount of Rs.2,54,180.00 was more than the known source of income of the accused leading to the presumption that the said amount was obtained by him by illegal and corrupt means. On the basis of the said report of Mr. V.B. Raval, his successor (P.I.-Mr. H.D. Sharma) lodged the criminal complaint against the appellant in Special Case No.6 of 1987 before the Special Judge, Kachchh at Bhuj for the alleged offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the P.C. Act’).

7. The Special Judge had honourably acquitted the appellant of the offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the Act by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant and thus the appellant cannot be held to be guilty of the said offence. This acquittal is by way of complete exoneration and not by giving benefit of doubt which is ev

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2006 Supreme(SC) 472

Cases Referred (9)