The main legal point established in the judgment is that even if an appeal is time-barred, sufficient cause for condoning the delay may be shown, and the court may limit its decision to specific questions, setting aside the orders of the lower court and restoring the matter to the appropriate authority for further consideration.

ORDER

1. LEAVE GRANTED.

2. THE ISSUE RAISED IN THESE APPEALS RELATES TO THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 25(1) OF THE SICK INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES (SPECIAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1985 (FOR SHORT "THE ACT"), WHICH EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE TIME FOR PREFERRING AN APPEAL STARTS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE COPY OF THE ORDER SOUGHT TO BE CHALLENGED IS ISSUED TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY. THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED FOR PREFERRING AN APPEAL IS 45 DAYS WITH A CONDONABLE FURTHER LIMIT OF 15 DAYS D MAKING A TOTAL PERIOD OF 60 DAYS WITHIN WHICH AN APPEAL COULD BE FILED.

3. A QUESTION HAS ARISEN AS TO WHETHER THE PHRASE "ISSUED TO HIM" IN SECTION 25(1) OF THE ACT INCLUDES SERVICE ON THE AGGRIEVED PARTY.

4. IN THIS CASE, THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE BOARD FOR INDUSTRIAL AND FINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTION (BIFR) WAS PASSED ON 2-8-1999. ACCORDING TO THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE APPELLANTS BEFORE THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY UNDER THEE ACT, IT IS AVERRED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED THE COPY OF THE ORDER OF BIFR ON 21-9-1999. THEY PREFERRED THE APPEAL ON 4-11-1999, THAT IS, WITHIN THE PERIOD OF 45 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THE RECEIPT AND 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER.

5. THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY ACCEPTING THAT THE WORDS "ISSUED TO HIM" IN F SECTION 25(1) OF THE ACT, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS ACTUAL SERVICE, HELD THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO DISBELIEVE THE STATEMENT OF THE APPELLANT BANKS THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON 21-9-1999. IT THEREFORE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE APPEAL WAS WITHIN TIME. THE APPEAL WAS ACCORDINGLY ADMITTED. AGGRIEVED, THE RESPONDENTS FILED A WRIT APPLICATION BEFORE THE HIGH COURT CHALLENGING THE ADMISSION OF THE APPEAL BY THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY. THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE BY HIS ORDER DATED 16-3-2000 ALLOWED THE WRIT APPLICATION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND HELD THAT LIMITATION SHOULD BE CALCULATED FROM THE DATE OF THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE APPEAL FILED BY THE APPELLANTS BEFORE THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY WAS BARRED BY LIMITATION AND CONSEQUENTLY THE ORDER OF ADMISSION PASSED BY THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY WAS QUASHED.

6. THE MATTER WAS THEN CARRIED IN APPEAL BEFORE THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT. THE DIVISION BENCH UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE BUT ON A DIFFERENT GROUND. THE DIVISION BENCH HELD THAT THE WORDS "ISSUED TO HIM" MUST BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THE DATE OF ACTUAL ISSUANCE AND NOT THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER. IT FOUND THAT THE LIMITATION, THEREFORE, STARTED RUNNING FROM 16-9-1999, THAT IS, THE DATE AFTER THE RECORDED DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF BIFR. IT WAS FOUND THAT SINCE THE APPEAL WAS PRESENTED ON THE 50TH DAY, IT WAS BEYOND THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED UNDER THE PROVISO TO SECTION 25(1) OF THE ACT. THE DIVISION BENCH HELD THAT THE APPEAL WAS, THEREFORE, BARRED BY LIMITATION BY 5 DAYS AND "AS THERE WAS NO CAUSE FOR THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE REASONS FOR DELAY OF 5 DAYS WERE PLAUSIBLE OR NOT, THE APPEAL FILED BY THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY IS TIME-BARRED".

7. AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT, THE APPELLANTS ARE BEFORE US. THE APPELLANT BANKS HAVE RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN CWT V. KUNDAN LAL BEHARI LAL1 AND SUBMITTED THAT THE HIGH COURT HAD CLEARLY MISCONSTRUED THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 25(1) OF THE ACT. IT IS POINTED OUT TO US THAT THE WORD "ISSUED" HAS BEEN JUDICIALLY CONSTRUED AS INCLUDING THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF SENDING NOTICES AS WELL AS SERVICE THEREOF. ACCORDING TO THE APPELLANTS THE SAME REASONING SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THIS COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE AS FAR AS THE PROVISIONS UNDER SECTION 25(1) OF THE ACT ARE CONCERNED, ALTHOUGH THE DECISION IN KUNDAN LAL BEHARI LAL CASE1 WAS IN RESPECT OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 18(2-A) OF THE WEALTH TAX ACT. IT IS FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE HIGH COURT SHOULD HAVE SEEN THAT THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE APPEAL WAS PREFERRED WAS A CONDONABLE PERIOD AND THAT SINCE THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY HAD NOT, IN FACT, EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION ON THAT ISSUE WHICH WAS BASICALLY AN ISSUE OF