2006 Supreme(SC) 674

2006(5) Supreme 770
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and Lokeshwar Singh Panta, JJ.
Syed Ibrahim — Appellant
versus
State of Andhra Pradesh — Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 798 of 2006
(Arising Out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2787 of 2005)
Decided on 27-7-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : A. Subba Rao, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Ms. D. Bharathi Reddy, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and it is merely a rule of caution.

Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 — Appellant convicted for murder of his wife — While deceased, her father, brother and sister PWs 1, 2 and 3 were talking in their house, accused came and abused deceased, grew wild and stabbed her with knife causing multiple injuries — High Court found that PW1, father of deceased and no other witness supported prosecution version but found evidence of PW1 sufficient to fasten guilt of accused — Appeal — Contention that High Court itself noticed that PW1 was speaking half truth and was giving exaggerated version — Principle of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” was not applicable in Indian Jurisprudence and it had to be appreciated in each case as to what extent evidence was worthy of acceptance — An attempt has to be made to, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate gram from the chaff — Normal discrepancies would not corrode credibility of case — If evidence of PW1 was accepted as cogent and credible then prosecution must succeed — Evidence of PW1 found uncreditworthy, he indicated four different places to be the place of occurrence — High Court was not right in lightly brushing aside apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies by making a general observation that PW1 was an illiterate person — Impugned judgment was liable to be set aside.

       Held : Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by PW1 to a large extent to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient, or to be note wholly credible. Falsity of material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witness or witnesses cannot be branded as liar(s). The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence.(Para 10)

       Normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a partys case, material discrepancies do so.(Para 10)

       In the background of principles set out above it is to be seen how far the evidence of PW1 is cogent and credible. Merely because he was the solitary witness who claimed to have seen the occurrence, that cannot be a ground to discard his evidence, in the background of what has been stated in Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the Evidence Act). No particular number of witnesses are required for the proof of any fact, material evidence and not number of witnesses has to be taken note of by the courts to ascertain the truth of the allegations made. Therefore, if the evidence of PW 1 is accepted as cogent and credible, then the prosecution is to succeed. It is to be noted that PW1-father of the appellant, claimed to have set law into motion. The testimony of PW1 was to the effect that after witnessing a part of the occurrence he had run to the police station and had come back within about five minutes. The evidence on record disproves veracity of this part of his evidence. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place and at about 10 P.M. the FIR was lodged at the police station at about 11.30 P.M. PW1 and the investigating officer accepted that it will take nearly one hour for somebody on foot to reach the police station considering the distance of the alleged place of occurrence and the police station. There is another interesting factor PW1 accepted in the cross examination that the report (Ex.B1) was written in the police station in the presence of sub inspector and a constable. But in his examination-in-chief, he had stated that he had got written the report by somebody at a hotel and the person normally writes petitions. No particulars of this person who allegedly scribed the report, not even his name, was stated by PW1. His evidence is further to the effect that he alone had come to the police station where the report was lodged and that is how he admitted that the report was written at the police station. This may not appear to be that important a factor considering the illiteracy of PW1. But there is another significant factor which completely destroys the prosecution version and the credibility of PW1 as a witness. He has indicated four different places to be the place of occurrence. In his examination in chief he stated that the occurrence took place in his house. In the cross-examination he stated that the incident took place at the house of his wife-the deceaseds mother. This is a very important factor considering the undisputed position and in fact the admission of PW1 that he and his wife were separated nearly two decades ago, and that he was not in visiting terms with his wife. Then the question would automatically arise as to how in spite of strained relationship he could have seen the occurrence as alleged in the house of his wife. That is not the end of the matter. In his cross examination he further stated that the incident happened in the small lane in front of the house of his wife. This is at clear variance with the statement that the occurrence took place inside the house where allegedly he, the deceased, his son-PW2 and daughters PWs. 3 and 6 were present. That is not the final say of the witness. He accepted that in the FIR (Ex. B1) he had stated the place of occurrence to be the house of the deceased. Though the FIR is not a substantive evidence yet, the same can be used to test the veracity of the witness. PW1 accepted that what was stated in the FIR was correct. When the place of occurrence itself has not been established it would be not proper to accept the prosecution version. Above being the position the High Court was not right in lightly brushing aside the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies by making a general observation that the PW1 is an illiterate person. Above being the position the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.(Paras 11 and 12)