2006(5) Supreme 857
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court)
H.K. Sema and A.K. Mathur, JJ.
M/s Crawford Bayley & Co. & Ors. — Appellants
versus
Union of India & Ors. — Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 171 of 2004
With
C.A. No. 172 of 2004, C.A. No. 5990 of 2004, W.P. (C) 168 of 2004 & W.P. (C) No. 244 of 2004
All Decided on 5-7-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Gopal Subramanium, Vikas Singh, A.S.G., P.N. Lekhi, Sr. Advocate, Percy Gandhi, D.B. Engineer, R.N. Karanjawala, Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms. F. Karbhari, Ms. Manik Karanjawala, Debmalya Banerjee, Ms. Simran Brar, Jayant Mohan, E.C. Agrawala, V.B. Joshi, M.V. Kini, Sanjay Kapur, Rajiv Kapur, Tushad Cooper, Mrs. Shubra Kapur, Ms. Arti Singh, Sameer Bansal, Lokesh Kumar, M.K. Garg, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Arvind Kumar, Ms. Laxmi Arvind, Mrs. Poonam Prasad, Niraj Sharma, S. Wasim A. Qadri, V.K. Verma, Mohit Kumar, Chandra Prakash, Ritu Raj, Advocates.
Held : In view of the aforesaid observation made by this Court that no man can be a judge in his own cause certain parameters has to be observed i.e. a personal bias of the person concerned or personal interest or person acted in the matter concerned and has already taken a decision which he may be interested in supporting the same. These parameters have to be observed before coming to the conclusion that no man can be a judge in his own cause. This is a matter of factual inquiry. Be that as it may. Mr. Gopal Subramanian learned Addl. Solicitor General of India with his usual fairness has submitted that the officer who has been appointed as an Estate Officer though alleged to have been associated as an officer dealing with the eviction matters will not be presiding over as an Estate Officer. Therefore, in view of this submission made by Mr. Subramanian we do not think that the matter is required to be prosecuted further. (Para 18)
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:
The doctrine that "no man can be a judge in his own cause" applies only when the individual has a personal interest, has already taken a decision, or has acted in the matter concerned. Simply being named as an authority or officer does not automatically invoke this doctrine (!) .
The appointment of Estate Officers under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, is valid even if the officer has previously dealt with eviction matters, provided that the officer does not preside over the case in which they have a personal interest or have already made a decision supporting one side (!) .
The power to appoint Estate Officers has been decentralized to the concerned administrative departments, and such appointments made by these departments are valid. The rules of Business, which are administrative in nature, support this decentralization and do not invalidate appointments made under it (!) (!) .
The provisions of the relevant statutes, including the specific appointment procedures and the qualifications of officers, are consistent with constitutional principles, including Articles 14 and 254 of the Constitution, and are designed to ensure speedy and effective eviction processes (!) (!) .
The validity of the statutory provisions, including the proviso that limits the appointment of Estate Officers to officers of statutory authorities controlling the premises, has been upheld. This proviso does not violate the constitutional principles as it does not amount to a "judge in his own cause" scenario, especially when the officer does not preside over cases where they have a personal interest (!) (!) (!) .
The appointment of officers by the central government, even if initially made by a particular ministry, remains valid after subsequent decentralization and amendments, provided the proper procedures and notifications are followed (!) (!) .
The presiding officers in the eviction proceedings, such as the Assistant General Manager of a bank, are not considered judges in their own cause when they act in accordance with the statutory framework and do not have a personal interest or prior involvement in the specific case (!) (!) .
Overall, the courts have consistently upheld the constitutional validity of the statutory framework governing eviction proceedings and the appointment of Estate Officers, dismissing challenges based on alleged bias, procedural irregularities, or improper appointment procedures (!) (!) (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further elaboration or specific legal analysis on any of these points.
JUDGMENT
A.K. Mathur, J. — All these appeals & writ petitions raise similar question of law, therefore they are disposed off by this common order.
2. For the convenient disposal of these matter, the facts given in the Civil Appeal No. 171/2004 are taken into consideration.
This appeal is directed against an order passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 3105/2002 on 25th April, 2003 whereby the High Court of Bombay dismissed the Writ Petition and held that in view of the certain proposition of law laid-down by the apex Court none of the argument raised by the party is sustainable and accordingly dismissed the writ petition.
3. The appellant No. 1 is a firm of Advocates and solicitors whereas appellant Nos. 2 & 3 are its partners. The appellants moved this writ petition before Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for striking down the provisions of Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act, 1971) on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They also sought an order for quashing of the termination of tenancy dated 17th April, 2002 issued by the respondent No. 2 as also a show cause notice dated 3rd October, 2002 issued by the respondent No. 2 under the provisions of the said Act.
4. The appellants also claimed a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondent No. 2 (Estate Officer) from proceeding with Case No. 3 of 2002 initiated by him. The respondent No. 3, the State Bank of India owns a building in Fort, Mumbai. According to the appellants the management of the Imperial Bank which was the predecessor of respondent No.3 – State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as "the Bank") leased out the premises to appellant No. 1 in 1943. The ground floor and the second floor of the said building is occupied by the respondent No. 3 – Bank. The lease granted in favour of the appellants was renewed from time to time and it was last renewed till 1973. But after that same was not renewed. But by notice dated 6th January, 2000 respondent No.3 terminated the tenancy of the appellant No. 1 on the ground that it requires the premises to accommodate their Capital Market Branch, Personal Bank Branch and other branches. But subsequently on 17th April, 2002, the termination notice dated 6th January, 2000 was withdrawn. Thereafter, another notice dated 17th April, 2002 was given terminating the tenancy at the end of calendar month next to the calendar month in which the notice was received by the appellant no.1. Several reasons were given for termination of the tenancy. Thereafter the respondent No. 2 issued a show cause notice under sub-section (1) and clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act, 1971 to the appellant No. 1 to show cause why the order of eviction should not be passed against them. This show cause notice issued by respondent No. 2 was challenged by filing present writ petition.
5. The appellant raised five grounds before the High Court; first the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Rent Act) shall prevail over the provisions of the said Act of 1941 in view of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India as the Maharashtra Rent Act applies to all premises belonging to the respondent and therefore, the appellant No. 1 is a protected tenant under the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Act and the order of eviction for the appellant No. 1 cannot be made. It was submitted that the Maharashtra Rent Act is a law made by the Legislature of the State in respect of matters enumerated under the Concurrent List i.e. Entries 6 & 46. The public premises Act, 1971 is an earlier law made by the Parliament under the Concurrent List i.e. Entry 6. It was submitted since it was reserved for the assent of the President of India as it contained the repugnant provisions to the earlier law made by the
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