ORDER

1. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 8-10-1998 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RSA No. 498 of 1998 allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the XVth Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore who in turn allowed the appeal from a judgment of the Principal Civil Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, in OS No. 31 of 1974 dated 24-10-1979.

2. The plaintiff-respondent filed the aforementioned suit, inter alia, for a declaration of his title over the suit property as also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant Corporation from interfering with the plaintiffs possession thereover as also for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to effect the change of khatha in favour of the plaintiff and for the issuance of licence for putting up constructions on the suit property.

3. The cause of action for the suit arose in the month of February 1974 when the defendant Corporation attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property held by him and on subsequent dates although he was the owner of the suit schedule property.

4. The plaintiff filed the said suit, inter alia, alleging that he had been in peaceful possession of the suit property and perfected his title by adverse possession. The said suit was decreed. The first appellate court on appeal, however, reversed the said judgment and decree which in turn has been reversed by the impugned judgment by the High Court.

5. Mr S.S. Javali, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that the High Court has failed to formulate a substantial question of law as is mandatorily required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in that view of the matter the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The learned counsel has pointed out that the High Court in its judgment proceeded to formulate two points which were purported to have arisen in the said appeal, namely:

(1) Whether the first appellate court is justified in holding that alternative plea of adverse possession cannot be set up when once ownership is asserted?

(2) Whether the first appellate court is justified in rejecting the plea of adverse possession on the ground that there is no specific and sufficient pleading and evidence?

6. The contention of Mr Javali is that in view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure substantial question(s) of law was required to be formulated at the time of admission of the appeal and the respondent could be called upon to respond only in relation thereto. In support of the said contention, strong reliance has been placed on Roop Singh v. Ram Singh.

7. Mr Ganapathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, b on the other hand, would submit that substantial questions of law did arise for consideration before the High Court.

8. It is no longer res integra that a second appeal Can be admitted for hearing; only in the event the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, whereupon it shall formulate such a question in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (5) of Section 100 mandates that the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall at the hearing of the appeal be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such a question. In view of the provisions contained in sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a substantial question of law is required to be formulated at the time of the d admission of the second appeal and the respondent can be called upon to respond only thereto. Even the respondent is entitled to show that the question so formulated by the High Court does not involve such a question. The hearing of the second appeal, thus. must be confined to the substantial question of law so formulated subject