The main legal point established in the judgment is the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits challenging vesting orders under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, and the correctness of the High Court's reliance on an earlier judgment.

Judgment

G.P. MATHUR, J.- Civil Appeal No. 3105 of 1997 has been preferred by the Gaon Sabha and another against the judgment and decree dated 7-111991 of the Delhi High Court in RFA No. 209 of 1986. Civil Appeal No. 2183 of 1993 has been preferred by the Union of India and another against the judgment and decree dated 30-5-1991 of the Delhi High Court in RFA No. 167 of 1986. The controversy involved in both the appeals is identical

and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a common order. Civil Appeal No. 2183 of 1993 was initially allowed by this Court on 7-2-19971 but the order was recalled on 25-7-2003 on the ground that some of the respondents a had died and their heirs had not been brought on record when the matter was heard and decided at the earlier stage.

2. We will mention the facts of CA No. 3105 of 1997 which has been preferred by the Gaon Sabha and the Union of India against Nathi and 38 others. Proceedings for acquisition of a large tract of land were initiated by issuing notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. b The Collector made an award but a dispute arose between the Gaon Sabha and the private respondents regarding the right to receive compensation. He accordingly made seven references for decision of the Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Additional District Judge decided

all the seven references by common judgment and order dated 22-2-1986 wherein he held that it was the Gaon Sabha which was entitled to receive the c compensation amount and not the private respondents. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid award decree of the Additional District Judge, Nathi and others preferred RFA No. 209 of 1986 before the Delhi High Court. The High Court, following its earlier judgment and decree dated

30-5-1991 in RFA No. 167 of 1986 given in the case of SherSingh allowed the appeal on

7-11-1991 by a short order and held that the respondents were entitled to entire amount of compensation and not the Gaon Sabha. It is this judgment and decree which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present appeal which has been preferred by the Gaon Sabha and the Union of India.

3. In view of the fact that the impugned judgment does not deal with the controversy raised and the High Court has allowed the appeal only on the basis of its earlier judgment rendered in the case of Sher Singh in RFA No. 167 of 1986, it becomes necessary to look to the reasoning given for deciding the said matter. Even otherwise the judgment and order dated 30-5-1991 in RFA No. 167 of 1986 is under challenge in CA No. 2183 of 1993 filed by the Union ofIndia.

4. The land in dispute is situate in Village Tekhand and in khasra girdwari it was recorded as gair mumkin pahar. The case of the Gaon Sabha was that the land being gair mumkin pahar it had vested in it under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), that it was in possession over the land when the same was acquired and that the Government took possession of the land from the Gaon Sabha. The respondents herein (private parties) pleaded that as the land was gair mumkin pahar it could not vest in the Gaon Sabha and they were owners /proprietors of the same. Sher Singh and others further submitted that there had been a prior litigation regarding title of the land in dispute in the civil court wherein a decree had been passed in their favour. The Gaon Sabha however relied upon a judgment dated8-12-1982 of the Delhi High Court (Justice M.L. Jain) in CWP No. 1019 of 1972 wherein it was held that land recorded as

gair mumkin pahar is wasteland which would vest in the Gaon Sabha. The Additional District Judge chose to follow the later judgment delivered in the writ petition and further held that in the civil suit ultimately the High Court in second appeal (RSA No. 73 of 1972) had remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the Deputy Commissioner and as such there was no final determination of the rights of the prope