The evidence proved a case under Section 304-A IPC, and the act of the accused was considered rash, leading to the victim's death.

ORDER

1.Heard the parties.

2.Application for impleadment is allowed.

3. The sole appellant was convicted by the trial court under Section 302 of the Penal Code (for short "IPC") and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs 10,000, in default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of six months. On appeal being preferred, the High Court confirmed the conviction. Hence this appeal by special leave.

4. We have been taken through the first information report as well as evidence from which it appears that according to the prosecution case as well as evidence, no case under Section 302 IPC is made out, but at the highest, a case under Section 304-A IPC is disclosed. From the facts proved, it cannot be said that the accused had either intended to cause death of the victim or had knowledge that he was likely to cause death by such act. The evidence to prove a case of culpable homicide or murder is completely lacking. Merely because the victim was dashed by the vehicle which was being driven by the appellant, from that alone, neither a case of murder nor that of culpable homicide can be inferred. We are of the view that the facts alleged and proved show that act of the accused was a rash one, as a result of which the victim was dashed causing his death thereby. In our opinion, the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubts but the accused can be said to have committed an offence under Section 304-A IPC and the High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC.

5. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed in part, conviction and sentence awarded against the appellant under Section 302 IPC are set aside and he is convicted under Section 304-A IPC, under which maximum sentence which could be awarded is two years and since, according to learned counsel, the appellant has remained in custody for a period of 20 months, we are of the view, the ends of justice would be met in case the sentence of imprisonment already undergone is imposed against him. Thus, we award the sentence for the period already undergone against the appellant. The appellant who is on bail is discharged from the liability of bail bonds.