1. Recovery of possession of godown — storage of pledged oilseeds — injunction against removal of goods — suit for damages for wrongful use and occupation. (Para 1 )
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2000 Supreme(SC) 534
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND S. RAJENDRA BABU, JJ
BANK OF INDIA -Appellant;
Versus
LEKHIMONI DAS AND OTHERS -Respondents.
Civil Appeals No. 828 of 1986t with No. 7507 of 1994
Decided on March 10, 2000
Important Points
Section 95 CPC provides a summary remedy for compensation for wrongful injunctions but does not bar a regular suit for damages for wrongful use and occupation of property. A party without lawful right to possess property is liable for damages, independent of the summary procedure under Section 95 CPC.
Subject
Damages - Wrongful Use and Occupation
Act Referred
Headnote
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 39, rules 1 & 2 - Wrongful obtainment of injunction - Suit for compensation/damages - Not barred by omission to proceed u/s 95, CPC-Plaintiff obtaining possession of premises-Defendants securing order of injunction restraining plaintiff from removing goods lying in the premises - Such injunction is bad having been obtained on insufficient and improbable grounds - Claim for damages by plaintiff is maintainable - Bank as a pledgee cannot absolve itself of malice arising in case. (Paras 6 to 8)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 95 - Section 95 is an alternative remedy in cases of wrongful obtainment of an injunction and it does not in any way interfere with the principles regulating suits for damages for torts of malicious legal process-A regular suit for compensation is not barred by the omission to proceed under summary procedure provided u/s 95, but if an application is made and disposed of, such disposal would operate as a bar to regular suit irrespective of the result of the application. (Para 7)
Practice and Procedure - Where two remedies are available under law, one of them should not be taken as operating in derogation of other-In a suit for compensation of tort the plaintiff must not only prove want of reasonable or probable cause of obtaining injunction but also that the defendant was attracted by malice which is an improper motive. (Para 8)
AIR 1982 Kant. 9 : AIR 1963 Pun. 158: AIR 1957 Mad. 156; (1957) 1 Mad. LJ 118: AIR 1944 Cal 289: AIR 1929 PC 222-Ref.
Contract Act, 1872 - Section 172 - Pledgee-Liability-Bank, as a pledgee of goods of firm cannot absolve itself to malice arising in a case of wrongful injunction. (Para 11)
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether Section 95 CPC is a complete code for compensation and whether proof of malice is required for damages when acts are under judicial sanction. (Para 6 )
3. Section 95 CPC provides an optional summary remedy; regular suits for damages for wrongful occupation or malicious legal process remain maintainable. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 )
4. A regular suit for damages for wrongful use of property is maintainable independently of Section 95 CPC; malice is required for malicious legal process. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 )
5. Appeals dismissed; High Court order affirming liability for damages upheld. (Para 12 )
6. Is Section 95 CPC the exclusive remedy for compensation when a temporary injunction is obtained on insufficient grounds?
No. Section 95 CPC provides an optional summary remedy. An injured party can file a regular suit for compensation if they have not already sought relief under the summary procedure. (Para 7 , 8 )
7. What is the legal distinction between a claim for damages based on trespass and one based on malicious legal process?
In trespass, the plaintiff only proves the trespass, and the defendant must prove a good cause. In malicious legal process, the plaintiff must prove the absence of reasonable and probable cause and the presence of malice. (Para 9 )
8. When is proof of malice necessary in a suit for damages arising from judicial sanctions?
Proof of malice is necessary when the act complained of was done under judicial sanction at the instance of a party, as the remedy is an action for malicious legal process. (Para 9 )
9. Does the lack of specific pleadings regarding malice preclude a claim for damages if the facts are evident?
No. Where facts are clear and parties are aware of the claims, the lack of specific pleadings does not prejudice the parties or bar the claim for damages. (Para 11 )
Judgment
RAJENDRA BABU, J.- For purposes of convenience, we refer to the parties as arrayed in the original suit out of which this appeal arises. ShitaI Chandra Das and Karmadhar Das filed Title Suit No. 77 of 1959 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore against Madhuri Choudhary, daughterin-law of the original lessee of a godo\yn bearing No. 103/1B, Raja Dipendra Street, Calcutta. The sub-tenants Brij Kishore Bhagat, NawaI Kishore Bhagat and Durga Devi Bhagat were also impleaded in the said suit as defendants. The said suit was decreed on 30-9-1963 against all the defendants, including Brij Kishore Bhagat, Nawal Kishore Bhagat and Durga Devi Bhagat. The a plaintiffs in that suit levied execution in Case No. 18 of 1963 in which warrant for delivery of possession of the disputed premises was issued. In the disputed godown there were racks on which oilseeds were stacked. Inasmuch as the said oil seeds could not be immediately removed, the plaintiffs therein obtained delivery of possession of the godown along with the oilseeds stacked in several bags. The said oil seeds were kept in the custody of Sitaram Roy, an officer of the plaintiffs by the process-server of the Court. Thereafter Bank of India, Defendant 1 in the suit, filed an application under Order XXI Rule 101 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) claiming that the Bank was in possession of the godown as a pledgee of the goods from an alleged partnership firm, namely, Mis Bansidhar Baijnath and Brij Kishore Bhagat, Durga Devi Bhagat and Nawal Kishore Bhagat, who are stated to be the partners of the said firm. Mis Bansidhar Baijnath, the firm, also filed an application under Order XXI Rules 100 and 101 CPC claiming to be in possession of the godown on the date of the delivery of the possession. These applications were registered as Miscellaneous Cases Nos. 1 and 3 of 1972 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Alipore. The plaintiffs contended that the present defendants were bound by the decree and the claim of possession of Mis Bansidhar Baijnath or the Bank as pledgee were all baseless. It was also contended that the Bhagat group were in possession of the godown on the date of the delivery of the possession. The defendants filed two separate applications in those two miscellaneous cases for restraining the decreeholders from removing the stacks of oil seeds from the godown. The ad interim injunction was made absolute on the understanding that the miscellaneous cases would be expeditiously disposed of and an inventory of the oil seeds was made by a Commissioner appointed by the Court. Miscellaneous Case No. 1 of 1972 was filed seeking for a direction upon Defendant 1, the Bank, to remove the said oilseeds on the ground that the plaintiffs were suffering substantial loss daily and the goods were perishable. The Subordinate Judge, Alipore, granted leave to the Bank to remove the f said goods. Defendant 1 Bank, however, applied for modification of the order dated 27-6-1972. A revision petition was filed in the High Court. Before the High Court Defendant 1 withdrew the petition for removal of the said goods and the order of the Subordinate Judge passed on 27-6-1972 was set aside. In view of the indifference by the defendants, the plaintiffs had suffered loss by way of rent and by not delivering the vacant possession to the Bank by obtaining an order of injunction wrongfully and by not removing the goods in spite of the offers made by the plaintiffs and having kept the goods in spite of the offers made by the plaintiffs, the defendants have become liable to pay compensation. A separate suit was also filed for ascertaining the mesne profits and in the suit out of which these proceedings arise, the plaintiffs claimed damages for wrongfully keeping the said alleged oilseeds from 15-1-1972.
2. Defendant 1 Bank, contested the suit. It is pleaded that MIs Bansidhar Baijnath is a partnership firm and a constituent of the Bank which carried on the business of sale and purchase o
