2006 Supreme(SC) 832

2006(7) Supreme 450
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Gujarat High Court)
K.G. Balakrishnan and D.K. Jain, JJ.
Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel—Appellant
versus
Anilbhai Jayantibhai Patel & Ors.—Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4056 of 2006
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 4663 of 2006)
Decided on 11-9-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Shyam Diwan, Sr. Advocate, Nikhil Goel, Amar Dave, Mrs. Naveen Goel for Mrs. Sheela Goel, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Sharad Vakil, Sr. Advocate, I.H. Syed, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Ms. Shivangi, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Dr. Kailash Chand, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
When a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene.

Headnote:(i) ELECTION LAW—Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963—Section 32—Gujarat Municipalities (President and Vice-President) Election Rules, 1964—Rules 3 & 4—General elections to the office of councillors to constitute Anand Municipality—At the meeting, conducted and presided over by the Resident-Deputy Collector, out of 42 elected councillors, 38 were present—Two independent councillors were unable to attend the meeting as they had been arrested by the police at about 12.30 p.m. on the date of meeting—Election was held for the post of President and Vice-President—Two councillors offered their candidature for the office of President—In election 19 councillors cast their votes in favour of appellant and the remaining 19 councillors cast their votes in favour of another candidate—In view of equality of votes, Presiding Officer decided by draw of lots and declared appellant elected as President of the Municipality —Election challenged on ground that the two councillors were arrested to prevent both of them from casting their vote at the elections—Whether High Court was justified in setting aside election of appellant—(Yes)—However High Court was justified in declaring respondent 1 as having been elected as the President—(No).

       Held : Chapter III of the Act contains provisions relating to the President, Vice-President etc. Section 31 stipulates that the Municipality shall be presided over by a President, who shall be elected by the councillors from among themselves in the manner prescribed by the rules made by the State Government. Section 32 deals with the election of President and Vice-President. Sub-section (4) thereof provides that if in the election of the president or the vice-president there is an equality of votes, the result of the election shall be decided by lot to be drawn in the presence of the Collector or the officer presiding in such manner as the Collector or as the case may be, the officer may determine.(Para 21)

       There is no denying the fact that in the light of clear stipulation in sub-section 4 of Section 32 of the Act, because of equality of votes the election result had to be decided by draw of lots and this is what the Presiding Officer did. But, the moot question is whether the detention of the two councillors was such a trivial factor in the subject election, which could be overlooked by the Presiding Officer? It is manifestly clear from the material on record that he was made aware of the said development. In the light of some of the circumstances, viz., (i) after arresting councillors Anilbhai Patel and Meenaben Gohil at around 12.30 P.M., just half an hour before the scheduled time for elections, the police officers did not produce them before the Magistrate immediately, but took them around Anand town in the police van and produced them before the Magistrate only at about 5.00 P.M., by which time the elections were already held and the results were also declared; (ii) no circumstance brought on record by the police to show that it would have been inexpedient to wait till the elections were over before effecting arrest of Anilbhai Patel and Meenaben Gohil. Both the councillors are residents of Anand and their co-accused in the respective offences were released by the police officers themselves after arresting them on 5.11.2005; and (iii) there was no circumstance to show that the two councillors would have escaped and avoided arrest if they were allowed to go inside the meeting hall for voting at 1.00 P.M. and if they were not arrested till the meeting for electing President and Vice-President was over. We have no hesitation in holding that the detention of the two councillors, a few minutes before the election meeting was a relevant factor which ought to have been taken into account by the Presiding Officer to decide whether to continue with the election or to postpone it and call the meeting on some other day in terms of Rule 10. Failure to do so not only offends against procedural propriety, it makes his decision to go ahead with the election meeting perverse and irrational, a facet of unreasonableness, warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error of law and/or jurisdiction in setting aside the election of the appellant as President of the Anand Municipality.(Para 23)

       In the instant case, admittedly both the candidates had got equal number of votes polled and the appellant was declared as elected on the basis of draw of lots, held as per the prescribed procedure. Admittedly, the controversy did not relate to counting of votes. Under the circumstances, the direction of the High Court that the votes of the two arrested councillors be treated as having been cast in favour of the first respondent, in our view, is based on pure speculation that they would have definitely voted for him. In our opinion, the High Court has erred on this aspect of the matter and therefore, to that extent the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the order of the High Court, declaring the first respondent as the President of the Anand Municipality is set aside.(Para 28)

       (ii) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—Judicial Review—Scope of—Norms which may be employed to assess whether an administrative action is justiciable or not—Inherent limitation in exercise of power of judicial review—Principle of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ or irrationality, classified by Lord Diplock as one of the grounds for intervention in judicial review—Constitution of India—Article 226.

       Held : Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to ensure that each and every authority in the State, including the State, acts bonafide and within the limits of its power. However, the scope of judicial review in Administrative matters has always been a subject matter of debate despite a plethora of case law on the issue. Time and again attempts have been made by the Courts to devise or craft some norms, which may be employed to assess whether an administrative action is justiciable or not. But no uniform rule has been or can be evolved to test the validity of an administrative action or decision because the extent and scope of judicial scrutiny depends upon host of factors, like the nature of the subject matter, the nature of the right affected, the character of the legal and constitutional provisions applicable etc. While appreciating the inherent limitations in exercise of power of judicial review, the judicial quest has been to find and maintain a right and delicate balance between the administrative discretion and the need to remedy alleged unfairness in the exercise of such discretion.(Para 12)

       Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.(Para 18)