IMPORTANT POINT
Unless the punishment imposed by Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference.

Headnote:SERVICE LAW—Punishment of dismissal from service—Scope for judicial review—Court should not interfere with administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffered from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court—Scope of judicial review was limited to deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision—Respondent a constable with Central Reserve Police Force while on duty as sentary fired one bullet from his SLR without orders and without any sufficient reason—Misconduct and negligence/remissness in discharge of duty was found proved in departmental inquiry—Order of dismissal from service was passed—High Court in writ jurisdiction held that defence of respondent was not properly considered and punishment was shockingly disproportionate and set it aside and directed for reinstatement—Appeal—High Court did not indicate any reason for its conclusion that punishment was shockingly disproportionate and its order reflected non-application of mind—Matter needed to be remitted for re-hearing restricted to question of quantum of punishment.
       Held : The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court. Such interference cannot be a routine matter.(Para 10)
       Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case (1948 (1) KB 223) that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service [(1983) 1 AC 768] (called the CCSU case) summarized the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz., illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that "proportionality" was a "future possibility".(Para 11)
       The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesburys case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. (Para 15)
       To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.(Para 16)
       The High Court, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for Union of India, has not indicated any reason for coming to the conclusion that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate. The High Court only stated that the defence of respondent-Dwarka Prasad was not duly considered. If that was really so, the High Court would have interfered on that ground but that has not been done. The High Courts order therefore reflects non application of mind. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to re-hear the writ petition restricted to the question of quantum of punishment. The appeal filed by respondent-Dwarka Prasad is without merit in view of the fact that his statement at different stages during the departmental proceedings indicates that he has accepted that he himself was responsible for the incident. (Para 18)

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:

The scope of judicial review in administrative disciplinary cases is limited. Courts should not interfere with the decision unless it is illogical, procedurally improper, or shocks the conscience of the Court (!) (!) .
The primary role in determining the appropriateness of punishment lies with the disciplinary or administrative authority. The courts' role is secondary, primarily to examine whether there has been procedural irregularity, illegality, or irrationality (!) (!) .
Interference with the quantum of punishment is generally not permissible unless the punishment is shockingly disproportionate or the decision reflects non-application of mind (!) (!) .
When a disciplinary authority has considered relevant factors and imposed a punishment that does not shock the conscience, courts should typically refrain from substituting their own judgment (!) (!) .
If the Court finds that the decision was made without proper reasoning or was disproportionately harsh, it may set aside the order and remand the matter for re-hearing, limited to the question of quantum of punishment (!) (!) .
The Court’s review is confined to procedural and rationality aspects, not to the correctness of the decision itself, unless the punishment is shockingly disproportionate or the decision is made without proper consideration of relevant facts (!) (!) .
In cases where fundamental rights are involved, courts may apply a more rigorous standard of review, such as proportionality, but in disciplinary cases not affecting fundamental freedoms, the Wednesbury or similar principles are generally applied (!) (!) .
The decision-maker's statement and the facts established during departmental proceedings are crucial, and courts will consider whether the decision reflects proper application of mind and relevant considerations (!) (!) .
The order of the Court should be precise and reasoned, especially when setting aside disciplinary actions, to avoid non-application of mind and to ensure proper judicial oversight (!) (!) .
Overall, courts exercise restraint in reviewing disciplinary punishments, emphasizing respect for the administrative decision-making process, unless there is clear evidence of arbitrariness, procedural flaws, or disproportionate punishment (!) (!) (!) .

If you need further clarification or specific legal advice based on this document, please let me know.

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.

2. These two appeals are directed against a common judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent-Dwarka Prasad who is the appellant in the appeal relating to SLP (C) No. 15725 of 2006. The writ petition was partially allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court holding that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on respondent-Dwarka Prasad was too harsh and was required to be substituted by an appropriate lesser punishment. Accordingly the order of dismissal was set aside and reinstatement with continuity of service without any back wages was directed and it was further directed that from the date of judgment the respondent-Dwarka Prasad shall be entitled for full salary.

3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Respondent-Dwarka Prasad was posted as a constable with Central Reserve Police Force (in short the CRPF) in F/74 Battalion, CRPF at Platoon Post, Jayanti Pura which was accommodated in a building on Batala Amritsar Road–a sensitive and terrorist infested area. He was on sentry duty from 1000 hrs. to 1200 hrs. on 31.8.1989 on the roof of the building. He had been issued a 7.62 mm SLR and 40 rounds of ammunition. At about 1115 hrs, he fired one bullet without orders and without any sufficient reason. A Court of Inquiry was conducted and it was established that he alone was responsible for the firing in which he had sustained bullet injury in his abdomen. Accordingly a departmental inquiry in terms of Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (in short the Rules) was ordered alleging misconduct and negligence/remissness in discharge of his duty in his capacity as a member of the Force. The inquiry was conducted and the respondent-Dwarka Prasad was given opportunity to defend himself. The inquiry officer found the respondent guilty of charges framed against him. After consideration of the representation made by respondent-Dwarka Prasad, the Commandant dismissed him from the services with effect from 20.01.1990 under Rule 27(a)(i) of the Rules.

4. Against the order of dismissal respondent preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short the DIGP), CRPF. During pendency of the appeal, a writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution) which was numbered as M.P. No. 2978 of 1990. The High Court by its order dated 26.11.1990 dismissed the petition but direction was given for disposal of the appeal pending before the DIGP, CRPF who dismissed the appeal. A revision petition before Additional Director General (in short the ADG), CRPF did not bring any relief.

5. A review petition was filed before the Director General (in short the DG), CRPF who modified the punishment of dismissal to one of removal considering the respondent-Dwarka Prasads young age and short length of service. Against the said order a writ petition bearing number M.P. No. 2150 of 1992 was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The High Court by the impugned judgment held that the defence of the respondent-Dwarka Prasad was not properly considered by any departmental authority and the punishment awarded was shockingly disproportionate. Accordingly as noted above the punishment was set aside and direction for reinstatement with certain other benefits was given.

6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the Union of India and its functionaries submitted that the High Court has completely overlooked the fact that the respondent-Dwarka Prasad was a member of a disciplined Force. He had committed a serious misconduct and after taking into account the relevant factors, the departmental authority initially passed the order of dismissal, which by taking a compassionate view the DG on review modified to that of removal from service. The High Court did not indicate even any reason a

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2006 Supreme(SC) 946

IMPORTANT POINTUnless the punishment imposed by Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference.

Cases Referred (6)

IMPORTANT POINT
Unless the punishment imposed by Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference.