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2006 Supreme(SC) 956

2006(8) Supreme 1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Uttaranchal High Court)
G.P. Mathur and A.K. Mathur, JJ.
Union of India—Appellant
versus
M/s. Shring Construction Company Private Limited—Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 4516 of 2006
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 26627 of 2005)
Decided on 17-10-2006
Counsel of the Parties :
For the Appellant : B. Dutta, A.S.G., Ms. Purnima Bhat Kak and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not excluded from the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996.

Headnote:Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 34Limitation Act, 1963—Section 14—Delay in filing application u/s. 34 of the Act for setting aside arbitral award—Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act—Condonation of delay by excluding time in prosecuting remedy before the High Court—Works Contract—Appointment of Arbitrator by the High Court. Award of Arbitrator published on 30-11-2004 and a copy thereof was received by appellant on 3-12-2004—Appellant being aggrieved with the award filed a writ petition challenging the award before the High Court under a bona fide belief that since the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court, the award could by challenged in the High Court by filing writ petition—Writ petition dismissed in limine being not maintainable on ground that the award ought to have been challenged u/s. 34 of the Act by filing objections in the Court of District Judge—Application u/s. 34 of the Act, filed beyond even the extended period of 30 days dismissed as barred by limitation—Application for condonation of delay—Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act has been excluded from ambit of Arbitration Act—(No)—It being a bona fide error on part of Union of India to have filed writ petition in the High Court—Period spent by appellant in prosecuting the remedy before the High Court is liable to be deducted—Matter remitted back to the trial Court to decide plea of limitation.

       Held : In view of the decision in the Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 we think it just and proper to remit this matter back to the trial court to decide whether the application for setting aside the award under section 34 of the Act filed by the appellant could be considered to be within the period of limitation i.e. after deducting the period spent by the appellant in prosecuting the remedy before the High Court.(Para 5)

       

JUDGMENT

A.K. Mathur, J.—Leave granted.

2. The short question involved in this appeal is whether Section 14 of the Limitation is applicable to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ( hereinafter to be referred to as the "Act ") or not ?

3. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in First Appeal No.67 of 2005 on 17.8.2005 whereby the Division Bench has affirmed the order dated 6.8.2005 passed by the District Judge, Dehradun in Arbitration Case No.170 of 2005 dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the arbitral award on account of being barred by time.

4. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the appellant – Union of India entered into a contract i.e. No. CEB/DDN/14 of 1993-94 (for a value of Rs.82,34,789/-) with the respondent herein through the Chief Engineer, Bareilly Zone for construction of residential accommodation for Officers and staff of Defence Accounts Department at Lansdowne. The work was to be completed by the respondent in three phases by the dates specified in the contract. However, the respondent failed to complete the contract work within the stipulated period despite grant of extension of time by the appellant- Union of India. However, the final bill of the respondent was duly settled. Subsequently, the respondent raised a dispute and filed an application before the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital for appointment of an arbitrator. The High Court by its order dated 21.7.2003, appointed Justice K.D. Shahi (former Judge of Allahabad High Court) as the arbitrator. The award was published on 30.11.2004 and a copy thereof was received by the appellant on 3.12.2004. As per the award, a sum of Rs.28,94,720/- was awarded in favour of the respondent to be paid by the appellant- Union of India with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The appellant being aggrieved with the aforesaid award filed a writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No.283 of 2005 challenging the award before the High Court of Uttaranchal, at Nainital under a bona fide belief that since the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court, the award could be challenged in the High Court by filing writ petition. However, the writ petition was dismissed on 4.4.2005 in limine being not maintainable on the ground that the award ought to have been challenged under Section 34 of the Act by filing objections in the court of District Judge, Dehradun. Hence, an objection under Section 34 of the Act was filed before the District Judge, Dehradun along with an application for condonation of delay and the same came to be registered as Arbitration Case No.170 of 2005. According to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act for setting aside an arbitral award, an application may be made within three months from the date on which the party making application had received the arbitral award or if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. There is further proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 that the period for filing the application can be extended if the applicant could show that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months by further 30 days but not thereafter. In the present case, admittedly the application was filed beyond even the extended period of 30 days. Hence, the District Judge dismissed the application for condonation of delay as well application for setting aside the award being barred by time. The first appeal preferred against that order before the High Court by the appellant was also dismissed. Aggrieved against that order, the present appeal has been filed.

5. Mr. B. Dutta, learned Additional Solicitor General for the appellant submitted that it is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will have no application in these proce





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