JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted.

2. Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court holding that the order of detention passed by the Additional District Magistrate and Police Commissioner, Hubli, Dharwad city, directing detention of one Shri Ramesh Madhusa Bhandage (hereinafter referred to as the detenu) under the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 (in short the Act). The habeas corpus petition filed by the appellant who is brother-in-law of the detenu was dismissed by the High Court.

3. The order of detention was passed on 7.10.2005 under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and the detenu was taken into custody that very day. Subsequently, the detenu was furnished with the grounds of detention dated 7.10.2005 which were also supplied to him that very day. The Detaining Authority submitted a report to the Government as required under law within 12 days from the date of order of detention, which passed an order approving the detention under Section 3(3) of the Act. The order of approval is dated 11.10.2005. The aforesaid order of detention was challenged before the High Court. During the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court the Advisory Board to whom the Government had referred the matter also approved the order of detention. The Government accepted the said report and passed an order in terms of Section 13 of the Act. The said order of the Government was not called in question by the detenu. Several points were urged in support of the habeas corpus petition. Primarily following points were urged in support of the habeas corpus petition. Firstly, even assuming that the detenu is a boot-legger within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act, his activities cannot be considered as likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Secondly, the detenu had submitted his reply to the Detaining Authority who rejected the same. Once the order passed under Section 3(2) has been approved by the State Government under Section 3(3), the Detaining Authority became functus officio and any representation given to the Detaining Authority ought to have been transmitted to be considered by the State Government. Thirdly, the proposals made by the Sponsoring Authority were verbatim reproduced in the grounds of detention. Fourthly, the orders of acquittal passed by the Criminal Court in respect of two cases were not supplied to him. Therefore, subjective satisfaction was affected. Fifthly, there was no report of the Forensic Department that the liquor sold or manufactured by the detenu was unfit for human consumption. Non-supply of order referred to above, rendered the order of detention vitiated. If it is held that the documents are not supplied then the Detaining Authoritys decision is based on irrelevant consideration. The Detaining Authority and the State Government countered each of the contentions.

4. The High Court did not find any substance in the different grounds pressed into service and held that the detention was in order. The High Court referred to Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors. (JT 1995 (3) 639) which is relied upon by the appellant, and held that the said case was rendered under the COFEPOSA Act and the provisions are not in pari materia. There is no provision in the Act to show that the role of the Detaining Authority comes to an end after making an order. Under the relevant provision, that is Section 3(3), the State Government which has empowered the Detaining Authority assumes the role of the Detaining Authority. The Detaining Authority made the detenu aware of his right to make representation to the State Government and, therefore, there was no infraction.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant urged one point i.e. Detaining Authority became functus officio the moment