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1951 Supreme(SC) 28

Supreme Court Of India
Ram Singh
Versus
State of Delhi
Decided On : April 6, 1951

The right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is not absolute and can be restricted by a law that is authorized by the Constitution, such as the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.

Headnote:

PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT - [SECTION 3] - [ARTICLE 22(5)] - [ARTICLE 19(1)(A)] - Preventive detention of the petitioners for making speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order - Validity of the detention orders - Scope of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) - Interpretation of Articles 19, 21, and 22 - Grounds of detention - Sufficiency of particulars - Requirement of Article 22(5) - Mala fide conduct of the detaining authority - Burden of proof.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, President, Vice-President, and Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha of Delhi State, were arrested and detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, on the ground that their speeches were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. They challenged the validity of the detention orders, arguing that the provisions of the Act were unconstitutional and that the grounds of detention were too vague and indefinite to enable them to make effective representations to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

Finding of the Court:

1. The provisions of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, are constitutional and valid, as held by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (1950 S. C. R. 88). 2. The right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is not absolute and can be restricted by a law that is authorized by the Constitution, such as the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. 3. The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were sufficient to enable them to make their representations to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The requirement of Article 22(5) is satisfied if the deductions or conclusions of facts from which the order was based are disclosed, and it is not necessary to communicate the offending passages or their substance in cases where the speeches were made at public meetings and their general nature and effect were stated. 4. The petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that the detaining authority acted mala fide in issuing the detention orders.

Issues: 1. Whether the provisions of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, are constitutional and valid. 2. Whether the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is absolute or can be restricted by a law that is authorized by the Constitution. 3. Whether the grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were sufficient to enable them to make their representations to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution. 4. Whether the detaining authority acted mala fide in issuing the detention orders.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, are constitutional and valid, as held by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (1950 S. C. R. 88). 2. The Supreme Court held that the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is not absolute and can be restricted by a law that is authorized by the Constitution, such as the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. 3. The Supreme Court held that the grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were sufficient to enable them to make their representations to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The requirement of Article 22(5) is satisfied if the deductions or conclusions of facts from which the order was based are disclosed, and it is not necessary to communicate the offending passages or their substance in cases where the speeches were made at public meetings and their general nature and effect were stated. 4. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that the detaining authority acted mala fide in issuing the detention orders.

Final Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and upheld the validity of the detention orders.

Judgment

PATANJALI SASTRI, J.

( 1 ) THESE three petns. have been presented to this Ct. under Art. 32, Const. Ind. praying for the issue of writs in the nature of habeas corpus for release of the petnrs. who are respectively the President, Vice-President and Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha of the Delhi State.

( 2 ) THE petnrs. were arrested on 22/8/1950 by order of the Dist. Mag. , Delhi, made under subs. (2) read with cl. (a) sub-cl. (i) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (hereinafter refd. to as the Act ). The order ran as follows :"whereas I, Rameshwar Dayal, Dist. Mag. , Delhi, am satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do so, I Rameshwar Dayal, Dist. , Mag, Delhi, hereby order the detention of. . . . . . . . . . . under- sub s. (2) of S. 3 (1) (a) (ii), Preventive Detention Act. Given under my seal and signature. "

( 3 ) THE grounds of detention communicated to the petnrs. were in identical terms, save as to the dates on which the speeches were said to have been made, and read thus :"in pursuance of S. 7, Preventive Detention Act, you are hereby informed that the grounds on which the detention order dated 22/8/1950 has been made against you are that your speeches generally in the past and particulary on. . . . . . August 1950 at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order. "

( 4 ) THE petnrs. applied to the H. C. at Simla for similar relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but the petns. were dismissed. It appears to have been contended before the learned judges (Khosla and Falshaw JJ.) who heard those petns. that although this Ct. held in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, 1950 S. C. R. 88, that the provisions of S. 3 of the Act were constitutional and valid, detention under that section was ultra vires and illegal where, as here, it was based on the ground of making speeches prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. This was said to be the result of the later pronouncements of this Ct. in Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi, 1950 S. C. R. 605, and Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, 1950 S. C. R. 594. This contention was rejected on the ground that no such proviso could be read into S. 3 on the strength of the later decisions refd. to above which related to a different point, viz. , the scope of authorised restrictions on the right to freedom of speech conferred by Art. 19 (1 ). (Falshaw J. (with whom Khosla J. concurred), proceeded, however, to draw attention to what he conceived to be in "anomaly": while a State Govt. should not be allowed to interfere with the freedom of the press by way of stopping the circulation of newspapers or by pre-censorship of news, the Govt. should, for the same object be entitled to place a person under preventive detention which is "even greater restriction on personal liberty than any restriction on a newspaper ever could be. " This distinction appeared to the learned judge to be illogical, and he thought that there was "an apparent conflict" between the decisions of this Ct. in Gopalans case and the other cases, which could only be resolved by this Ct. "it would be well" the learned judge concluded "if the point were raised in this form at an early date in the S. C. "

( 5 ) NO wonder that, after this encouragement, the petnrs. have preferred these petns. raising the same contention before us. On behalf of the petnrs. Mr. Hardy submitted that the provisions of the Act should not be used to prevent a citizen from making speeches though they might be const. to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, for, maintenance of public order is not a purpose for which imposition of a restriction on freedom of speech is authorised by the Constitution, as held by this Ct. in the C




























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