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1967 Supreme(SC) 281

Supreme Court Of India
PASCAL FERNANDES
Versus
State of Maharashtra
Decided On : September 28, 1967

The Special Judge's powers to tender pardon under S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act are untrammelled and can be exercised suo motu, but the Special Judge must act with due propriety, considering the nature of the evidence the person seeking pardon is likely to give and consulting with the prosecution before making the decision.

Headnote:

CRIMINAL LAW - Tender of Pardon - Special Judge's Power - Scope and Limitations - Interpretation of S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 - Distinction from S. 337 and 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - Considerations for Tendering Pardon - Propriety of Tendering Pardon Suo Motu - Public Policy.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, an accused in a conspiracy to cheat the Naval Dockyard authorities, challenged the tender of pardon to a co-accused by the Special Judge under S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, arguing that the Special Judge acted without being invited by the prosecution and that the discretion was not properly exercised.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the Special Judge's powers to tender pardon under S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act are untrammelled and not conditioned by considerations underlying S. 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which governs the summoning of material witnesses. The Court further held that the Special Judge's action was not outside his jurisdiction, as the power to tender pardon can be exercised at any time after the case is received for trial and before its conclusion, and it may include a person arraigned before him.

Issues: 1. Whether the Special Judge's powers to tender pardon under S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act are limited to an application by the prosecution or can be exercised suo motu. 2. Whether the Special Judge's discretion in tendering pardon is circumscribed by considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. 3. Whether the Special Judge acted with due propriety in tendering pardon to the co-accused in the present case.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and found that the Special Judge's powers to tender pardon are not limited to an application by the prosecution. The Court reasoned that the language of the provision is wide enough to enable the Special Judge to tender pardon to any person supposed to have been involved in the offense, including a person arraigned before him. 2. The Court held that the Special Judge's discretion in tendering pardon is not circumscribed by considerations of public policy and the interests of justice as long as the action is taken with a view to obtaining evidence and the person seeking pardon makes a full and true disclosure of the circumstances relating to the offense. 3. The Court found that the Special Judge did not act with due propriety in tendering pardon to the co-accused in the present case because he failed to inquire into the nature of the evidence the co-accused was likely to give and did not consult with the prosecution before making the decision.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the tender of conditional pardon to the co-accused, as the prosecution also agreed to the tender of pardon.

Judgment

M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Bombay dated July 20, l967 dismissing a criminal revision application filed by the appellant against an order of the Special Judge, Bombay tendering pardon to a co-accused under S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1952. The appellant is being tried before the Special Judge, Bombay along with seven others for conspiracy to cheat the officers of the Naval Dockyard and under S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The substantive charges against the several accused are different but it is not necessary to mention them here. The gist of the accusation is that the several accused had entered into criminal conspiracy to cheat the authorities of the Naval Dockyard. Material purchased locally was certified to be of superior quality while it was, in fact, inferior. In this and in diverse ways the Naval Dockyard Authorities were cheated to the tune of Rupees 8,65,000 and odd. Among the array of the accused in the case are three contractors (accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7) and their servant (accused No. 8), and four Government servants of whom accused No. l is the appellant before us. Of the remaining three Government servants, accused No. 4 (M. M. Jagasia) was an Upper Division Clerk working as Office Supdt. at the material time drawing a salary of Rs. 200 per month. Against Jagasia there is yet another charge, namely, that he is in possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income which fact, if proved, is likely to lead to a presumption under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Evidence has already been accumulated, which is calculated to show that he is in possession of three motor cars, a building valued at Rs. 28,000 and odd and currency notes in a locker of the value of Rs. 16,400 in addition to gold and other ornaments and his bank balance.

( 2 ) THE case appears to have been previously before Mr. R. K. Joshi, Special Judge, Greater Bombay and he framed charges against the accused in the case, on the basis of material furnished by the prosecution under the provision of S. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The case then went before the present Special Judge, Mr. N. M. Indurkar. The case was fixed for trial from April 24, l967. On Ap 20/04/1967, Jagasia made an application to the Court praying that he should be tendered pardon and made an approver and examined as a prosecution witness. The reason given by Jagasia was that he had full and complete knowledge of all that had taken place between the officers and the contractors and that he was in a position to disclose how the conspiracy was farmed and the several offences committed. He said that he was making this offer "in order to unburden the mental tension and in order to help the cause of Justice. " He also stated that he had not been given any threat, promise or any inducement by any police officer and that he was making the application voluntarily.

( 3 ) THE application of Jagasia was stoutly opposed by his co-accused, particularly the appellant before us. It was contended on his behalf that the granting of pardon to secure evidence, whether under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under S. 8 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, was essentially for the prosecution to consider in the first instance; that the application being made after the framing of the charges was not legally tenable; that the prosecution considered the evidence sufficient for the successful prosecution of all the accused including Jagasia himself; that the evidence against Jagasia was likely to be fortified by the presumption under the Prevention of Corruption Act and that the grant of pardon to him would be an act of favour to him and highly prejudicial to the defence of other accused. The special Judge, Greater Bombay, after hearing arguments tendered a conditional pardon to Jagasia and ordered that he shall be examined as an approver and witness for the pr












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