1. Fraud in a bank — Sanction for prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC — High Court quashed sanction on grounds of lack of hearing and departmental exoneration. (Para 3 )
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1995 Supreme(SC) 827
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Superintendent of Police (C. B. I)
VERSUS
Deepak Chowdhary
DECIDED ON: AUGUST 17, 1995
Important Points
The grant of sanction for prosecution is an administrative function, not a quasi-judicial one; therefore, providing the accused an opportunity of hearing is not required. Furthermore, exoneration in a departmental inquiry is irrelevant to the decision of whether to grant sanction for criminal prosecution.
Subject
Criminal Law - Sanction for Prosecution
Act Referred
Headnote
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120b, 420, 467, 468, 471,477a, 201 and 109 – Criminal Conspiracy and Cheating – Departmental Enquiry –Sanction - During year 1982, while respondent No. 1 was working as a Branch Manager in Desh Priya branch of United Bank of India at Calcutta it was realised that certain officers working in that bank had conspired with a creditor and the bank was defrauded for a sum of Rs. 45,000. 00 - On a complaint laid, a crime case was registered and appellant investigated matter and submitted report to competent authority for sanction, who, by its order - It is contended for the appellant that question of giving an opportunity to charged officer before granting sanction does not arise since it is not a quasi judicial function. Grant of sanction is an administrative function - What is required is that investigating officer should place all necessary material before sanctioning authority who should apply its mind to that material and accord sanction - Therefore, question of giving opportunity of hearing to accused before granting sanction does not arise - Held, Authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice - Second ground of departmental exoneration by the disciplinary authority is also not relevant - What is necessary and material is whether the facts collected during investigation would constitute the offence for which the sanction has been sought for - It is not appropriate at this stage to go into the merits of the culpability of respondent though sought to be contended for by Shri Thopas Roy, the learned counsel - In fairness to accused, we deem it inappropriate to go into the merits to express any opinion - Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether grant of sanction is a quasi-judicial function requiring a hearing for the accused or an administrative function requiring only application of mind to investigation material. (Para 4 )
3. Grant of sanction is an administrative act requiring the authority to be satisfied by investigation material; departmental exoneration does not preclude granting sanction for criminal prosecution. (Para 5 , 6 )
4. Grant of sanction for prosecution is an administrative function; therefore, the principles of natural justice requiring a hearing for the accused do not apply. (Para 5 )
5. Appeal allowed — High Court order set aside — Trial Court directed to proceed with the trial expeditiously. (Para 8 )
6. Is a hearing required before granting sanction for prosecution?
No. The grant of sanction is an administrative function, not a quasi-judicial one. The sanctioning authority must only consider the material provided by the investigating officer to reach a prima facie satisfaction that the facts constitute the offense. (Para 5 )
7. Does exoneration in a departmental enquiry prevent the grant of sanction for criminal prosecution?
No. Departmental exoneration is irrelevant to the decision to grant sanction. The material consideration is whether the facts collected during the investigation constitute the offense for which sanction is sought. (Para 6 )
( 1 ) LEAVE granted.
( 2 ) DELAY of 232 days condoned.
( 3 ) THE facts lie in a short compass. During the year 1982, while the respondent No. 1 was working as a Branch Manager in Desh Priya branch of the United Bank of India at Calcutta it was realised that certain officers working in that bank had conspired with a creditor and the bank was defrauded for a sum of Rs. 45,000. 00. On a complaint laid, a crime case was registered and the appellant investigated the matter and submitted the report to the competent authority for sanction, who, by its order dated the 14/01/1987 accorded sanction under 6 (1-C) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, p. C. Act) to file the charge-sheet against the respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 120b, 420, 467, 468, 471,477a, 201 and 109 I. P. C. and also under Section 5 (1) (d) read with Section 5 (2) of the P. C. Act. The respondent filed writ petition in the High Court to quash the sanction. The High Court by the impugned order dated the 2/04/1992 in Matter No. 498/87 quashed the sanction on two grounds, namely, that the respondent was not given any opportunity of hearing before granting sanction and in the departmental equiry conducted by the Bank, respondent was exonerated of the charge. Therefore, it was not expedient to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. Hence, the above appeal has been filed.
( 4 ) IT is contended for the appellant that the question of giving an opportunity to the charged officer before granting sanction does not arise since it is not a quasi judicial function. Grant of sanction is an administrative function. What is required is that the investigating officer should place all the necessary material before the sanctioning authority who should apply its mind to that material and accord sanction. Therefore, the question of giving opportunity of hearing to the accused before granting sanction does not arise.
( 5 ) WE find force in the contention. The grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a Court of law. What is material at that time is that the necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act the need to provide an opportunity of hearing the accused before according sanction does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice.
( 6 ) THE second ground of departmental exoneration by the disciplinary authority is also not relevant. What is necessary and material is whether the facts collected during investigation would constitute the offence for which the sanction has been sought for.
( 7 ) IT is not appropriate at this stage to go into the merits of the culpability of the respondent though sought to be contended for by Shri Thopas Roy, the learned counsel. In fairness to the accused, we deem it inappropriate to go into the merits to express any opinion.
( 8 ) THE appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial against the respondent as expeditiously as possible and conduct joint trial, if trial is not already concluded along with other accused. If the case has been separated and the trial of other accused has been concluded, then the trial Court is directed to expeditiously conclude the trial of the respondent, not exceeding one year. Appeal allowed.
