Judgment

HEGDE,

( 1 ) IN this appeal by special leave against the decision of the high Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil application No. 5 of 1961, the only question pressed for decision at the hearing was whether the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 11 A of the c. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (for brevitys sake to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) contravene Article 14 of the Constitution in so far as they affect proceedings under sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act.

( 2 ) THE appellant was a registered dealer under the Act during the period material for our present purpose. During the period in question it carried on the business of winning and selling manganese ore from its mines in the States of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. In respect of the period from 1st January, 1953, to 31st December, 1953, the appellant filed quarterly returns as required by law showing nil taxable turnovers since according to it all the sales effected by it during that period were exempt from payment of sales tax in view of Article 286 of the Constitution and section 27a of the Act. The returns for the first and the last quarters of that year were submitted within the prescribed period but those for the second and third quarters were submitted beyond the said period. On 2nd December, 1957, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax issued notices to the appellant under section 11 (2) calling upon it to produce evidence in support of its returns in respect of the first and last quarters of 1953. On the same day he issued notices to the appellant under section 10 (3) in respect of the second and third quarters of that year.

( 3 ) THE appellant objected to the validity of those notices. It contended that those notices were barred by time. The Assistant Commissioner of sales Tax kept the proceedings pending. This he did possibly because of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bisesar House v. State of Bombay , which lent support to the contention of the appellant. That decision laid down that the period of limitation prescribed under section 11a is to be imported in section 11 (2) and therefore a notice under section 11 (2) cannot be issued after the expiry of three years from the end of the relevant period for which the assessment is to be made. . Evidently to overcome the effect of that decision the Bombay Legislature enacted Bombay Act 22 of 1959 which came into force on 18th April 1959. Among other provisions that act incorporated one more sub-section to section 11 A, i. e. , sub-section (3),which reads : " (a) Nothing in sub-sections (1) and (2) (i) shall apply to any proceeding (including any notice issued) under section 11 or 22-A or 22-B and (ii) notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal, shall be deemed ever to have been applicable to such proceeding or notice. (b) The validity of any such proceeding or notice shall not be called in question merely on the ground that such proceeding or notice was inconsistent with the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2),"

( 4 ) IT was contended on behalf of the appellant that the newly introduced section 11a (3) brought about a discrimination between those dealers who submit their returns within the time prescribed and those who do not do so. According to the appellant, the differentiation made between those two classes is without any just-basis and the classification made has no reason- able nexus with the object of the Act. It was said there is no substantial difference between those two classes; both section 11 (2) as well as section 11 A deal with escaped turnovers ; both classes of cases have common characteristics and properties ; therefore there is no just basis to fix a period of limitation in one case and deny that benefit to the other. It was further said that the differentiation made between the two classes of dealers is invidious and irrational; in fact, the persons who have wilfully committed a breach of the law are tr