( 27 ) TURNING to aspect (b) which is really the crux of the matter on merits, we shall have to ascertain the precise nature of the three claims in order to determine whether they fall within the Arbitration Clause which uses expressions of the widest possible amplitude and content. While narrating the chronological events in the earlier part of our Judgment we have indicated what these three claims are and how they have arisen. The three claims are: (a) 2. 1 million U. S. dollars being the Unpaid Regular Interest, (b) U. S. $7,84,151. 84 being the Delinquent Interest and (c) 4. 1 million U. S. dollars being the Compensatory Damages. As explained earlier the first claim represents the quantum of 73% of the regular interest which was wrongly deducted and wrongly withheld and retained by Renusagar from 1970 onwards allegedly for payment of income-tax not withstanding the Delhi High court's judgment in effect retrospectively restoring the tax exemption granted in favour of G. E. C. ; the second claim. represents interest claimed by G. E. C. on account of the delay that occurred in the payment of four instalments of purchase price together with interest on their due dates as per the original Schedule of Payment, while the third claim is by way of compensation for illegally and wrongfully retaining and enjoying the use of the first two funds by Renusagar and depriving G. E. C. the use thereof for 12 long years. Whereas Renusagar has contended that none of these claims falls within the purview of the Arbitration Clause G. E. C. has claimed that all of them do within the wide language of that clause.

( 28 ) AS regards the first two claims counsel for Renusagar have pointed out that admittedly the first claim substantially (approx. 80%) and the second claim entirely are for interest due after 30/06/1967 (i. e. after thirtieth month from the Contract Effective Date) and according to counsel since the underlying commercial contract (IGE-9584) for supply and sale of goods and services contains no obligation to pay any interest after 30/06/1967 and since only the promissory notes provide for payment of such interest after 30/06/1967, these two claims do not "arise out of" the contract. nor are they "in relation thereto" but arise under the promissory notes and hence fall outside the scope of Arbitration Clause. Counsel further urged that the promissory notes executed by Renusagar were in complete discharge of obligation to pay price and interest thereon under the contract and since these notes constitute independent and separate contracts by themselves the liability arising thereunder cannot he regarded as any arising out of the contract or in relation thereto and in this behalf strong reliance was placed by counsel on the fact that in its notice of intention to arbitrate G. E. C. has described these claims as arising "under the promissory notes". Counsel pointed out that Article III of the contract provides for payment of the total purchaseprice in three modes, the third mode being by executing promissory notes and urged that since the requisite promissory notes were executed by Renusagar these notes must be regarded as having been executed in the complete discharge and satisfaction of the obligation under the contract and that the sole obligation which survives since after the execution of the notes is the one which arises under the notes. In support of this contention counsel relied upon two decisions of this court, namely (1) Ogle Glass Works Ltd. case where the posting of cheques by a purchaser by way of remitting the bills payable to the seller was held to amount to payment (that is, in discharge of the obligation to pay the price for goods purchased) and (2) H. P. Gupta v. Hiralal where the posting of a dividend - warrant (cheque) by a company at Delhi for dispatching it to a shareholder at his registered address (which was Meerut) as per Article 132 of the Articles of Association was deemed as payment to the shareholder in dischar