2007 Supreme(SC) 618

2007(3) Supreme 920
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Delhi High Court)
S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju, JJ.
Arunima Baruah — Appellant
versus
Union of India & Ors. — Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2205 of 2007
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9283 of 2006)
Decided on 27-4-2007
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Saurabh Ajay Gupta and Raj Kumar Tanwar, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Nikhil Nayyar and Ankit Singhal, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

Headnote:(i) Constitution of India — Article 226 — Writ petition — Suppression of fact by way of non-disclosure — Jurisdiction of Court to deny equitable relief — Termination of service — Appellant, an employee of Indian Council for Child Welfare filed a suit for declaration challenging order of termination as illegal — An application filed for grant of injunction was dismissed — Appellant filed a writ petition not disclosing the fact in regard to pendency of the said suit — However, before the writ petition came up for preliminary hearing, she filed an application for withdrawal of suit — Writ petition came up for preliminary hearing on 18-4-2001 while her application to withdraw the suit was allowed by an order dated 30-4-2001 — Writ petition, however, was dismissed by the High Court by an order dated 29-11-2002 on ground of a material concealment of fact and in view of conduct of petitioner — Whether, in this case, suppression of filing of the suit is a material fact — (No) — In the event, appellant files a fresh writ application, the same may be considered on its merits.

       Held : The court’s jurisdiction to determine the lis between the parties, therefore, may be viewed from the human rights concept of access to justice. The same, however, would not mean that the court will have no jurisdiction to deny equitable relief when the complainant does not approach the court with a pair of clean hands but to what extent such relief should be denied is the question. (Para 10)

       It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question. (Para 11)

       There is another doctrine which cannot also be lost sight of. The court would not ordinarily permit a party to pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same subject matter. [See Jai Singh v. Union of India and Others, (1977) 1 SCC 1] But, where one proceeding has been terminated without determination of the lis, can it be said that the disputant shall be without a remedy? (Para 16)

       Existence of an alternative remedy by itself, as was propounded in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. (supra) may not be a relevant factor as it is one thing to say that there exists an alternative remedy and, therefore, the court would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction but it is another thing to say that the court refuses to do so on the ground of suppression of facts. (Para 18)

       Ubi jus ibi remedium is a well known concept. The court while refusing to grant a relief to a person who comes with a genuine grievance in an arguable case should be given a hearing. [See Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi (supra)] In this case, however, the appellant had suppressed a material fact. It is evident that the writ petition was filed only when no order of interim injunction was passed. It was obligatory on the part of the appellant to disclose the said fact. (Para 19)

       In this case, however, suppression of filing of the suit is no longer a material fact. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court may be correct that, in a case of this nature, the court’s jurisdiction may not be invoked but that would not mean that another writ petition would not lie. When another writ petition is filed disclosing all the facts, the appellant would be approaching the writ court with a pair of clean hands, the court at that point of time will be entitled to determine the case on merits having regard to the human right of the appellant to access to justice and keeping in view the fact that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India. The judgment of the High Court, in a case of this nature, shall not operate as a res judicata. (Paras 20 and 21)

       (ii) LEGAL MAXIMS — Ubi jus ibi remedium — Meaning — Court while refusing to grant a relief to a person who comes with a genuine grievance in an arguable case should be given a hearing. (Para 19)