The case established the application of Section 25-F and Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act to contract-based employment, emphasizing the protection of workers' rights in such arrangements.

ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. The respondent herein was an employee of the appellant. On or about 12 - 7 - 1994, an agenda of a meeting was placed before the Municipal Executive Council being Agenda No. 143, which is in the following terms:

"As per the guidelines of the Government, the Municipal Council had required a clerk on contract basis immediately as in the octroi branch, one post is vacant and two employees are already on leave: for the engagement of Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Nathu Ram r/o Samrala who had already worked under the Municipal Council @ Rs 1000 p.m., till it deems necessary."

3. The said proposal came to be accepted by the Executive Council. C Pursuant thereto the respondent herein was appointed as a clerk on contract basis on a monthly salary of Rs 1000. In the offer of appointment it was specifically averred that "his services will be availed till it is considered as fit and proper and necessary. After that his services will be dispensed with".

4. The respondent affirmed an affidavit inter alia stating:

(1) That I am engaged as clerk on contract basis by the Municipal Council, Samrala @ Rs 1000 p.m. from 24 - 6 - 1994.

(2) That I am ready to do whatsoever job or department assigned to me by the Municipal Council, Samrala.

(3) That I have no objection if the Municipal Council, Samrala would have dispensed with my services as they have a right to do this.

His services were dispensed with by an order dated 22 - 5 - 1997.

5. An industrial dispute having been raised, the matter was referred to the Labour Court, Ludhiana. In its award dated 11 - 2 - 2003, the learned Presiding Judge, Labour Court came to the conclusion that:

"It has been established that in the first spell, the workman worked from 24 - 6 - 1994 to 2 - 3 - 1996 and again from 7 - 3 - 1997 to 21 - 5 - 1997 and his services having been terminated vide office order Ext. M - 5, he had worked for more than 240 days in the last calendar year, prior to termination of his services."

6. It is, thus, not in dispute that the respondent had worked intermittently. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any dispute that the terms of employment were as contained in the offer of appointment as noticed supra. The learned Presiding Judge, Labour Court in terms of his award dated 11 - 2 - 2003, on a finding that the said order of termination of the respondent was in violation of the provisions of Section 25 - F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the Act" for short) directed that he be reinstated in service with 25% back wages. The appellant herein filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed.

7. Before the High Court as also before us, the appellant contended that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 2(00)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the respondent having been appointed for a fixed period on contract basis, Section 25 - F of the Act will have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. Both the learned Judges of the Labour Court as also of the High Court negatived the said contention on the ground that the offer of appointment issued in favour of the respondent· did not indicate that the same was for a fixed period.

8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant raised a short question in support of this appeal. It was submitted that having regard to the definition of "retrenchment" as contained in Section 2(oo)(bb), the respondent having been appointed on a contract basis, the provisions of Section 25 - F will have no application. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on other hand, submitted that the terms and conditions of appointment of the respondent nowhere suggest that the same was in relation to either in respect of a project or for a fixed period, and in that view of the matter the. provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act would have no application in the instant case. Learned counsel furthermore urged that from a p