2007 Supreme(SC) 1004

2007(5) Supreme 668
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
Dr. Arijit Pasayat & P.P. Naolekar, JJ.
Smt. Shakuntala — Petitioner
versus
State of Haryana — Respondent
Appeal (crl.) 376 of 2002
Decided on : 27-07-2007

Important Points
The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim “nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri, a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.”
Dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. However, it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.

Headnote:Dying declaration – Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act makes relevant what is generally described as dying declaration, though such an expression has not been used in any Statute – It essentially means statements made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death – Such statements are admitted on two grounds – Firstly, necessity for the victim being generally the only principal eye-witness to the crime, the exclusion of the statement might deflect the ends of justice – Secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a sanction equal to the obligation of an oath – The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity; a situation so solemn and so lawful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of justice – The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim “nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri, a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.” (Para 7)

       (1789) 1 Leach 500 – Relied upon.

       The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Dying declaration – The situation in which a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement – Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, such exclusion would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence – Because in case of dying declaration, the accused is deprived of cross-examination, the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness – However it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. (Paras 8, 9,

       AIR 1992 SC 1817 – Relied upon.

       Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – If after careful scrutiny the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Para 10)

       JT 1992 (2) SC 417; JT 1993 (5) SC 87; JT 1994 (3) SC 232; JT 1996 (2) SC 595 – Relied upon.

       Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – There being no material showing the dying declaration to be result of product of imagination, tutoring or prompting; rather the same appearing to have been made by the deceased voluntarily; it is trustworthy, credible and believable. (Para 11 and 12)

       Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – The facts of the case clearly indicating the intention of the appellant as she fully knew that the deceased would be burnt to death – Materials on record clearly showing that the murder was intentionally committed – The trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that Section 302 IPC was applicable. (Para 13)

       Facts of the case :

       Suman (the ‘deceased’) had been married with son of accused-appellant, about two years prior to the incident. At about 9.00 A.M. on 6th April, 1997, the deceased and the accused had a quarrel over the inadequate dowry brought at the time of the marriage. As the deceased was fed up with the daily squabbles, she picked up a can of Kerosene oil to scare her mother-in-law-the appellant with an intention to keep her quiet, but the appellant on the contrary, took out a match box and set the deceased on fire and having done so ran out of the room calling out that deceased had set herself on fire. The villagers, who had collected there on hearing the noise, rushed her to the P.G.I.M.S., Rohtak, A ruqa sent to the police post, brought ASI Om Parkash (PW-7) and after collecting the medico-legal report from the hospital, he moved an application before Dr. Ranbir Singh (PW-5) who certified her to be fit to make a statement. Shri A.K. Singhal, JMIC, Rohtak (PW-6) was brought to the hospital, who recorded her statement and on its basis, the formal F.I.R. was registered at 4.45 P.M. on 6th April, 1997 initially for offences punishable under Section 307 IPC but on Suman’s death on 11th April, 1997, the offence was converted to one under Section 302 IPC. On completion of the investigation, the accused was charged for offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and in the alternative for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and as she pleaded not guilty, was brought to trial.

       The trial Court found the accused guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC while acquitting her from the other charges. Appeal was dismissed by High Court.

       Findings of the Court:

       The dying declaration was made voluntarily and it is trustworthy, credible and believable.

       Appellant intentionally and knowingly committed murder of the deceased.

       Result : Appeal dismissed.