Important Point
An order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed.

Headnote:Interpretation of statute – In interpreting a provision dealing with limitation, a liberal interpretation in a situation of this nature should be given – Although an order passed after expiry of the period of limitation fixed under the statute would be a nullity, the same would not mean that a principle of interpretation applied thereto should not be such so as to mean that not only an order is required to be made but the same is also required to be communicated – It is difficult to comprehend that while fixing a period of limitation, the Parliament did not visualise the possibility of abuse of power on the part of the statutory authority – It advisedly chose the word ‘made’ and not ‘communicated’– Even if a statute requires strict interpretation, words thereto would not be added. (Paras 16 to 18)
       Words and phrases – Made – A distinction, exists in construction of the word ‘made’ depending upon question as to whether power was required to be exercised within the period of limitation prescribed therefor or in order to provide person aggrieved to avail remedies if he is aggrieved thereby or dissatisfied therewith – Ordinarily, the words ‘given’ and ‘made’ carry the same meaning – An order passed by a competent authority dismissing a Government servant from services requires communication but an order placing a Government servant on suspension does not require communication of that order – An order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed. (Paras 27 and 28)
       1992 Supp. (1) SCC 471; AIR 1966 SC 1313; AIR 1970 SC 214 – Relied upon.
       AIR 1954 SC 194; AIR 1961 SC 1500; (1999) 7 SCC 510; 2007 (7) SCALE 380 – Referred.
       Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 – Section 126(4) – In construing the word ‘made’ High Court erred in proceeding on a wrong premise opining that the power could be misused by the Commissioner – High Court failed to notice that there exists a presumption that the official act is presumed to have been done in regular course of business – There also exists a presumption that a statutory functionary would act honestly and bona fide. (Para 29)
       Facts of the case :
       Respondents were the owners of a property bearing No.1/2 of 1 (1&3) Part, Ram Kishore Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, which was proposed to be assessed for property taxes by the competent authority of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, a notice wherefor was issued in March 1997 purported to be under Section 126 of the Act to fix the rateable value thereof at Rs.50,00,000/- with effect from 01.04.1996. Respondents objected to the said proposal.
       By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 25.08.2004, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the said decision of the learned Single Judge opining that the date of the order ‘made’ in terms of Section 126(4) of the Act should be taken to be the date when the same was communicated to the assessee and not the one when it was signed.
       Findings of the Court:
       An order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed.
       Result : Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT

S.B. SINHA, J.—

1.Leave granted.

2.The meaning of the word ‘made’ occurring in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter called and referred to, for the sake of brevity, as ‘the Act’), is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 25.08.2004 passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 162 of 2003, reversing the judgment and order dated 21.10.2002 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said court.

3.Before adverting to the question involved in this appeal, we may notice the basic fact of the matter.

4.Respondents herein are the owners of a property bearing No.1/2 of 1 (1&3) Part, Ram Kishore Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, which was proposed to be assessed for property taxes by the competent authority of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, a notice wherefor was issued in March 1997 purported to be under Section 126 of the Act to fix the rateable value thereof at Rs.50,00,000/- with effect from 01.04.1996. Respondents herein objected to the said proposal. They filed various documents in support of their case stating that the property in question had jointly been purchased by Anil Gupta, Qimat Rai Gupta and Vinod Gupta by four separate deeds of sale for a total consideration of Rs.32,00,000/-. The market value of the land was assessed by the assessee at Rs. 89,93,100/- comprising of the value of the land at Rs.42,19,000/- and cost of construction at Rs.51,00,000/-. The said market value disclosed by the assessee was not accepted by the assessing authority. The assessing officer upon hearing the respondents assessed the value at Rs.1,40,90,100/- and determined the rateable value therefor at Rs. 11,97,660/- with effect from 01.04.1996. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of assessment, Respondents preferred an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi, in terms of Section 169 of the Act, inter alia, on the ground that the order of assessment was barred by limitation. By reason of an order dated 14.12.2000, the appellate authority opined that no amendment in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 126 of the Act could be made after lapse of period of three years from the end of the year in which the notice was given and as the notice in the case had been issued in the period ending 31.03.1997, the order of assessment could be made only upto 31.03.2000.

It was further held :

“Now coming to the questions what is meaning of word ‘made’ whether it has to be taken as a date of passing the order or the date when it was communicated to the party concerned. The dictionary meaning of word ‘made’ is built or formed. This is discussed in AIR 1956 Madras 79 wherein it has been held that term ‘made’ has to be liberally construed as the date on which the order is communicated to the concerned parties and reaches them. Taking the same into consideration, the present order cannot be said to have been communicated to the assessee/appellants within three years which is illegal. Accordingly, I set aside the impugned order dated 31.3.2000 being time barred. The property be assessed on the RV already in existence prior to the passing of order dated 31.3.2000. No order as to cost. File be consigned to R/R.”

5.Appellant herein being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order dated 14.12.2000 filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 3227 of 2002. A learned Single Judge of the said Court allowed the said writ petition remanding the matter to the appellate authority directing it to determine the question on merits and in accordance with law.

6.Respondents field an intra-court appeal thereagainst. By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 25.08.2004, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the said decision of the learned Single Judge opining that the date of the order ‘made’ in terms of Section 126(4) of the Act should be taken to be the date when the same was communicated

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2007 Supreme(SC) 1007

2007(5) Supreme 680Supreme Court of India(From Delhi High Court)S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi, JJ.Municipal Corporation of Delhi — PetitionerversusQimat Rai Gupta & Ors. — RespondentsAppeal (civil) 3303 of 2007[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 3553 of 2005]Decided on : 27-07-2007

Important PointAn order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed.

Cases Referred (7)

2007(5) Supreme 680
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi, JJ.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi — Petitioner
versus
Qimat Rai Gupta & Ors. — Respondents
Appeal (civil) 3303 of 2007
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 3553 of 2005]
Decided on : 27-07-2007

Important Point
An order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed.