ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. The point involved in the present case is as to whether an illegitimate child can acquire/claim as of right a share in the joint Hindu family property.

3. The High Court relying upon the judgment of a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Nirmalamma v. G. Seethapathi has held that under Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short "the Act"), the illegitimate child would be entitled to succeed/claim a share in the joint Hindu family property as well. This view of the High Court is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi. In the said case this Court, interpreting the same provisions of the Act, has come to the conclusion that an illegitimate child cannot succeed/claim a share in the joint Hindu family property. Such illegitimate child would only be entitled to a share in the self-acquired property of the parents. It has been observed: (SCC pp. 733-34, para 5)

"5. So far as Section 16 of the Act is concerned, though it was f enacted to legitimise children, who would otherwise suffer by becoming illegitimate, at the same time it expressly provides in sub-section (3) by engrafting a provision with a non obstante clause stipulating specifically that nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage, which is null and void or which is annulled by a decree of nullity under Section 12, any rights in or to the property of any person, other than the parents, in any 9 case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents'. In the light of such an express mandate of the legislature itself, there is no room for according upon such children who but for Section 16 would have been branded as illegitimate any further rights than envisaged therein by resorting to any presumptive or inferential process of reasoning, having recourse to the mere object or purpose of enacting Section 16 of the Act. Any attempt to do so would amount to doing not only violence to the provision specifically en grafted in sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the Act but also would amount to court relegislating on the subject under the guise of interpretation, against even the will expressed in the enactment itself.

Consequently, we are unable to countenance the submissions on behalf of the appellants. The view taken by the courts below cannot be considered to suffer from any serious infirmity to call for our interference, in this appeal."

4. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court, the impugned order is set aside, the appeal is accepted and the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiffs is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.