(BEFORE ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.)
KRISHNA BHAGYA JAL NIGAM LTD.- Appellant;
Versus
MOHD. RAFI- Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 3639 of 2006,
decided on August 24,2006
Industrial Disputes Act - Termination of Services - Section 25-F - 10(1)(c) - Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimanil, Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, Municipal Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram, Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani, Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran Singh, Surendranagar District Pallchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, R.M. Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, ONGC Ltd. v. Shyamai Chandra Bhowmik, Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam v. Sham Lail
Fact of the Case:
The workman's services were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court set aside the termination and directed reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service. The Single Judge set aside the award, stating lack of evidence of the workman's service. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal filed by the workman.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court's order was erroneous as it failed to recognize the burden of proof on the workman to show completion of 240 days of service. The initial burden of proof was on the workman, and mere affidavits or self-serving statements were insufficient to discharge this burden.
Issues: The main issue was the termination of the workman's services without complying with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The court also addressed the burden of proof regarding the workman's completion of 240 days of service.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the burden of proof is on the workman to show completion of 240 days of service, and this burden is discharged only upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. Mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman.
Final Decision: The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
Judgment
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.-
1. Leave granted.
2.Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, Bangalore allowing the writ appeal filed € by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the workman") and restoring the award made by the Labour Court.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The workman had been working as a daily-wage employee with Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Limited (for short "the Jal Nigam") which, at the relevant point of time was executing the Upper Krishna Project in the State of Karnataka. His services were allegedly terminated which gave rise to an industrial dispute. According to the claim made by the workman he served the Jal Nigam from 29-10-1989 to 1-4-1996. He further claimed that his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"). A reference under Section 1O(1)(c) of the Act was made to the Labour Court, Gulbarga.
Several other employees had also challenged the termination of their services and other references had been made to the Labour Court and some of the employees had also filed applications before it under sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act. The reference made at the instance of the workman was contested by the Jal Nigam and on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties, the Labour Court recorded a finding that the services of the workman had been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and therefore the termination was illegal. Accordingly the termination was set aside and the Jal Nigam was directed to reinstate the workman with full back wages and continuity of service. This award came to be challenged by the Jal Nigam in WP No. 40822 of 1999. This writ petition was heard along with the writ petitions filed in the case of other workmen as well and all the writ petitions were disposed of by the learned Single Judge by a common order. In the case of other workmen there was considerable delay in raising the industrial dispute and therefore the learned Single Judge non-suited them on that ground. In the case of the workman the Labour Court observed that there had been no delay but the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act had not been complied with and therefore the termination was wrongful. The learned Single Judge set aside the award of the Labour Court holding that there was no evidence before it indicating that the workman had ever been in the service of the Jal Nigam. According to the learned Single Judge, the workman had not discharged the initial onus of proving that he had worked for more than 240 days with the Jal Nigam and therefore the award directing his reinstatement was illegal. The writ petition was allowed and the award of the Labour Court set aside. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge that a writ appeal was filed before the Division Bench. By the impugned judgment, the writ appeal was allowed.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the basic approach of the High Court is erroneous. It proceeded on the basis as if the period of employment/engagement of a workman has to be established by the employer. There is no appearance on behalf of the workman.
5. In a large number of cases the position, of law relating to the onus to be discharged has been delineated. In Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimanil it was held as follows: (SCC p. 26, paras 2-3) "2. In the instant case, dispute was referred to the Labour Court that the respondent had worked for 240 days and his service had been terminated without paying him any retrenchment compensation. The appellant herein did not accept this and contended that the respondent had not worked for 240 days. The Tribunal vide its award dated 10-8-1998 came to the conclusion that the service had been terminated without giving retrenchment compensation. In arriving at the conclusion that the respondent
(2006) 1 SCC 337: 2006 SCC (L&S) 113
(2005) 8 SCC 481 : 2006 SCC (L&S) II : (2005) 7 Supreme 165
(2005) 8 SCC 750: 2006 SCC (L&S) 38 : (2005) 7 Supreme 307
(2006) 9 SCC 124: 2006 AIR SCW 3574
(2001)9 SCC 713: 2002 SCC (L&S) 269
(2002) 3 SCC 25: 2002 SCC (L&S) 367
(2002) 8 SCC 400 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 13
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