judgment

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J. —

1.Leave granted.

2.Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the revision filed by respondent No.1. The revision was filed questioning the legality of the order dated 18.11.2000 passed by XIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aligarh in Criminal Revision No.272 of 2000 accepting the contention that the informant of the case got a false affidavit filed alongwith protest petition, and therefore no action could have been taken.

3.Stand taken before the learned Sessions Judge was that by the time the protest petition was filed the informant had died and false affidavit with a thumb impression was filed. Since the informant had already died, the learned Magistrate could not have been proceeded in the matter. This found acceptance by the learned Sessions Judge. The High Court by the impugned order had held that the order was not passed on the protest petition and was in fact passed on consideration of the report submitted in terms of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘Cr.P.C.’).

4.Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court fell in grave error by holding that the filing of false affidavit, if any, alongwith protest petition was immaterial. According to him, when the learned Magistrate acted upon the protest petition, the view that the affidavit alongwith the protest petition was not of any consequence, cannot be maintained.

5.Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that a bare reading of the order passed by learned Magistrate shows that the order did not have its foundation on the protest petition, but was relatable to the report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C.

6.The only question that falls for consideration is whether the order was passed by learned Magistrate on protest petition or on the police report.

7.Reference may be made to a judgment of this Court in Abhinandan Jha and Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra,1 (AIR 1968 SC 117) where it was held as follows:

“8.It is now only necessary to refer to Section 190, occurring in Chapter XIV, relating to jurisdiction of Criminal courts in inquiries and trials. That section is to be found under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings” and sub-section (1) is as follows :

(1)Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence

(a)upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b)upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;

(c)upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed.”

9.From the foregoing sections, occurring in Chapter XIV, it will be seen that very elaborate provisions have been made for securing that an investigation does take place into a reported offence and the investigation is carried out within the limits of the law, without causing any harassment to the accused and is also completed without unnecessary or undue delay. But the point to be noted is that the manner and method of conducting the investigation, are left entirely to the police, and the Magistrate, so far as we can see, has no power under any of these provisions, to interfere with the same. If, on investigation, it appears to the officer, in-charge of a police station, or to the officer making an investigation, that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds of suspicion justifying the forwarding of an accused to a Magistrate, s. 169 says that the officer shall release the accused, if in custody, on his executing a bond to appear before the Magistrate. Similarly, if, on the other hand, it appears to the officer, in-charge of a police station, or to the officer making the investigation, under Chapter XIV, that there is sufficie