The court examined whether the copyright subsists in the copy-edited version of judgments and law reports, particularly in the context of works that are in the public domain, such as judgments of courts. It was found that judgments delivered by courts, including the Supreme Court, are in the public domain and their reproduction or publication does not constitute infringement of copyright, provided that such reproduction is not prohibited by the court itself (!) (!) .

The court emphasized that for a work to qualify for copyright protection, it must involve a minimum level of originality and creativity, beyond mere labour or capital expenditure. The standard for originality requires that the work must originate from the author and not be a mere copy, with some exercise of skill and judgment involved in its creation (!) (!) (!) .

In the specific context of law reports and judgments, the court held that the inputs added by the publishers—such as cross-references, citation corrections, paragraph numbering, headings, and stylistic modifications—must demonstrate a certain degree of creativity and independent effort to qualify for copyright protection. Routine or trivial modifications, or those merely reproducing facts or well-known information, do not suffice (!) (!) .

It was further clarified that modifications requiring discernment, judgment, and understanding of legal discourse—such as paragraph segmentation, internal referencing, and indicating dissenting or concurring opinions—are considered to involve a minimal but sufficient level of creativity and thus can attract copyright (!) (!) .

Overall, the court concluded that the work of editing, organizing, and presenting judgments with added inputs that involve a modicum of skill, judgment, and effort can be protected by copyright. However, mere copying of the raw judgments or reproducing facts and well-known information without substantial creative input does not qualify for copyright protection. The court modified the earlier injunctions to prohibit copying of specific elements that involve such minimal creativity, while affirming that judgments themselves, being in the public domain, cannot be exclusively copyrighted (!) (!) .

In summary, the court recognized that copyright protection extends to those works where the added inputs involve a minimal but meaningful exercise of skill and judgment, and that judgments of courts in the public domain are not subject to copyright, but the editorial work that involves creative effort can be protected.