Judgement

Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 15, 1913) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Patna.

The suit was instituted by the appellant to recover possession of his share in two mauzas as heir to his grandfather.

The facts and the effect of the decisions in India appear from the judgment of their Lordships.

1917. Oct. 18, 19. De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the appellant. Neither the compromise nor the subsequent award and decree are binding upon the appellant. There were no proper proceedings under the Bengal Minors Act (XL. of 1859) appointing the appellants father as his guardian. It cannot be supposed that the Court allowed the father to represent him under the proviso to s. 3, since the interest of the appellant conflicted with that of his father. In any case the appellant as reversioner had no interest which could be affected by the compromise or the relinquishment of the property Sham Sunder Lal v. Acham. (( 1898) L. R. 25 I. A. 183.) The decision in Walian v. Banke Behari Prasad Singh (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 183.), relied upon by the High Court, is distinguishable. There the minors mother repre sented him in the transaction, and his interests were not prejudiced. Dunne, K.C., for the respondents. The appellants mother claimed to be in possession on behalf both of herself and of the appellant. He was therefore a necessary party to the arbitration. The property was of small value, and it must be assumed that the father, who is described as the appellants guardian, was allowed to represent him under the proviso to s. 3 of Act XL. of 1859. The decree was properly made and binds the reversioners Katama Nachiar v. Raja Mootoo Vijaya. (( 1863) 9 Moo. I.A. 539, 604.)

Nov. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

MR. AMEER ALI. This is a suit by a Hindu reversioner to recover possession of certain properties that originally belonged to his maternal grandfather, Jhamman Singh. He alleges that the defen dants, respondents before this Board, wrongfully possessed themselves of these properties under colour of certain arbitration proceedings whilst the estate was held by his mother, Kar Koer, as a female owner under the Hindu law. Kar Koer died in 1905, and this action was brought in 1908. The suit is therefore clearly within time. The sole question for determination in this appeal is whether the arbitration proceedings and the decree on the award which gave to the predecessors of the respondents possession of these properties are binding on the appellant.

On Jhammans death Radha Koer, his widow, applied for the registration of her name in place of her deceased husband in the Collectors records. Her application was opposed by some of Jhammans agnatic male relations, whom the respondents now represent; they claimed the property both under the general Hindu law as also under some undefined family custom. Their objections were overruled by the revenue Courts, and Radha Koers name was duly entered in the Collectors register. Radha died shortly after in 1864, and was succeeded in the possession of the estate by her daughter, Kar Koer, the mother of the appellant. The agnates raised a fresh contest as to her right to hold the property. In the disputes that followed, and which were eventually referred to the arbitration of a number of caste-men, she seems to have been represented by her husband, Rajander Singh. There is nothing, however, on the record to show if he had any authority to act for her as her agent. Before the arbitrators had taken any action in the matter a compromise was arrived at, in which also Rajander purported to act both for her and her infant son, the appellant. Under this compromise Kar Koer abandoned in favour of the agnates all right to the immovable property of her father, receiving on her part, besides some movable property, two small fractional shares in certain lands which stood in the names of herself and her mother. The effect of the arrangement was to extingui