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1936 Supreme(SC) 43
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ROCHE, SIR SHADI LAL, AND SIR GEORGE RANKIN.
ALLURI VENKATAPATHI RAJU - Appellant
Versus
DANTULURI VENKATANARASIMHA RAJU - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : July 17, 1936.
Solicitors for appellants in appeal No. 55, and for respondents Nos. 2-5 in appeal No. 56: Douglas Grant & Dold.
Solicitors for respondents 1 and 2 in appeal No. 55, and for appellants in appeal No. 56: G. K. Kannepalli.
Renunciation of interest by one member of a Mitakshara joint family does not separate the remaining coparceners. Severance of joint status requires a division of right or defined shares; without this, property passes by survivorship to surviving coparceners rather than by inheritance to heirs.
Headnote:(A) Hindu Law - Mitakshara School - Joint Family and Coparcenary - Severance of Status - Renunciation of interest by one member of a joint family does not automatically operate as a separation of all members from one another. Such renunciation merely extinguishes the interest of the renouncing member and reduces the number of persons to whom shares would be allotted upon a future division, without affecting the status of the remaining coparceners.
(B) Division of Right vs. Division of Property - A distinction exists between a division of right and a division of property. Severance of joint status occurs when there is a division of right or any act or transaction that has the effect of defining shares in the estate, even if no physical partition by metes and bounds takes place. If no such division of right or severance of interest is established, members continue to be joint in estate; mere cesser of commensality or separate residence for convenience does not effect a separation in estate.
Facts of the case:
A joint Hindu family consisting of a father and four sons lived together. The eldest son renounced his interest and left the family. The remaining three sons continued to live together and acquired properties through a joint business. One of the sons and his own son died shortly after each other. The daughter of the deceased son claimed the property as an heir, while the surviving brothers claimed the property by survivorship, asserting that the deceased was joint with them. Evidence was presented regarding statements made by the brothers to government authorities claiming they were "divided," which were used to argue that they held the estate as tenants in common.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the renunciation of the eldest son did not change the joint status of the remaining members. The statements made by the brothers to government authorities claiming they were "divided" were determined to be false, having been made solely to circumvent liquor licensing regulations that prohibited a single interest in two different types of liquor contracts in the same locality. There was no evidence of a genuine division of rights or defined shares in the estate.
Issues: Whether the renunciation of interest by one member of a joint family effects a separation of the remaining members, and whether the deceased member was joint in estate with his brothers at the time of death, thereby making the property subject to survivorship rather than inheritance.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the renunciation of a member's interest does not affect the status of the remaining coparceners. Severance of joint status requires a clear division of right or an act defining shares. In the absence of such evidence, and where statements of separation are proven to be tactical falsehoods, the family remains joint. Consequently, the interest of a deceased coparcener passes by survivorship to the remaining coparceners and cannot descend to heirs under Hindu law.
Result: Decree of the trial judge dismissing the suit restored; defendants' appeal allowed and plaintiffs' appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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family law
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hindu law
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mitakshara school
- coparcenary
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mitakshara school
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hindu law
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property law
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succession
- survivorship
- inheritance
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succession
Judgement
Consolidated Appeals (Nos. 55 and 56 of 1933) from a decree of the High Court (September 27, 1927) setting aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam (November 9, 1922).
The main question in these appeals was whether the plaintiffs [respondents in appeal No. 55, and appellants in appeal No. 56] had any reversionary rights in the suit properties, and that depended on whether or not their maternal grandfather was joint in estate with the ancestors of the contesting defendants.
Law. Rep. 63 Ind. App. 397 ( 1935- 1936) Alluri Venkatapathi Raju V. Dantuluri Venkatanarasimha Raju 139
The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit.
An appeal to the High Court (Ramesam and Cornish JJ.) was allowed, and the plaintiffs were granted a declaration that, on the death of their mother, they would be entitled to succeed to a portion of the estate claimed by them.
1936. May 7, 8, 11, 12, and 14. Dunne K.C. and Subba Row for appellants in appeal No. 55, and respondents 2-5 in appeal No. 56.
De Gruyther K.C. and Abdul Majid for respondents 1 and 2 in appeal No. 55, and appellants (plaintiffs) in appeal No. 56.
The following authorities were referred to Hurrinath Chatterji v. Mohunt Mothoor Mohun Goswami (( 1893) L. R. 20 I. A. 183.); Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 342.); Palani Ammal v. Muthu-venkatacharla Moniagar (( 1924) L. R. 52 I. A. 83.); Vaithialinga Mudaliar v. Srirangath Anni (( 1925) I. R. 52 I. A. 322.); Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 539.); Mata Prasad v. Nageshar Sahai (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 398.); Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna (( 1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 220.); Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gay a Singh (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. 35.); Chaudhri Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 168.); Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan (( 1866) 11 Moo. I. A. 75.); Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 139.); Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 130.); Jatti v. Banwari Lal (( 1923) L. R. 5o
I. A. 192.); Haridas Narayandas v. Devkuvarbai (( 1926) I. L. R. 50 B. 443.); Rampershad Tewarry
v. Sheochurn Doss (( 1866) 10 Moo. I. A. 490.); Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri (( 1901)
I. L. R. 25 M. 149.); Joy Narain Giri v. Girish Chunder Myti (( 1878) L. R. 5 I. A. 228.); Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 151.); Rewa Prasad Sukal v. Deo Dutt ram Sukal (( 1899)
L. R. 27 I. A. 39.); Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 187.); and Kalipada De v. Dwijapada Das . (( 1929) L. R. 57 I. A. 24.)
July 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Shadi Lal. These are two consolidated appeals from a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, by which that Court set aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam dismissing the plaintiffs suit, and granted a declaration that the plaintiffs would be entitled to succeed, on the death of their mother, to a portion of the estate claimed by them. The principal question, on which elaborate arguments have been advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, is whether the plaintiffs maternal grandfather was, or was not, joint in estate with the ancestors of the contesting defendants.
The relationship of the persons concerned is indicated in the following pedigree—
Alluri Venkataraju
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Pattabhiramaraju Krishnamraju Akkiraju Ramaraju
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Buchi = Venkatraghvaraju = Venkata
Venkayya Narasayya
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Chandrayya
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Law. Rep. 63 Ind. App. 397 ( 1935- 1936) Alluri Venkatapathi Raju V. Dantuluri Venkatanarasimha Raju 140
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Venkata Satyanarayanaraju
Narasimmaraju (Plaintiff No. 2)
(Plaintiff No. 1)
The common ancestor of the parties, Alluri Venkataraju, and his four sons constituted a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school of the HINDU LAW . They originally resided in Gudimellanka in the Godaveri District of the Madras Presidency, but in or about 1839 the eldest son
