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1931 Supreme(SC) 88
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT DUNEDIN, LORD BLANESBURGH, SIR JOHN WALLIS, SIR GEORGE LOWNDES, AND SIR DINSHAH MULLA.
BAGESHWARI CHARAN SINGH - Appellant
Versus
JAGARNATH KUARI (DEFENDANTS) - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : Dec. 4. 1931.
Solicitor for appellant:Solicitor, India Office. Solicitors for respondents: Watkins & Hunter.
An acknowledgment of a pre-existing right in immovable property is a statement of fact, not a "declaration" of right that changes legal relations. Therefore, such an acknowledgment does not require registration under Section 17(b) of the Registration Act to be admissible as evidence.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Section 19 - Indian Registration Act, 1908 - Section 17(b) - Acknowledgment of liability in respect of immovable property - Whether a petition requesting sanction for a gift constitutes an acknowledgment of liability to reset the limitation period - Whether such an acknowledgment must be registered to be admissible in evidence - A document that merely recites a fact or acknowledges a pre-existing right does not "declare" a right in the sense of creating a change in legal relations and thus does not require registration under Section 17(b) of the Registration Act.
(B) Registration Act, 1908 - Section 17(b) - Interpretation of the word "declare" - Distinction between a declaration of will that changes legal relations and a mere statement of fact. (Paras 15-22)
Facts of the case:
The grandfather of the appellant owned an estate subject to restrictions on alienation. He executed a deed of gift of certain lands in favor of his wife without obtaining the required sanction from the Commissioner. The wife entered into possession and later transferred the lands to her son. After the grandfather's death, the grandson filed a suit to recover the lands. The respondents contended that the suit was barred by limitation. Evidence was produced in the form of a petition signed by the wife, requesting the Commissioner to either sanction the original gift or order a fresh grant.
Findings of Court:
The petition signed by the wife was a clear acknowledgment that she had no title unless the gift was sanctioned, thereby recognizing the title of the husband. Such a document is an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. Furthermore, the document did not require registration because it merely acknowledged a fact and did not create, assign, limit, or extinguish any right, title, or interest.
Issues: Whether the petition requesting sanction for a gift was an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act and whether the lack of registration rendered the document inadmissible under Section 17(b) of the Registration Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the word "declare" in Section 17(b) of the Registration Act implies a declaration of will that causes a change in legal relations to the property, not a mere statement of fact. An acknowledgment of a right is a recital of fact and does not operate to create or declare a title; hence, it is not an instrument requiring mandatory registration.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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transfer of property
- gift
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transfer of property
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limitation law
- acknowledgment of liability
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registration law
- compulsory registration
Judgement
Appeal (No. 98 of 1930) from a decree of the High Court (January 9, 1929) affirming a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh (April 26, 1926).
The suit was brought on February 24, 1925, by the appellant against the respondents to recover, as heir to his grandfather, immovable property which his grandfather had transferred to his (the grandfathers) wife, the first respondent, by a deed of gift dated June "16, 1909. The respondents, among other defences, pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.
The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The High Court (Das and Adami JJ.), affirming the judgment of the trial judge, held that the suit was barred by limitation. Both Courts held that the petition of March 16, 1916, signed by the first respondent, which petition is set out in the present judgment, was not an acknowledgment of right within the meaning of s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act so as to cause a fresh period of limitation to be computed. The judgment of the trial judge referred also to Faki v. Khotu (1) as deciding that the petition was not admissible in evidence as it was not registered.
1931. Nov. 5, 6. Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the appellant. The petition of March 16, 1916, was an acknowledgment of liability by the first respondent within s. 19 of the Limitation Act, and under that section a fresh period of limitation was to be computed. The result is that the suit was not barred whether art. 144 or art. 142 applied. It is submitted that Faki v. Khotu (( 1880) I. L. R. 4 B. 590.) was wrongly decided, and that the petition was admissible in evidence as an acknowledgment although it was not registered. [Reference was made to Sakharam Krishnaji v. Madan Krishnaji (( 1881) I. L. R. 5 B. 232;) and Jiwan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal .(( 1886) I. L. R. 9 A. 108 (F. B.).)]
De Gruyther K.C. and Jinnah for the respondents. The petition was not ah acknowledgment within s. 19 of the Limitation Act. It was not "an acknowledgment of liability" in respect of the property, but merely a request for the removal of any doubt with regard to the title. It should be read in conjunction with the Thakurs petition. But if upon its true construction it was an acknowledgment it was inadmissible for want of registration. It was an instrument within s. 17 (b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as it purported or operated to declare a right, title or interest in the property. If it did not do so it was not an acknowledgment within s. 19 of the Limitation Act. Faki v. Khotu (( 1880) I. L. R. 4
B. 590.), which exactly covers this case, was rightly decided.
Although it has been referred to in later decisions in India it has not been overruled. [In addition to cases above [mentioned reference was made to Antaji v. Dattaji (( 1893) I.
L. R. 19 B. 36, 42.) and Anandrao v. Joti .(( 1900) I. L. R. 24 B. 615.)] No reply was called for.
Dec. 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
VISCOUNT DUNEDIN This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, dated January 9, 1929, which affirmed a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh, dated April 26, 1926, dismissing the plaintiff-appellants suit.
Thakur Jadu Charan Singh, the plaintiffs grandfather, was the owner of an impartible estate known as the Dhargulli Estate, in the District of Hazaribagh. He was heavily in debt, and by an order passed under s. 2 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act (VI. of 1876) in 1894, the management of the whole of his estate was vested in a manager appointed under that Act. The management of the estate continued under the Act until May 15, 1909, when the estate was released and made over to him according to the provisions of the Act.
Sect. 12a provides by sub-ss. 1, 2 and 3 " 12a.—(1.) When the possession and enjoyment of property is restored, under the circumstances mentioned in the first or the third clause of s. 12, to the person who was the holder of such property when th
