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1917 Supreme(SC) 32
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT HALDANE, LORD ATKINSON, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND MR. AMEER ALI.
BALAKRISHNA UDAYAR - Appellant
Versus
VASUDEVA AIYAR - Respondents
On Appeal From The High Court at Madras.
Decided On : May 21, 1917.
Solicitor for appellant: O. A. Cayley. Solicitor for defendant: Douglas Grant.
Under Section 10 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, a court order for remaining committee members to "forthwith" fill a vacancy implies appointment by those members, not a new election, as the latter would contradict the requirement for immediate action.
Headnote:(A) Religious Endowments Act, 1863 - Section 10 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 115 - Filling of vacancy in temple committee - Jurisdiction of High Court in revision - An order by a Civil Court determining the validity of a member's appointment to a committee under a statutory scheme is a judicial act and constitutes a "case" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, allowing for revision by the High Court.
(B) Religious Endowments Act, 1863 - Section 10 - Interpretation of "order that the vacancy be forthwith filled up by the remaining members of the committee" - Distinction between election by persons interested and appointment by remaining members - When a court orders the remaining members to fill a vacancy "forthwith," it implies appointment by those members, not the conduct of a fresh election, as the latter would involve delays and procedures contrary to the term "forthwith."
Facts of the case:
A vacancy occurred in a temple committee. The remaining members failed to hold an election within the statutory three-month period. The Civil Court ordered the remaining members to fill the vacancy forthwith. The members interpreted this as a direction to hold an election, which they did, resulting in the election of a candidate. The Civil Court subsequently validated this election and accepted the candidate as a member. This order was challenged in the High Court via a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
Findings of Court:
The High Court correctly held that it had jurisdiction to revise the order and that the Civil Court erred in interpreting the statute to mean that the vacancy should be filled by election upon a court order to fill it "forthwith."
Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to revise the District Court's order and whether the phrase "order that the vacancy be forthwith filled up by the remaining members of the committee" under Section 10 of the Religious Endowments Act implies an election or an appointment.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that the Civil Court exercises judicial functions under the Act, and an adjudication on membership constitutes a "case" for revision. Regarding the filling of vacancies, the statute distinguishes between the election process by interested persons and the court-ordered filling of a vacancy by remaining members. The requirement to fill the vacancy "forthwith" excludes the time-consuming process of an election, which requires public notice and specific timeframes. Therefore, the act of filling the vacancy must be an appointment by the remaining members themselves.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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civil procedure
- revision
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civil procedure
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administrative law
- statutory interpretation
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trusts and endowments
- religious endowments
Judgement
Appeal from an order of the High Court (September 23, 1913) setting aside an order of the District Judge of Tanjore.
The facts appear fully from the judgment of their Lordships and may be shortly stated as follows. A member of a temple committee instituted under the Religious Endowments Act (XX. of 1863) died in 1912, but the remaining members failed to hold an election by the persons interested within three months as provided by s. 10 of that Act. The section is set out in the judgment. The District Judge of Tanjore upon an application by the respondent made an order under s. 10 that the remaining members of the committee should fill up the vacancy forthwith. They thereupon held an election by the persons interested. The appellant was the sole candidate and received 1745 votes. The remaining members of the committee declared him to be elected and so reported to the District Judge.
In 1913 the appellant and the respondent petitioned the District Court, the former that the appointment might be held valid, and the latter that it might be set aside.
On July 13, 1913, the District Judge declared that the appointment was regular and accepted the appellant as a member of the committee.
The respondent by a civil revision petition to the High Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, prayed that the order of the District Judge might be set aside.
The High Court (Sir C. Arnold White C.J. and Oldfield J.) by a judgment delivered on September 23, 1913, rejected a preliminary objection that the High Court had no jurisdiction under the section last mentioned. They were of opinion that the decision of the Privy Council in Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri(L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 160.) did not affect the question, and that Balaji Sakharam v. Merwanji Nowroji (( 1895) I. L.R. 21 Bomb. 270.), decided under a different Act, was distinguishable. By a judgment delivered on the same day the learned judges held that upon the true construction of Act XX. of 1863, s. 10, the remaining members of the committee should have filled up the vacancy by themselves making an appointment. They declined to follow Ramanuja Aiyangar v. Anantaram Aiyar (6 Madr. L. J. 1.), in which it was held that upon an order to fill up a vacancy the proper course was to hold an election. The order of the District Judge was accordingly set aside and the matter remitted to him.
1917. April 26. De Gruyther, K.C., and Sproule, for the appellant. The High Court had no jurisdiction to call for the record in revision under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The District Judge had not decided a case within the meaning of that section. His order was not a judicial decision in the exercise of his ordinary civil jurisdiction but was an administrative act as a person4 designata for a particular purpose Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri. (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 160.) The proceedings before the District Judge was not a " case " ; that word means a suit or a proceeding in a suit Subbaya v. Adoy Naide . (( 1915) 29 Madr. L. J. 671.) In any case the High Court wrongly construed s. 10 of Act XX. of 1863. The only method provided by the Act for filling up a vacancy is by holding an election. The order of the District Judge was to compel the remaining members of the committee to do that which they had omitted to do. The persons interested have a right to elect, but if the judgment is right the remaining members can defeat that right by omitting to hold an election. If, however, the appointment should have been made by the remaining members themselves they were entitled to ascertain the opinion of the electorate and themselves appoint the person elected. They in fact adopted the result of the election and admitted the appellant as a member.
Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, were not called upon.
May 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD ATKINSON. This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Mad
