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1921 Supreme(SC) 92
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BUCKMASTER, LORD ATKINSON, LORD CARSON, MR. AMEER ALI, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
BAWA MAGNIRAM SITARAM - Appellant
Versus
KASTURBHAI MANIBHAI - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Bombay.
Decided On : December 5, 1921.
Solicitor for appellant: E. Dalgado.
Solicitors for respondents: Baker, Blaker & Halves.
Long-term undisturbed possession and conduct, such as subleasing, can establish a permanent lease. For religious property grants by managers with limited powers, a long lapse of time creates a presumption that the grant was lawful or made under legal necessity to ensure quiet possession.
Headnote:(A) Law of Leases and Tenancy - Construction of lease documents - Permanent lease vs. tenancy from year to year - Where a document is informal, its construction must be derived from the terms and the subsequent conduct of the parties - Long-term undisturbed possession and the act of subleasing the property for substantial periods at increased rents are sufficient to justify a finding that a permanent right to occupy was conferred.
(B) Religious Endowments - Power of a manager to alienate property - While a manager of property devoted to religious purposes may have limited powers to grant leases, a long lapse of time between the alienation and the challenge to its validity allows the court to presume that the grant was made under legal necessity or in exercise of extended power to secure quiet possession for the holder.
Facts of the case:
The appellant sought to recover possession of land, claiming the respondents were yearly tenants whose interest had been determined by notice. The respondents contended they held a permanent lease based on a rent note from 1824. The land had been originally granted for a religious purpose. Evidence showed the respondents had been in continued and undisturbed possession since 1826 at the original rent and had subleased the property on three separate occasions for substantial periods of years.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the terms of the 1824 document, combined with the long-term undisturbed possession and the conduct of the parties in subleasing the land, indicated that the transaction was intended to create a permanent lease. Regarding the limited authority of the grantor, the court held that after a lapse of 100 years, it is consistent with judicial policy to assume the grant was lawfully made.
Issues: Whether the document of 1824 created a tenancy from year to year or a permanent lease, and whether such a permanent lease was valid if the grantor possessed only limited powers over property devoted to religious purposes.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that long-term undisturbed possession and the exercise of rights consistent with ownership (such as long-term subleasing) support the construction of a permanent lease. Furthermore, where a grant of religious property is challenged after a very long period, the court will presume the grant was made under legal necessity to ensure quiet possession.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Appeal (No. 151 of 1920) from a judgment and decree (December 22, 1916) of the High Court affirming a decree of the District Judge at Ahmedabad, which reversed a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad.
The suit was brought by the appellant to recover possession of certain lands from the respondents as yearly tenants whose interest had been determined by notice. The respondents by their written statement alleged that they were in possession under a permanent lease. The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships.
The District Judge, reversing the trial Judge, dismissed the suit, holding that a permanent lease existed. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed on the ground that the matter to be decided was not a question of law, and was not properly the subject of a second appeal.
1921. Dec. 2, 5. Upjohn K.C. and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. On its true construction the document of February 22, 1824, created only a tenancy from year to year; it cannot be construed as a
Law Rep. 49 Ind. App. 54 ( 1921- 1922) Bawa Magniram Sitaram V. Kasturbhai Manibhai
330
permanent lease Bilasmoni Dasi v. Sheo Per shad Singh (( 1882) L. R. 91. A. 33.); Toolshi Per shad Singh v. Ram Narain Singh . (( 1885) L. R. 12 I. A. 205,214.) The circumstance that the lease was made by a person with a limited interest is to be considered Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo . (( 1869) 13 Moo. I. A. 270.) But if the document purported to create a permanent tenancy, it is invalid as beyond the competence of the grantor who was . the shebait Vidya Varuthi Thiriha v. Balusami Ayyar . (( 1921) L. R. 481. A. 302, 327.)
De Gruyther K. C., and Parikh for the respondents. Upon the true construction of the lease it was a permanent lease Upendra Krishna Mandal v. Ismail Khan Mahomed (( 1904) L. R. 311. A. 144.); Nabukumari Debi v. Behari Lal Sen . (( 1907) L. R. 34 I. A. 160.) There is no authority that there could be in Bombay in 1824 a yearly tenancy subject to six months notice. Having regard to the long interval of time which has elapsed since the grant of the lease it is to be presumed that it was granted for legal necessity Murugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 98.); Chockalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar. (I. L. R. 19 M. 485.)
[Lord Buckmaster referred to Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Chowdhuri . (( 1916) L.
R. 43 I. A. 249.)]
Further, the evidence did not establish that the grantor of 1824 was the shebait. Lastly, there was no right to a second appeal; there were no substantial questions of law.
E. B. Raikes replied.
Dec. 5. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD BUCKMASTER. Their Lordships have come to a clear opinion upon the merits of this appeal, and as it relates to the possession of land, they will not reserve the expression of the advice that they will tender to His Majesty.
The appellant is seeking to obtain possession of a piece of land some 5 ½ acres in extent, that is situated near the Delhi Gate of the city of Ahmedabad. That the respondents are in possession by themselves or their tenants is not in dispute ; it is indeed the foundation of the appellants claim, for the proceedings out of which this appeal has arisen were instituted by the appellant as plaintiff claiming to recover possession of the property upon the ground that the only right of the respondents is as tenants from year to year, a tenancy which had been duly determined by notice, or in the alternative, that the conduct of the respondents rendered it unnecessary that the appellant should take any further steps to secure its determination.
The land in question was granted on June 17, 1756, to one Sultansingh Maharajji for the deity of Shri Ranchhodji; in other words, the grant was a grant to a named person for a defined religious purpose.
On February 22, 1824, this land was dealt with by way of lease ; the document recording the transaction takes the form of a recognition by the tena
