Judgement

Appeal (No. 131 of 1924) from a decree of the Court of the Resident at Hyderabad (September 27, 1922) reversing a decree of the assistant Resident.

The suit was brought by the appellant in the Court of the Civil Judge at Secunderabad to recover from the first respondent the balance of a debt for money lent, and against the second respondent as guarantor.

The Resident, on appeal, held that the Civil Court had not jurisdiction under s. 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, since no part of the cause of action arose within the local limits of the Court.

The material facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

1925. June 29. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellant referred to Puttappa Manjaya v. Virabhadrappa (( 1905) 7 Bom. L. Reporter, 993.) and to Pollock and Mulla on the Indian Contract Act, note to s. 49.

Sir George Lowndes K.C. and E. B. Raikes for the respondents referred to Haldane v. Johnson.

(( 1853) 8 Ex. 689, 695.)

Oct. 20. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

LORD BLANESBURGH. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment and decree dated September 27, 1922, of the Court of the Resident at Hyderabad, reversing a decree dated November 22, 1921, of the assistant Resident there, and restoring, albeit on other grounds, a decree made by the Civil Judge of Secunderabad, dated July 8, 1919.

The suit was commenced by the appellant in the Court of that judge in September, 1911. Its purpose was to recover money lent by him so long ago as 1891 to the grandfather of the first respondent with repayment guaranteed, so it was alleged by the late Sir Asnam Jah, prime minister of Hyderabad, whose estate is represented in the suit by his son, the second respondent. The borrower, the alleged surety, and their respective representatives were, or are, all resident in Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizams dominions. The appellant, however, has a place of business at Secunderabad, a neighbouring British cantonment, and asserting that the loans were both made and repayable there, he claimed that his suit in respect of them was cognizable by the local British Court.

But this was not the appellants only reason for invoking that jurisdiction—if he could successfully do so. In the Courts of the Nizam his demands had long since been barred by lapse of time. In the British Court, however, he claimed to be entitled to escape from the operation of the Indian Limitation Act—an Act otherwise entirely applicable to the case—on the ground that the residence of the defendants in Hyderabad was a "foreign" residence, which took his claim against them outside the statute, although their residence was in fact only six miles away.

In the Courts below many matters of fact were canvassed. Most of these, concluded by concurrent findings, were before their Lordships treated as settled, and the arguments were addressed to one question only—namely, was the Court of the Civil Judge of Secunderabad entitled to entertain the suit at all ?

That learned judge had held that he had jurisdiction in the matter, but he dismissed the suit, holding, on the view taken by him of the facts, that the appellant had been repaid all that was due to him.

The appellant appealed to the assistant Resident at Hyderabad. His appeal was resisted only by the second respondent, and he, it is stated, did not there raise again his objection to the jurisdiction of the Court taken before the trial judge, and certain at least it is that the learned assistant Resident made no reference to the point in his judgment, by which the claim of the appellant was in effect allowed in full. The second respondent then appealed to the Resident, and he, taking up the consideration of the question afresh, held that the Civil Judge of Secunderabad had no jurisdiction in the matter. On that ground he allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit, expressing, however, at the same time his concurrence with the findings of fact of the assistant Resident where