The main legal point established in the judgment is that the decision in a prior suit can operate as res judicata, barring a party from challenging the validity of certain grants, and that the lack of Commissioner's sanction rendered the 1909 grant still-born.

Judgement

Appeal (No. 59 of 1934) from a decree of the High Court 1 (July 29, 1932) reversing a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh (March 31, 1928).

On November 17, 1909, Jadu Charan Singh, the owner of an impartible estate which had shortly before been released from management under the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, 1876, executed a maintenance grant in favour of the appellant, his son, yielding an annual income of Rs.1300. The sanction of the Commissioner under the Act to that grant was not obtained. On September 21, 1917, the appellant, having attained his majority, instituted a suit against his father and his (the appellants) two brothers claiming a maintenance grant, inclusive of that of 1909, of the yearly value of Rs.4000. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit and declared that the grant of 1909 was " legally valid " and decreed and ordered that the appellant was entitled to the maintenance grant as prayed. In implement of that order Jadu Charan Singh executed a maintenance grant dated February 21, 1920.

The respondent, Jadus grandson and successor, instituted the present suit on May 14, 1926, claiming a declaration that the two maintenance grants of 1909 and 1920 were illegal and invalid and not binding on him.

The facts and the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The Subordinate Judge held that the decision in the 1917 suit that the 1909 grant was valid and that the appellant was entitled to maintenance of Rs.4000 a year operated as res judicata for the purposes of the present suit. He held that the 1909 grant was valid, and that the 1920 grant, being made in obedience to a decree of the Court, was also valid.

Upon appeal to the High Court the learned judges (James and Agarwala JJ.) held that the grants were alienations within the meaning of s. 12A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, 1876 ; that the 1909 grant, in the absence of the Commissioners sanction, was still-born, and that the decision in the 1917 suit could not infuse it with life, and that the decision in the 1917 suit did not therefore operate as res judicata. The Court also held that Jadu Charan was; incompetent to give effect to the decree of 1917 unless the Commissioner sanctioned a transfer under s. 12A of the Act. The appeal is reported at ( 1933) I. L. R. 12 Pat. 147.

1935. Oct. 24, 25. Pringle for the appellant. [Reference was made to ss. 2, 3, 7,12, 12A, 21B, and 23 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, 1876.] The Court which heard the 1917 suit had jurisdiction either under s. 23 or under the general law. Except in respect of the two classes of suits mentioned in s. 12A of the Act the ordinary civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits brought against the holder of an estate on its restoration to him ; the judgment in the 1917 suit therefore being a judgment by a Court having jurisdiction cannot be treated as a nullity and binds the respondent until set aside in appropriate proceedings. The respondent is now barred by limitation from instituting such proceedings. Moreover, there are concurrent findings below that the decree in that suit was not collusive. The 1920 grant being made in obedience to the 1917 decree lies outside the purview of s. 12A and requires no sanction of the Commissioner to give it effect. The authorities relied on in the

Law. Rep. 63 Ind. App. 53 ( 1935- 1936) Bindeswari C haran Singh V. Bageshwari C haran Singh

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High Courts judgment, properly understood, do not support it.

Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. The validity of the first grant may be res judicata by reason of the judgment in the 1917 suit. But that judgment does not make the validity of the second grant res judicata, as by it the appellants maintenance was not charged on any specific property. No such charge could be created except with the sanction of the Commissioner as provided in s. 12A. Moreover, the decree in the 1917 suit was collusive. The respondents