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1945 Supreme(SC) 53
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD THANKERTON, LORD GODDARD AND SIR JOHN BEAUMONT.
BRIJ BHUSHAN SINGH - Appellant
Versus
KING-EMPEROR - Respondents
On Appeal from the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow.
Decided On : October 17; November 22, 1945.
Solicitors for appellant:Hy. S. L. Polak & Co. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.
Statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used as substantive evidence to prove facts; they are only for contradiction or corroboration. Additionally, strong suspicion arising from an accused's conduct does not constitute legal proof sufficient for conviction.
Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302, 304 and 201 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 - Section 164 - Use of statements recorded under Section 164 as substantive evidence - A statement recorded under Section 164 can be used to cross-examine the person who made it, or to check, corroborate or destroy evidence, but it cannot be used as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the facts stated therein. (Paras 15, 21)
(B) Evidence - Suspicion vs Proof - The fact that an accused undertakes a journey at midnight and provides a false explanation for the same may raise suspicion, but suspicion, however strong, does not amount to legal proof. (Paras 24, 25)
Facts of the case:
The appellant was accused of beating a maidservant, leading to her death, and subsequently disposing of the body. The prosecution alleged that the body was transported in a car to a relative's house for disposal. The appellant admitted to the beating but claimed it was light and that the victim was alive during the journey. The trial court convicted the appellant of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and the appellate court affirmed this conviction, relying in part on statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Findings of Court:
The appellate court improperly used statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code as substantive evidence. In the absence of such evidence, there was no proof that the victim had died or that the beating was severe enough to cause death. While the appellant's conduct and false explanations were suspicious, they did not constitute legal proof of the crime.
Issues: Whether statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be treated as substantive evidence and whether suspicion arising from the conduct of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction for culpable homicide.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Section 164 statements are inadmissible as substantive evidence and can only be used for contradiction or corroboration. Furthermore, it reaffirmed that suspicion cannot replace proof, and a conviction cannot be based solely on the improbability of the accused's explanation or their suspicious conduct.
Result: Appeal allowed and the conviction quashed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
crime and sentencing
-
offences against the person
- culpable homicide
- murder
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offences against administration of justice
- causing evidence to disappear
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offences against the person
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practice and procedure
-
evidence
- admissibility of statements
- circumstantial evidence
- standard of proof
-
evidence
Judgement
Appeal (No. 32 of 1945), by special leave, from a judgment and order of the Chief Court (May 5, 1944) varying as to sentence only an order of the Sessions Judge at Lucknow (January 10, 1944) by which the appellant was found guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder of one Bilasia, his wifes bandi maidservant, under para. 2 of s. 304 of the Indian Penal Code, and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment, which, by the above variation, was reduced to a period of about four months, which the appellant had already served.
The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The prosecution case was that on May 26, 1943, in the appellants house at Lucknow, Bilasia had been found in compromising circumstances with the appellants bearer, one Samuel, and that on that fact being reported to the appellant on his return from his office at about 7.30 p.m. he gave Bilasia a beating. The prosecution suggested that it was a very severe beating and that it reduced the girl to the point of death. At about
8.30 p.m. the appellant went out to dinner with a friend, and returned at about midnight, and the prosecution alleged that by that time Bilasia had died. Thereupon, that was, shortly after midnight, the appellant, with his wife and his chauffeur Mahabir, drove in the appellants car some sixty miles to the house at Ramgarh Gularia of Bhanwar Singh, whose wife, a sister of the appellants wife, had a bandi maidservant named Basanti, who was a cousin of Bilasia. The prosecution alleged that the dead body of Bilasia was in the boot of the car, and that the object of the journey was to dispose of the body. The prosecution alleged that a mile or two before reaching Ramgarh Gularia the appellants car had a puncture, and that certain villagers who were passing in a bullock cart took the appellants party up to the house of Bhanwar Singh ; that when the party reached the house, Bhanwar Singh, who was accused 2 on a separate charge of disposing of the body, sent his servant, who was accused 3, and two Pasis who were accused 4 and 5 with Mahabir to the appellants car ; that they removed the body of Bilasia from the car and concealed it, and subsequently dismembered it and scattered the bones in the jungle, and later pointed out such bones to the police.
The appellant admitted that he gave Bilasia a beating on the evening of May 26, but alleged that it was a light beating, mainly on the hands and arms, though he gave her one blow on the back as she was running away. He said that he was very angry about Bilasias conduct, since she had been guilty of similar conduct on previous occasions, and that he insisted that his wife should get rid of her at once. He alleged that on his return from his dinner party at about midnight he was very much annoyed to find that Bilasia was still in the house ; he refused to have her any longer under his roof and insisted that he and his wife and chauffeur should take her at once to the house of Bhanwar Singh, where she could be handed over to the care of Basanti. On that part of the case the real point at issue between the prosecution and the defence was whether it was Bilasia herself or her dead body that was taken in the car from Lucknow.
The appellant admitted the puncture a mile or two short of Bhanwar Singhs house, and said that he and his wife and Bilasia walked the rest of the way to the house, leaving the chauffeur to repair the puncture ; that his wife and Bilasia remained at Bhanwar Singhs house, but the appellant himself returned to Lucknow in his car as soon as the puncture was mended. It was common ground that when the police visited the house of Bhanwar Singh on May 28, Bilasia had disappeared, and had not been heard of since. The appellants story was that she had gone out to the jungle to answer a call of nature and had not returned.
The original charge against the appellant was under s. 302 of the Penal Code for the murder of Bilasia, but he was c
