Judgement

Appeal (No. 43 of 1930) from a decree of the High Court (March 2, 1926) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Jaunpur (December 21, 1921).

The only question arising upon the present appeal was whether a registered deed of gift executed by a Hindu on September 16, 1862, in favour of his daughter-in-law conferred upon her an absolute or only a life interest in the immovable property which it mentioned.

The terms of the deed appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The High Court, affirming the trial judge, held that the donee took an absolute interest and that alienations made by her were valid after her death.

Law Rep. 60 Ind. App. 56 ( 1932- 1933) Bishunath Prasad Singh V. C handika Prasad Kumari

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Lindsay J. referred to the following passage in the judgment delivered by Lord Davey in Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (( 1897) L. R. 24 I. A. 76, 85.) " There are two cardinal principles in the construction of wills, deeds, and other documents which their Lordships think are applicable to the decision of this case. The first is that clear and unambiguous dispositive words are not to be controlled or qualified by any general expression of intention. The second is .... that technical words or words of known legal import must have their legal effect, even though the testator uses inconsistent words, unless those inconsistent words are of such a nature as to make it perfectly clear that the testator did not mean to use the technical terms in their proper sense/ The learned judge said that applying the first of those principles it was difficult, having regard to the words of the deed, to argue that there was a gift of anything less than the full proprietary interest in the property ; the language was quite definite and precise. According to the above rule no general expression of intention would suffice to control or qualify the clear dispositive words. The argument was that, as the intention appearing was to make a gift for the maintenance and support of the donee, the gift was for her life only ; it was sought to support that by the consideration that the gift was to a Hindu female. But in the present case there was no room for the presumption that the gift being for maintenance was for life only, because the deed declared in the plainest terms that she was to have an absolute estate. Applying the second cardinal principle laid down by Lord Davey, the learned judge said that a long line of decisions by the Board established that the word " malik " had a definite meaning and connoted the possession of all the rights of a full owner unless the context or circumstances showed a different intention. It could not be presumed that the donor did not know the real meaning of the words " malik mustaqil," and there was nothing to show that he did not use them in their natural and proper sense.

Mukerji J., after referring to the judgments of the Privy Council in Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (( 1907) L. R. 35 I. A. 17.) ; Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 129.), and Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 1.), as to the construction of a gift or bequest to a Hindu female, said that it was no longer true to say that an attempt should be made to read into a document, which on its face gave an absolute estate to a Hindu female, the intention to give her only a life interest. In his view the wish to provide maintenance was only the motive for the gift and should not be read as a measure of the extent of the gift.

1932. Dec. 13, 15. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the appellant. The deed of gift recites the donors desire to provide for the " support and maintenance " of his daughter-in-law, and again uses those words as describing the purpose of the gift. Prima facie a gift for maintenance is only for the lifetime of the donee Karim Nensey v. Heinricks. (( 1901) L. R. 28 I. A. 198.) The word " malik " confers an absolute estate only if the context does not show an intention