Judgement

Appeal (No. 27 of 1939) from a judgment of the High Court (February 24, 1938) on a reference made under s. 66, sub-s. 1, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

The sole question in this appeal was whether it was a condition precedent to the operation of s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, that the Income-tax Officer should hold a quasi-judicial inquiry to determine whether in fact profits had escaped assessment, or had been assessed at too low a rate.

Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 239 ( 1939- 1940) Commissioner of Income-Tax V. Messrs. Mahaliram Ramjeedas 70

The relevant statutory provisions, the facts, and the terms of the reference to the High Court appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The High Court (Derbyshire C.J., Khundkar and Mukherjea JJ.), in a judgment delivered by the Chief Justice, were of opinion that the condition precedent in the Indian Income-tax Act was that income had escaped, which implied that the Income-tax Officer had decided that income had escaped, and that that could only be a quasi-judicial decision by the Income-tax Officer, which involved giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard before the decision was made. In their opinion, in the present case, the condition precedent had not been fulfilled, since there had been no proper or, indeed, any decision by the Income-tax Officer that income had escaped assessment before he had purported to put s. 34 into operation, and for that reason the subsequent proceedings were invalid.

1940. April 2. J. M. Tucker K.C. and W. Wallach for the appellant. This case raises a question of considerable administrative importance to taxing authorities in India, and although the particular question involved cannot arise again from this year onwards, since the Act has been amended, it still can arise in respect of past years and pending cases. The whole point is whether there was a sufficient inquiry to satisfy s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. [Reference was made to s. 22, sub-ss. 2, 4; s. 23, sub-ss. 1, 2, 3, 4; and s. 34.] The High Court said in effect that the Income-tax Officer is the person to decide whether there has been an escape from assessment, but that he must hold a preliminary inquiry—that before he forms an opinion he must give the assessee an opportunity of coming before him to try to persuade him to the contrary. It is submitted that the general rule that a taxing statute must be construed against the Crown does not apply to a question of pure machinery. The notice given by the Income-tax Officer to the assessee indicates that "I have reason to believe that income has not "been assessed." There is no decision exactly upon the present point, but see In re Lachhiram Basantlal. (( 1930) I. L. R. 58 C 909, 912.) Sect, 34 must, it is submitted, be read with, and as complementary to, ss. 22 and 23 of the Act, and therefore it does not follow that anybody has to decide, before the notice is given, that income has escaped assessment. What has to be decided is whether this is a case which, had it been under s. 22, sub-s. 2, is one in which a person, in the Income-tax Officers opinion, has total income of such an amount as to render him liable to pay income-tax. If the view of the High Court is right—that there must be an inquiry, a decision, first—it would make the section unworkable, because there is no power in the Income-tax Officer to hold such an inquiry, no power to compel anybody to attend. Sect. 34 was considered by the Board in Rajendra Nath Mukerjee v. Income-tax Commissioner. (( 1933) L. R.. 61 I. A. 10, 16.) Admittedly, it is the Income-tax Officer who must decide, but there is nothing in the section which requires that a formal inquiry must be held. In the present case the initial requirement of s. 34 was satisfied, and the Income-tax Officer was entitled to proceed in relation to the assessee as he did.

Raymond Needham K.C., J. M. Parikh and R. A. Parikh for the respondents. Various phrases are used elsewhere in the I