Back
1921 Supreme(SC) 15
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT CAVE, LORD SUMNER, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
GOKAL CHAND - Appellant
Versus
HUKAM CHAND-NATH MAL (A FIRM) - Respondents
On Appeal from the Chief Court of the Punjab.
Decided On : Feb. 21. 1921.
Solicitors for appellant : T. L. Wilson & Co.
Earnings of a joint Hindu family member are partible if the specialized education qualifying them for the profession was funded by the family estate. The burden of proof lies with the member to prove the education was not family-funded to claim the earnings as separate property.
Headnote:(A) Mitakshara Law - Joint Hindu Family - Partibility of earnings from specialized education - Where a member of a joint Hindu family receives special training to qualify for a profession or state service at the expense of the joint family property, the subsequent gains and emoluments are regarded as joint family property and are partible among the members - Such earnings are viewed as the fruits of a family investment made in the person of a member.
(B) Burden of Proof - In a joint Hindu family possessed of ancestral property, there is a presumption that the acquisitions of members are partible - The burden of proof lies on the member to establish that their specialized education was obtained without the use of family funds, such as through scholarships, charitable benefactions, or self-taught efforts, to claim the resulting earnings as separate property.
(C) Nature of Gains - The fact that emoluments are the result of personal industry, integrity, or merit does not render them impartible if the qualifying specialized education was funded by the joint family - The distinction between direct and indirect fruits of specialized education is not recognized; the member becomes a continuing investment for the family benefit, and the personal element of the individual's character does not negate partibility.
Facts of the case:
A suit was instituted to recover sums based on hundis issued by a joint Hindu family business. One member, who had spent several years abroad for specialized professional training and subsequently held a high-ranking official position, contended that he was not personally liable and that his official earnings were separate property, as he had not participated in the family business and his income resulted from his own industry.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the professional training received by the member was specialized and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed to have been funded by the joint family. Consequently, the earnings from the resulting official position are partible joint family property and liable for the satisfaction of the decree.
Issues: Whether the earnings of a member of a joint Hindu family, acquired after receiving specialized professional training, are partible joint family property or the separate property of the member, particularly when the training is presumed to have been funded by the family estate.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Mitakshara law, while gains from one's own labor are generally impartible, gains from "science" or specialized learning are partible if the learning was acquired at the expense of the family property. The burden of proof rests on the member to show the education was not family-funded. Once the education is established as a family investment, the resulting emoluments are joint property, regardless of the personal effort or merit involved in achieving the specific rank or salary.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
family law
-
hindu law
-
joint family property
- partibility of earnings
-
joint family property
-
hindu law
-
practice and procedure
-
evidence
- burden of proof
-
evidence
Judgement
Appeal (No. 122 of 1919) by special leave from a judgment and decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab (May 19, 1916) varying a decree of the District Judge, Ferozepur.
The suit was instituted by the respondent firm in the Court of the District Judge, Ferozepur, against the
present appellant and his four brothers, the sons of Joti Mal deceased, to recover the sum of Rs. 7200 upon four hundis given to the respondent firm by the firm Nagar Mal-Jot Mal in respect of a balance due on account between the two firms. The defendants, including the appellant, were members of a joint Hindu family, which carried on under the style of the debtor firm an ancestral money-lending business in respect of which the hundis had been given.
The appellant by his written statement pleaded that he had no personal knowledge of the hundis, or anything in connection with them ; that he had never participated in the business of the family ; and that even if the claim was proved there could be no personal decree against him. The respondents by a replication to the appellants statement pleaded that his want of knowledge did not affect the respondents rights, and that he was a member of a joint Hindu family with his father and brothers, and was personally liable.
The only issue material to the appeal was as follows " Are Mr. Gopal Chand and Lala Amar Nath not necessary parties, and personally or in their property liable for the hundis ? " The defendant Amar Nath was a pleader, and had filed a defence similar to that of the appellant.
It appeared that the appellant in his youth spent seven years—i.e., 1892 to 1899—in England for the purpose of a special educational training for the Indian Civil Service, into which he had passed by examination, and that he held therein the post of a joint magistrate.
The District Judge rejected certain defences raised on the form of the hundis and on an alleged absence of presentation, and held all the defendants to be personally liable.
The present appellant and Amar Nath appealed to the Chief Court. The learned judges who heard the appeal held that the present appellant and Amar Nath were liable not personally but to the extent of their respective shares in the whole joint property. They differed however on the question whether the separate earnings of the then appellants formed part of that estate ; le Rossignol J. was of opinion that they did, and Shah Din J. was of opinion that they did not. This difference of opinion arose from the circumstance that there was no evidence to show whether or not the educational training of the appellants had been at the expense of the joint family.
The following question was therefore referred to Rattigan J. under s. 98 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 "In a case where a member of a joint Hindu family has received a special training to qualify himself for a profession or for the service of State, is there an initial presumption in the absence of all evidence on the point, that he received his training at the expense of the joint family property, or should this fact be alleged and proved like any other fact in a case and be found in the negative if no evidence at all were given on either side ? " The opinion of Rattigan J. coinciding with that of le Rossignol J., the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench, and a decree was passed declaring as follows " That the appellants are liable on the hundis in suit to the extent of their shares in the joint family property and that the separate property of the appellant Gokal Chand shall be held to be joint family property liable for the satisfaction of the decree. This decree shall be against the defendants shares in the joint family property, which shall be deemed to include Gokal Chands separate property."
The Chief Court rejected an application for leave to appeal, but special leave to appeal was granted by the Judicial Committee to the present appellant and Amar Nath. The latter, however, did not appear.
1920. Nov. 19, 20. De Gruyt
