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1930 Supreme(SC) 88
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ATKIN, LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, AND SIR JOHN WALLIS.
GOVIND RAO - Appellant
Versus
RAJABAI (DEFENDANTS) - Respondents
On Appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces.
Decided On : Dec. 19. 1930.
Solicitor for appellants: H. S. L. Polak.
Solicitors for respondent No. 2: T. L. Wilson & Co.
After a joint family separates, any undivided immovable property is no longer considered joint family property for the purpose of Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and is instead subject to adverse possession under Article 144.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Schedule I, Articles 127 and 144 - Joint Family Property - Adverse Possession - Whether property remains joint family property for the purpose of limitation after a separation in business and residence has occurred - If a separation has taken place, any immovable joint property that remains undivided is no longer treated as joint family property under Article 127 but is subject to the laws of adverse possession under Article 144.
(B) Joint Family Business - Presumption of Jointness - While living together and being joint in food, residence, and worship may raise a presumption of a joint family business, such presumption can be rebutted by evidence of separate business operations, the opening of separate accounts, and the subsequent conduct of the parties, including the acceptance of separate properties upon attaining majority.
Facts of the case:
The appellants claimed survivorship to properties, alleging they were joint family properties. The respondents contended that the business was the separate property of the senior branch. Evidence indicated that while the ancestors lived together, the surviving brothers had established separate businesses decades prior. The first appellant had accepted certain properties as his separate estate upon attaining majority and had not claimed a share in the senior branch's business for over twenty years until the death of the last male member of that branch.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the two branches of the family and their businesses had long been separate. The claim for the properties was rejected as the evidence of separate business operations and the conduct of the parties after attaining majority were conclusive. Regarding the villages, the court held that the possession by the respondents was adverse for more than the statutory period.
Issues: Whether the money-lending business was joint family property or separate; whether a separation occurred in 1865; and whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 144 or governed by Article 127 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that the act of opening separate businesses and the subsequent conduct of the parties—specifically the acceptance of separate property and the failure to claim management of the joint business—established a separation. Consequently, the property ceased to be joint family property, making Article 144 applicable instead of Article 127. Possession by one branch against another after separation constitutes adverse possession if the title is denied and profits are exclusively enjoyed.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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family law
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hindu law
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joint family property
- survivorship
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joint family property
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hindu law
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property law
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adverse possession
- limitation act
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adverse possession
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practice and procedure
- evidence
Judgement
Appeal (No. 91 of 1929) from two decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (March 20, 1924) varying a decree of the District Judge of Nagpur (December 14, 1920).
In 1917 the appellants, father and son, brought the present suit for possession of properties specified in schedules to the plaint. They alleged that all the properties were joint family properties on June 21, 1916, and that on the death on that date of one Narayan Rao, they were entitled by survivorship.
The trial judge held that the only property in suit which was joint family property consisted of four villages and a half share in a shop. He held that there had been adverse possession for more than twelve years of all the property except the shop. But he held that as the plaintiffs had been in enjoyment of the rent of the shop their claim in respect of the four villages was not barred, having regard to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 127. [He referred to Kumarappa Chettiar v. Saminatha Chettiar , (( 1918) I. L. R. 42 M. 431.)] He accordingly decreed the plaintiffs their shares in the villages and shop, and subject thereto dismissed the suit.
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. The plaintiffs appeal was dismissed, and the defendants appeal was allowed as to the four villages. It was held that the four villages were not joint property, and that the suit as to them also was barred by adverse possession under art. 144.
1930. Oct. 21, 23, 24 ; Nov. 17, 18, 20. Dube for the appellants.
Upjohn K.C. and Parikh for the second respondent.
The arguments were almost entirely upon the question whether the evidence showed that the property was joint family property or not. The argument for the appellants with regard to limitation of the suit so far as it related to the four villages appears from the present judgment; it was contended for the respondents that it had been rightly held on appeal that the claim thereto was barred by art. 144.
1930. Dec. 19. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
SIR JOHN WALLIS. The parties to this suit belong to a family of Mahratta Brahmins from Berar, who ever since the year 1839 have been carrying on business as money lenders or bankers at Pardi, three or four miles from Nagpur in the Central Provinces.
The property in suit, which is valued at two crores of rupees (considerably more than one and a-half millions sterling), was acquired in the business carried on by the senior branch of the family at Pardi and in recent years at Nagpur. In 1916, Narayan Rao II. (so described to distinguish him from the common ancestor of the same name), who was then the sole survivor of the senior branch, died, leaving an infant daughter, but no male issue. Thereupon Govind Rao, the first plaintiff, who with his son, the second plaintiff, now represents the junior branch of the family, claimed to have become entitled by survivorship to the whole of the suit property as the joint family property of the undivided family, and in 1917 filed the present suit in the District Court of Nagpur, impleading as first defendant Narayan Rao II.s daughter and as second defendant a boy who is alleged to have been adopted by his widow. This adoption was disputed by the plaintiffs, and was made the subject of an issue which it was found unnecessary to decide.
The relationship of the parties and their descent from the common ancestor are shown in the following genealogical table—
Narayan Rao 1.
|
| | | |
Gopal Panth Tanbaji = Ramchandra Sonbaji = Sitabai
(died 1885) Laxmibai. alias Babaji . (died 1880) = died
1887)
| = Gangabai. |
Ganapatrao (Tanbaji and Ramchandra Govind Rao
(died 1913) predeceased Gopalpanth and (adopted; Appellant
Sonbaji). No. 1).
| = |
Narayan Rao Chandrabhagabai Sadasheo alias
II= (adopted (died Feb. 8, 1916) Baburao.(Appellant
in 1874; died No. 2)
June 21,
1916)
|
| |
Anna alias Rajabai
Madhorao (Respondent No.
(alleged 1)
adopted son;
Respondent
No. 2)
The defe
